David Lewis

Agora

David Lewis

1941–2001

Pierwsze przybliżeniecelowe uproszczenie – portret mówi więcej

Każdy świat możliwy jest tak samo realny jak nasz – a mówienie o możliwościach to mówienie o tym, co dzieje się w tamtych światach.

Umiejscowienie

Filozofia analityczna · Ameryka Północna · Metafizyka, Język

Realizm modalny: wszystkie światy możliwe istnieją równie realnie jak nasz własny.

Kluczowe idee

Realizm modalny
Konwencje
Superweniencja humeańska

Nauczyciele: Willard Van Orman Quine

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Wpływ

Pod wpływem 5

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

pod wpływem
Lewis took up Leibniz’s possible worlds but as concrete, real worlds; his world-bound individuals with counterparts are often compared to Leibniz’s view (On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986). D. Lewis, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968); On the Plurality of Worlds (1986); SEP “David Lewis”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz › 1646–1716
David Hume

pod wpływem
Lewis named his thesis of ‘Humean supervenience’ after Hume, the denier of necessary connections: everything supervenes on the local distribution of particular qualities (Philosophical Papers II, 1986). D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol. II (1986), introduction; “Humean Supervenience Debugged”, Mind 103 (1994); SEP “David Lewis”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
David Hume › 1711–1776
Rudolf Carnap

pod wpływem
Lewis adapted the Ramsey–Carnap method for theoretical terms to define mental states by their causal roles (‘How to Define Theoretical Terms’, 1970; ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, 1972). D. Lewis, “How to Define Theoretical Terms”, Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970); “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972); SEP “David Lewis”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Rudolf Carnap › 1891–1970
Willard Van Orman Quine nauczyciel(ka)

nauczyciel(ka)
Lewis wrote his Harvard dissertation (1967) under Quine; it became Convention (1969), which answers Quine’s doubts about whether language can rest on convention. D. Lewis, Convention (1969), preface
Źródło: szkic AI
Willard Van Orman Quine › 1908–2000
J.J.C. Smart

pod wpływem
Lewis gave Smart’s identity of experiences and brain processes a new argument: experiences are defined by their causal roles, and the occupants of these roles are physical (1966). D. Lewis, “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
Źródło: szkic AI
J.J.C. Smart › 1920–2012

Krytyka

Krytyka ze strony 1

Sally Haslanger

krytyka ze strony
Haslanger defended endurance against Lewis’s argument from temporary intrinsics: things can change their intrinsic properties without having temporal parts (‘Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics’, Analysis, 1989). S. Haslanger, “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”, Analysis 49 (1989), 119–125; D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (1986), 202–204
Źródło: szkic AI
Sally Haslanger › ur. 1955

Krytykuje 2

Saul Kripke

krytykuje
Lewis rejected Kripke’s view that possible worlds are stipulated and share individuals, defending counterpart theory against the ‘Humphrey objection’ (On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986, ch. 4). D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (1986), ch. 4; “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968); S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980)
Źródło: szkic AI
Saul Kripke › 1940–2022
Frank Jackson

krytykuje
Lewis answered Jackson’s knowledge argument with the ability hypothesis: on seeing red, Mary gains abilities to recognise, imagine and remember, not new information (‘What Experience Teaches’, 1988). D. Lewis, “What Experience Teaches”, Proceedings of the Russellian Society 13 (1988); F. Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know”, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986)
Źródło: szkic AI
Frank Jackson › ur. 1943

Dzieła

1986On the Plurality of Worlds (O wielości światów)
Światy możliwe są tak samo realne jak nasz – relacje odpowiedników zamiast identyczności.

Stanowisko

Lewis built a systematic metaphysics of unusual clarity. His best-known and most controversial thesis is modal realism: talk of what is possible or necessary refers to other possible worlds that exist just as concretely as ours, only spatiotemporally separate from it. Things in other worlds are not identical with us but our “counterparts.” Lewis defended this view not out of eccentricity but because it explains modality, counterfactual conditionals, properties and content more economically than its rivals. He also gave an analysis of conventions in game-theoretic terms, a theory of counterfactuals and causation, and the programme of “Humean supervenience,” according to which everything depends on the local distribution of physical qualities.

Życie i kontekst

Lewis was born in Oberlin, Ohio, in 1941 and wrote his dissertation at Harvard under Quine. After teaching at UCLA he spent the rest of his career at Princeton from 1970, with frequent stays in Australia, which he regarded as a second philosophical home. He died in 2001; his papers, collected in several volumes, are among the most cited in analytic philosophy.