Peter Frederick Strawson
Jeśli nie ma króla Francji, zdanie „król Francji jest łysy” nie jest fałszywe, lecz chybia – a nasza praktyka obwiniania i odczuwania urazy nie potrzebuje metafizycznego uzasadnienia.
Umiejscowienie
Filozof z Oksfordu: wbrew Russellowi zdanie „Obecny król Francji jest łysy” raczej presuponuje, niż stwierdza, że istnieje król; „metafizyka opisowa” ciał i osób; odpowiedzialność ugruntowana w postawach reaktywnych, takich jak uraza.
Kluczowe idee
- Presupozycja („On Referring”)
- Metafizyka opisowa
- Osoby jako podstawowe indywidua
- Postawy reaktywne
Nauczyciele: Paul Grice
Uczniowie: John Searle
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 3
David Hume
pod wpływem
Strawson took from Hume a naturalist answer to scepticism: belief in bodies and induction are inescapable natural commitments that neither need nor admit justification (Skepticism and Naturalism, 1985). P. F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (1985); SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”
Źródło: szkic AI
David Hume › 1711–1776
Immanuel Kant
pod wpływem
Strawson reconstructed the analytic core of Kant’s Critique – the conditions of any experience intelligible to us – while rejecting transcendental idealism (The Bounds of Sense, 1966). P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (1966); Individuals (1959); SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Immanuel Kant › 1724–1804
Paul Grice nauczyciel(ka)
nauczyciel(ka)
Grice was one of Strawson’s two philosophy tutors, with J. D. Mabbott, when Strawson read PPE at St John’s College, Oxford (1937–40); they later wrote ‘In Defense of a Dogma’ (1956) together. SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”; P. F. Strawson, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson (1998)
Źródło: szkic AI
Paul Grice › 1913–1988
Wpływ na 1
John Searle uczeń/uczennica
uczeń/uczennica
Strawson was Searle’s tutor at Oxford; Searle credited him without hesitation with having truly taught him how to do philosophy, recalled tutorials for which his essay was due a day in advance, and the two became close friends. J. R. Searle, interview with T. Crane, CRASSH, University of Cambridge (9 June 2014)
Źródło: szkic AI
John Searle › 1932–2025
Krytyka
Krytykuje 2
Bertrand Russell
krytykuje
Strawson objected that Russell’s theory of descriptions confuses sentences with uses: ‘The King of France is bald’ presupposes, not asserts, that a king exists (‘On Referring’, 1950). P. F. Strawson, “On Referring”, Mind 59 (1950), 320–344; Russell’s reply: “Mr. Strawson on Referring”, Mind 66 (1957)
Źródło: szkic AI
Bertrand Russell › 1872–1970
Willard Van Orman Quine
krytykuje
In ‘In Defense of a Dogma’ (1956), written with Grice, Strawson argued that Quine’s doubts about analyticity would make the notions of synonymy and meaning itself unintelligible. H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson, “In Defense of a Dogma”, Philosophical Review 65 (1956); P. F. Strawson, “Propositions, Concepts and Logical Truths”, Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1957)
Źródło: szkic AI
Willard Van Orman Quine › 1908–2000
Dzieła
Przeciw teorii deskrypcji Russella: jeśli nie ma króla Francji, „Król Francji jest łysy” nie jest ani prawdziwe, ani fałszywe.
Opisuje, a nie rewiduje strukturę naszego myślenia: ciała materialne i osoby są podstawowymi indywiduami.
Stanowisko
“On Referring” (1950) challenged Russell’s theory of descriptions. Russell had analysed “The King of France is bald” as asserting that there is exactly one king of France and that he is bald, which makes the sentence false. Strawson replied that sentences do not refer – people use them to refer – and that the use of the sentence presupposes that there is a king; if there is none, the question of truth or falsity does not arise. Introduction to Logical Theory (1952) argued that the logical constants do not match the words of ordinary language, a view Grice later answered with his theory of implicature. In Individuals (1959) Strawson contrasted the “revisionary metaphysics” of Descartes or Leibniz with a “descriptive metaphysics” that lays bare the actual structure of our thought, as Aristotle and Kant had done. For us material bodies and persons are the basic particulars, and a person is not a mind attached to a body but something to which both mental and physical predicates apply. The Bounds of Sense (1966) reconstructed Kant’s Critique without transcendental idealism. “Freedom and Resentment” (1962) shifted the debate on free will: our practices of resentment, gratitude and blame are part of human life and need no metaphysical justification.
Życie i kontekst
Peter Frederick Strawson was born in Ealing, London, in 1919 and studied philosophy, politics and economics at St John’s College, Oxford, where H. P. Grice was his tutor. He served in the Royal Artillery and the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers from 1940 to 1946, leaving as a captain. After a year at Bangor he became a fellow of University College, Oxford, in 1948, and from 1968 to 1987 was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College. He was knighted in 1977. Among those he supervised was John Searle; his son Galen Strawson is also a philosopher. He died in London in 2006.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- Introduction to Logical Theory (1952)
- In Defense of a Dogma (with H. P. Grice, 1956)
- Freedom and Resentment (1962)
- The Bounds of Sense (1966)
- Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (1985)
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