W. V. O. 奎因
意义的真理与事实的真理之间没有截然的界线；我们的信念作为一张网，共同面对经验。
定位
《经验论的两个教条》：分析与综合之间没有明确的界线；认识论被自然化。
核心思想
- 整体论
- 翻译的不确定性
- 自然化认识论
老师: 阿尔弗雷德·诺思·怀特海
影响
受影响于 4
约翰·杜威
受其影响
Quine declared himself bound to Dewey by naturalism and shared his view of meaning as a matter of public behaviour, against the ‘museum myth’ (‘Ontological Relativity’, 1968). W. V. Quine, “Ontological Relativity” (Dewey Lectures 1968), Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (1969); SEP “Willard Van Orman Quine”
依据: AI 草稿
约翰·杜威 › 1859–1952
阿尔弗雷德·诺思·怀特海 师从
师从
Quine took his PhD at Harvard in 1932, after two years, under Whitehead with The Logic of Sequences, a generalisation of Principia Mathematica. W. V. Quine, The Time of My Life (1985)
依据: AI 草稿
阿尔弗雷德·诺思·怀特海 › 1861–1947
伯特兰·罗素
受其影响
Quine generalised Principia Mathematica in his dissertation (1932) and used Russell’s theory of descriptions to dissolve the riddle of non-being (‘On What There Is’, 1948). W. V. Quine, The Logic of Sequences: A Generalization of Principia Mathematica (dissertation 1932; publ. 1990); “On What There Is”, Review of Metaphysics 2 (1948); SEP “Willard Van Orman Quine”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
伯特兰·罗素 › 1872–1970
奥托·纽拉特
受其影响
Quine set Neurath’s image of sailors rebuilding their ship on the open sea as motto of Word and Object (1960), summing up a naturalism without foundations outside science. W. V. Quine, Word and Object (1960); O. Neurath, “Protokollsätze”, Erkenntnis 3 (1932); SEP “Otto Neurath”
依据: AI 草稿
奥托·纽拉特 › 1882–1945
影响了 6
托马斯·S. 库恩
影响了
Kuhn credited Quine with opening for him the puzzles of the analytic–synthetic distinction, a background to his holistic view of scientific concepts (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, preface). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), preface; W. V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
依据: AI 草稿
托马斯·S. 库恩 › 1922–1996
希拉里·普特南
影响了
Putnam developed Quine’s point that mathematics is indispensable to science into an argument for mathematical realism (Philosophy of Logic, 1971), known as the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument. H. Putnam, Philosophy of Logic (1971); “The Analytic and the Synthetic” (1962); SEP “Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
希拉里·普特南 › 1926–2016
理查德·罗蒂
影响了
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) Rorty combined Quine’s attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction with Sellars’s on the Given to argue for epistemological behaviourism. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951); SEP “Richard Rorty”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
理查德·罗蒂 › 1931–2007
比马尔·克里希纳·马蒂拉尔
影响了
Matilal, who studied with Quine at Harvard, applied modern logic and questions of reference and ontology to Indian theories (Logic, Language and Reality, 1985). B. K. Matilal, Logic, Language and Reality (1985); J. Ganeri (ed.), Mind, Language and World: The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal (2002)
依据: AI 草稿
比马尔·克里希纳·马蒂拉尔 › 1935–1991
戴维·刘易斯 教过
教过
Lewis wrote his Harvard dissertation (1967) under Quine; it became Convention (1969), which answers Quine’s doubts about whether language can rest on convention. D. Lewis, Convention (1969), preface
依据: AI 草稿
戴维·刘易斯 › 1941–2001
丹尼尔·丹尼特 教过
教过 ✓
Dennett studied with Quine at Harvard (BA 1963) and wrote his senior thesis in critical engagement with him; for his doctorate he went to Ryle in Oxford. D. C. Dennett, I’ve Been Thinking (2023)
依据: AI 草稿
丹尼尔·丹尼特 › 1942–2024
批评
相互批评 1
鲁思·巴肯·马库斯 ⇄ 相互
批评了
Quine objected that quantified modal logic, which Barcan Marcus first formalised (1946), founders on referential opacity and commits one to ‘Aristotelian essentialism’ (‘Reference and Modality’, 1953). W. V. O. Quine, “Reference and Modality”, in From a Logical Point of View (1953); “Three Grades of Modal Involvement” (1953); R. C. Barcan, Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (1946)
依据: AI 草稿
受其批评
Against Quine, Barcan Marcus argued that quantified modal logic is coherent: proper names are mere ‘tags’, and identities between them hold necessarily (‘Modalities and Intensional Languages’, 1961). R. Barcan Marcus, “Modalities and Intensional Languages”, Synthese 13 (1961), 303–322, with Quine’s comments (Boston Colloquium)
