Derek Parfit
Tożsamość osobowa w czasie nie jest tym, co się liczy – a dostrzeżenie tego sprawia, że bardziej troszczymy się o innych i mniej boimy się śmierci.
Umiejscowienie
„Racje i osoby”: tożsamość osobowa nie jest tym, co się liczy.
Kluczowe idee
- Redukcjonizm co do osób
- Odrażający wniosek
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 4
Budda Siakjamuni
pod wpływem
Parfit added an appendix “Buddha’s View” to Reasons and Persons (1984), quoting Buddhist texts to show that the Buddha had held the reductionist view of persons he defends. D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984), Appendix J “Buddha’s View”
Źródło: szkic AI
Budda Siakjamuni › ok. 480–400 p.n.e. · datowane umownie 563–483 p.n.e.
John Locke
pod wpływem
Parfit developed Locke’s memory criterion into psychological continuity – overlapping chains of memories, intentions and character – and asked whether identity is what matters (Reasons and Persons, 1984). D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984); J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (2nd ed., 1694), “Of Identity and Diversity”; SEP “Locke on Personal Identity”
Źródło: szkic AI
John Locke › 1632–1704
David Hume
pod wpływem
Parfit’s reductionism about persons – identity is psychological and physical continuity, no further fact – is commonly compared with Hume’s bundle view (Reasons and Persons, 1984). D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984); D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), “Of personal identity”; SEP “Personal Identity”
Źródło: szkic AI
David Hume › 1711–1776
Henry Sidgwick
pod wpływem
Parfit took up Sidgwick’s ‘dualism of practical reason’ between egoism and impartial benevolence and sought to resolve it (Reasons and Persons, 1984; On What Matters, 2011). D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984); On What Matters (2011); H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1874); SEP “Henry Sidgwick”
Źródło: szkic AI
Henry Sidgwick › 1838–1900
Wpływ na 2
Nick Bostrom
wpływ na
Bostrom used Parfit’s comparison of a war killing 99 per cent of humanity with one killing everyone to argue that reducing existential risk is a global priority (2013). N. Bostrom, “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority”, Global Policy 4 (2013); D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984)
Źródło: szkic AI
Nick Bostrom › ur. 1973
William MacAskill
wpływ na
MacAskill built on Parfit’s population ethics, including the repugnant conclusion and the value of future generations, in his case for longtermism (What We Owe the Future, 2022). W. MacAskill, What We Owe the Future (2022); D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984)
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William MacAskill › ur. 1987
Krytyka
Krytykuje 1
Bernard Williams
krytykuje
Parfit rejected Williams’s view that all reasons are internal, grounded in motivations: reasons are given by facts that count in favour of acting (On What Matters, 2011). D. Parfit, “Reasons and Motivation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 71 (1997); On What Matters (2011), vol. 1; B. Williams, “Internal and External Reasons” (1980)
Źródło: szkic AI
Bernard Williams › 1929–2003
Dzieła
Teleportacja, rozszczepienie – tożsamość osobowa nie jest tym, co się liczy.
Kantyści, konsekwencjaliści i kontraktualiści „wspinający się na tę samą górę”.
Stanowisko
In Reasons and Persons Parfit used thought experiments involving teleportation and brain division to argue that personal identity is not a deep further fact. A person is nothing over and above a body, a brain and psychological connections such as memory and character. What matters is this psychological continuity, which comes in degrees – and Parfit found this liberating, as the wall between himself and others became thinner. Its last part became a starting point of population ethics. There Parfit showed that principles which seem plausible imply the “Repugnant Conclusion”: for any population of people who all live very good lives, a much larger population whose lives are barely worth living would be better. The conclusion follows from premises that are hard to reject, yet it strikes most people, Parfit included, as unacceptable; he spent decades looking for a way out. His late work On What Matters argued that Kantians, consequentialists and contractualists are “climbing the same mountain on different sides.”
Życie i kontekst
Parfit was born in 1942 in Chengdu, China, to British medical missionaries and grew up in Oxford. He first studied history before turning to philosophy. Almost his entire career was spent at All Souls College, Oxford, with regular visiting positions at Harvard, New York University and Rutgers. He was famous for working on his books with extreme perfectionism for many years.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- Personal Identity (1971)
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