戈特洛布·弗雷格
在弗雷格看来，逻辑可以像数学一样精确地书写，而一个词既有涵义——它呈现某物的方式——也有指称——它所指出的东西。
定位
现代逻辑的创立者；区分了涵义与指称。
核心思想
- 《概念文字》（Begriffsschrift）
- 涵义与指称
- 逻辑主义
老师: 鲁道夫·赫尔曼·陆宰, 库诺·费舍
学生: 鲁道夫·卡尔纳普
影响
受影响于 4
戈特弗里德·威廉·莱布尼茨
受其影响
Frege presented his Begriffsschrift (1879) as a step towards Leibniz’s universal characteristic and adopted Leibniz’s definition of identity as substitutability salva veritate (Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884). G. Frege, Begriffsschrift (1879), preface; Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); SEP “Leibniz’s Influence on 19th Century Logic”; SEP “Gottlob Frege”
依据: AI 草稿
戈特弗里德·威廉·莱布尼茨 › 1646–1716
弗里德里希·阿道夫·特兰德伦堡
受其影响
In the preface to the Begriffsschrift Frege refers to Trendelenburg’s essay on Leibniz’s plan for a universal characteristic when he presents his concept-script as a step toward Leibniz’s ideal. Frege, Begriffsschrift (1879), preface and note 2, in van Heijenoort (ed.), From Frege to Gödel (1967), p. 6; cf. SEP “Gottlob Frege” §2.1
依据: AI 草稿
弗里德里希·阿道夫·特兰德伦堡 › 1802–1872
鲁道夫·赫尔曼·陆宰 师从
师从
Frege heard Lotze’s lectures on the philosophy of religion at Göttingen, the only philosophy course he took there, though Potter finds no philosophical teacher of central importance in Frege’s education. M. Potter, “Introduction”, in Potter and Ricketts (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Frege (2010), p. 1; SEP “Hermann Lotze” (D. Sullivan) names Frege a direct student
依据: AI 草稿
受其影响
Frege’s early set of key sentences about logic is a response to Lotze’s Logic of 1874, taking up the separation of thoughts from ideas but grounding it in the objectivity of truth rather than in value. M. Potter, “Introduction”, Cambridge Companion to Frege (2010), pp. 2–3, after M. Dummett, Frege and Other Philosophers (1991) and F. Hovens, History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (1997)
依据: AI 草稿
鲁道夫·赫尔曼·陆宰 › 1817–1881
库诺·费舍 师从
师从
The only philosophy Frege heard at Jena was Fischer’s lecture course on Kant’s critical philosophy. M. Potter, “Introduction”, Cambridge Companion to Frege (2010), p. 1
依据: AI 草稿
库诺·费舍 › 1824–1907
影响了 4
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普 教过
教过 ✓
Carnap attended Frege’s courses in Jena – Begriffsschrift I and II (1910–11, 1913) and Logic in Mathematics (1914) – as one of very few students; he later recalled them as his introduction to modern logic. R. Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963)
依据: AI 草稿
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普 › 1891–1970
迈克尔·达米特
影响了
Dummett read Frege as the founder of analytic philosophy, whose theory of sense makes the theory of meaning the foundation of philosophy (Frege: Philosophy of Language, 1973). M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (1973); Origins of Analytical Philosophy (1993); SEP “Gottlob Frege”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
迈克尔·达米特 › 1925–2011
J. N. 莫汉蒂
影响了
Mohanty used Frege’s distinction of sense and reference to compare him with Husserl, arguing in Husserl and Frege (1982) that Husserl reached it independently. J. N. Mohanty, Husserl and Frege (1982)
依据: AI 草稿
J. N. 莫汉蒂 › 1928–2023
约翰·塞尔
影响了
Searle developed Frege’s view that proper names have a sense into a cluster theory of names (‘Proper Names’, 1958) and defended a Fregean account of reference (Intentionality, 1983). J. R. Searle, “Proper Names”, Mind 67 (1958); Speech Acts (1969); Intentionality (1983)
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
约翰·塞尔 › 1932–2025
批评
相互批评 2
格奥尔格·康托尔 ⇄ 相互
批评了
Frege’s 1892 review of Cantor’s collected papers on the transfinite (and an unpublished draft of 1890) objects to Cantor’s appeal to mental abstraction. Frege, review of Cantor, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100 (1892), 269–272, tr. in Collected Papers (1984), pp. 178–181
依据: AI 草稿
受其批评
Cantor’s 1885 review of Frege’s Grundlagen objected to Frege’s attempt to define number through extensions of concepts. P. Ebert and M. Rossberg, “Cantor on Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic”, History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2009), 341–348
依据: AI 草稿
格奥尔格·康托尔 › 1845–1918
朱塞佩·皮亚诺 ⇄ 相互
批评了
In 1897 Frege compared Peano’s logical notation with his own and defended the superiority of his concept-script. Frege, “Über die Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano und meine eigene” (1897), listed in SEP “Frege’s Logic” (R. Cook, 2023)
依据: AI 草稿
受其批评 存在争议
Peano’s 1895 review of Frege’s Grundgesetze I in the Rivista di matematica prompted Frege’s replies of 1896–97; what exactly Peano objected to was not checked. Bibliographic data from the Frege–Peano literature (G. Besler; Rivista di matematica 5, 1895, 122–128 and 6, 1896–99, 53–61); review text not read
依据: AI 草稿
朱塞佩·皮亚诺 › 1858–1932
受批评于 4
伯特兰·罗素 影响了
影响了 ✓
Russell recognised Frege’s logicism as close to his own, expounded it in an appendix to The Principles of Mathematics (1903) and continued it in Principia Mathematica (1910–13). B. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics (1903), appendix A; A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematica (1910–13); SEP “Bertrand Russell”
受其批评