依据: AI 草稿
鲁思·巴肯·马库斯 › 1921–2012
受批评于 4
H. P. 格莱斯
受其批评
With Strawson, Grice defended the analytic–synthetic distinction against Quine: its ordinary use is shared and teachable, so its intelligibility cannot be denied (‘In Defense of a Dogma’, 1956). H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson, “In Defense of a Dogma”, Philosophical Review 65 (1956), 141–158
依据: AI 草稿
H. P. 格莱斯 › 1913–1988
唐纳德·戴维森 教过
教过 ✓
Davidson attended Quine’s courses as a Harvard student around 1939; his own dissertation (1949) was on Plato’s Philebus, and he later described Quine as the strongest influence on his philosophy. D. Davidson, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (1999)
依据: AI 草稿
受其批评
Davidson rejected the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, which Quine kept, as a ‘third dogma of empiricism’ (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); “Meaning, Truth and Evidence”, in R. Barrett & R. Gibson (eds.), Perspectives on Quine (1990)
依据: AI 草稿
唐纳德·戴维森 › 1917–2003
P. F. 斯特劳森
受其批评
In ‘In Defense of a Dogma’ (1956), written with Grice, Strawson argued that Quine’s doubts about analyticity would make the notions of synonymy and meaning itself unintelligible. H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson, “In Defense of a Dogma”, Philosophical Review 65 (1956); P. F. Strawson, “Propositions, Concepts and Logical Truths”, Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1957)
依据: AI 草稿
P. F. 斯特劳森 › 1919–2006
索尔·克里普克
受其批评
Kripke rejected Quine’s claim that quantified modal logic and essentialism are unintelligible: with rigid designators, de re necessity is coherent and intuitively grounded (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lecture I; “Identity and Necessity” (1971)
依据: AI 草稿
索尔·克里普克 › 1940–2022
批评了 1
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普 受其影响
受其影响
Quine met Carnap in Prague (1933), read Logische Syntax in typescript and presented it in Harvard lectures (1934); he called Carnap his teacher (‘Homage to Rudolf Carnap’, 1970). W. V. Quine, “Lectures on Carnap” (1934), in R. Creath (ed.), Dear Carnap, Dear Van (1990); “Homage to Rudolf Carnap” (1970); SEP “Willard Van Orman Quine”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
批评了
In ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951) Quine rejected Carnap’s analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism: statements face the tribunal of experience only as a corporate body. W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951), 20–43; “Carnap and Logical Truth” (1963)
依据: AI 草稿
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普 › 1891–1970
作品
立场
Quine questioned two pillars of logical empiricism. There is, he argued in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” no sharp line between analytic truths (true by meaning alone) and synthetic truths (true by experience). Nor can individual sentences be tested in isolation: our beliefs face experience only as a whole, like a web in which even logic could in principle be revised. From this followed a radical naturalism: philosophy is not a foundation prior to science but continuous with it, and epistemology becomes a chapter of psychology. With the thought experiment of “gavagai” he argued that translation is indeterminate: incompatible translation manuals can fit all possible evidence equally well, and there is no further fact of the matter about which is right. His holism and naturalism set the agenda of analytic philosophy for decades.
生平与背景
Quine was born in Akron, Ohio, in 1908 and earned his doctorate at Harvard under Alfred North Whitehead. A European journey in 1932–33 brought him to Carnap in Prague and to the logicians of Vienna and Warsaw. Apart from naval service in the Second World War he spent his whole career at Harvard, and is often counted the most influential American philosopher of his generation.
其他主要作品
- On What There Is (1948)
- Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951)
- From a Logical Point of View (1953)
- Word and Object (1960)
- Epistemology Naturalized (1969)
出现在
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