In a letter of 16 June 1902 Russell showed that Frege’s Basic Law V yields a contradiction; ‘On Denoting’ (1905) rejected Frege’s distinction of sense and reference. B. Russell to G. Frege, 16 June 1902, in J. van Heijenoort (ed.), From Frege to Gödel (1967); “On Denoting”, Mind 14 (1905); G. Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik II (1903), appendix
依据: AI 草稿
伯特兰·罗素 › 1872–1970
路德维希·维特根斯坦 影响了
影响了 ✓
Wittgenstein, who visited Frege (1911), thanked ‘the great works of Frege’ in the Tractatus preface and adopted his principle that names have meaning only in propositions (1921). L. Wittgenstein, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (completed 1918; publ. 1921), preface; G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
受其批评
Wittgenstein rejected Frege’s view that sentences name truth-values and that logical constants represent anything; Frege’s assertion sign he called logically meaningless (Tractatus, 1921, 4.0312, 4.431, 4.442). L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), 3.143, 4.0312, 4.431, 4.442; Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953), § 71
依据: AI 草稿
路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951
希拉里·普特南
受其批评
Putnam’s Twin Earth case denied that the Fregean sense a speaker grasps fixes a term’s extension: ‘meanings just ain’t in the head’ (‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, 1975). H. Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1975), 131–193
依据: AI 草稿
希拉里·普特南 › 1926–2016
索尔·克里普克
受其批评
Kripke rejected the Fregean view that a name’s descriptive sense fixes its reference: names are rigid designators, tied to bearers by a causal chain (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; book 1980), Lectures I–II
依据: AI 草稿
索尔·克里普克 › 1940–2022
批评了 4
伊曼努尔·康德 受其影响
受其影响
Frege kept Kant’s view that geometry rests on a priori intuition and recast his analytic–synthetic distinction as concerning how a truth is justified (Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884). G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); SEP “Gottlob Frege”
依据: AI 草稿
批评了
Frege argued against Kant that arithmetic is analytic, not synthetic a priori, and that Kant underestimated analytic judgements; geometry he left to intuition (Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884). G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), §§ 5, 12–13, 88–90
依据: AI 草稿
伊曼努尔·康德 › 1724–1804
约翰·斯图尔特·密尔
批评了
Frege rejected Mill’s view of numbers as properties of aggregates and of arithmetic as inductive, mocking it as an arithmetic of pebbles and gingerbread (Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884, §§ 7–11). G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), §§ 7–11, 23–25; J. S. Mill, A System of Logic (1843), book II, ch. 6
依据: AI 草稿
约翰·斯图尔特·密尔 › 1806–1873
埃德蒙德·胡塞尔 影响了
影响了 存在争议 ✓
Husserl discussed Frege’s Grundlagen in Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891); whether Frege’s critical review (1894) prompted his turn against psychologism in the Logical Investigations (1900–01) is disputed. G. Frege, review of E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 103 (1894); D. Føllesdal, Husserl und Frege (1958); J. N. Mohanty, Husserl and Frege (1982); SEP “Edmund Husserl”
批评了
In his 1894 review of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891) Frege charged it with psychologism, confusing subjective presentations with objective concepts and numbers. G. Frege, review of E. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik I, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 103 (1894), 313–332
依据: AI 草稿
埃德蒙德·胡塞尔 › 1859–1938
大卫·希尔伯特
批评了
Frege objected to Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry (1899) that axioms cannot implicitly define their terms but must be true statements, and that consistency does not prove existence. Frege–Hilbert correspondence, Dec. 1899–1900; G. Frege, “Über die Grundlagen der Geometrie”, Jahresbericht der DMV 12 (1903) and 15 (1906); SEP “The Frege–Hilbert Controversy”
依据: AI 草稿
大卫·希尔伯特 › 1862–1943
作品
立场
Frege is the founder of modern logic and of analytic philosophy of language. In his Begriffsschrift he created a formal language that could express mathematical reasoning without gaps, introducing quantifiers and the analysis of sentences into function and argument. He aimed to show that arithmetic can be derived from logic alone, and that numbers are objective logical objects, not mental images. His distinction between sense and reference explains why “the morning star is the evening star” is informative: both expressions refer to Venus but present it in different ways. His insistence on the objectivity of thought, against psychologism, shaped Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap and the whole analytic tradition.
生平与背景
Frege, born in Wismar on the Baltic, studied mathematics, physics and philosophy in Jena and Göttingen and taught mathematics at Jena for his whole career. His work received little recognition during his lifetime. In 1902 a letter from the young Russell showed that his system contained a contradiction, a blow from which his logicist project never recovered. His diary of 1924, published in 1994, reveals virulent antisemitic and anti-democratic views.
其他主要作品
- Begriffsschrift (1879)
- The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884)
- On Sense and Reference (1892)
- Basic Laws of Arithmetic (1893–1903)
- The Thought (1918)
出现在
- 旅程 ‘语言转向’ · 第 1 站，共 10 站
截至 2026年11月 · 来源 · 改进本页 · Agora 是如何制作的