威尔弗里德·塞拉斯
在经验中没有任何东西是不借助概念而简单地给予我们的——认识意味着能够给出理由，处于理由的空间之中。
定位
对“所予的神话”的批判；显象的意象与科学的意象。
核心思想
- 所予的神话
- 理由的空间
影响
受影响于 4
伊曼努尔·康德
受其影响
Sellars took up Kant’s distinction between sensibility and understanding for his account of sensory and conceptual elements in perception (Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes, 1968). W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (John Locke Lectures 1965–66; publ. 1968); SEP “Wilfrid Sellars”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
伊曼努尔·康德 › 1724–1804
查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔士
受其影响
Sellars took over Peirce’s idea of truth as the ideal end of inquiry, calling the final conceptual framework of science ‘Peirceish’ (Science and Metaphysics, 1968). W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (1968); SEP “Wilfrid Sellars”; SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔士 › 1839–1914
路德维希·维特根斯坦
受其影响
Sellars took up Wittgenstein’s language games and met the regress of rules with pattern-governed behaviour that precedes explicit rule-obeying (‘Some Reflections on Language Games’, 1954). W. Sellars, “Some Reflections on Language Games”, Philosophy of Science 21 (1954); SEP “Wilfrid Sellars”
依据: AI 草稿
路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普
受其影响
Sellars developed Carnap’s logical syntax and semantics into a ‘pure pragmatics’ of rule-governed language, the frame of his later epistemology (‘Pure Pragmatics and Epistemology’, 1947). W. Sellars, “Pure Pragmatics and Epistemology”, Philosophy of Science 14 (1947); “Autobiographical Reflections” (1975); SEP “Wilfrid Sellars”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普 › 1891–1970
影响了 1
理查德·罗蒂
影响了
Rorty took Sellars’s critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’ (1956) as a key argument against foundationalism, later introducing the 1997 edition of the essay. W. Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956), introd. R. Rorty (1997); R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); SEP “Richard Rorty”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
理查德·罗蒂 › 1931–2007
批评
批评了 2
伯特兰·罗素
批评了
Sellars argued that Russell’s acquaintance either involves concepts or is not knowledge (‘Acquaintance and Description Again’, 1949), later calling such views the ‘Myth of the Given’ (1956). W. Sellars, “Acquaintance and Description Again”, Journal of Philosophy 46 (1949); “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (1956); B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1912), ch. 5
依据: AI 草稿
伯特兰·罗素 › 1872–1970
A. J. 艾耶尔
批评了
Sellars’s ‘Myth of the Given’ critique targeted sense-datum theories; he examined Ayer’s view of sense-datum talk as ‘another language’ (‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, 1956, §§ 8–9). W. Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (1956), part II, §§ 8–9; A. J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940)
依据: AI 草稿
A. J. 艾耶尔 › 1910–1989
作品
- 1956经验论与心灵哲学
所予的神话。
立场
Sellars’ most famous target was the “myth of the given”: the idea that knowledge rests on a foundation of pure sensory givens that are known without any concepts. Even the simplest perceptual report, he argued, already stands in the “logical space of reasons” – it can be justified and challenged and presupposes mastery of a whole conceptual system. Sellars also described the tension between the “manifest image” of the world, in which we experience ourselves as persons, and the “scientific image” of particles and processes, and sought to unite them in a single “stereoscopic” view. His work founded the so-called Pittsburgh School; Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom and John McDowell built on it.
生平与背景
Sellars was born in Ann Arbor in 1912, the son of the philosopher Roy Wood Sellars. He studied in Michigan, Buffalo and, as a Rhodes Scholar, at Oxford, then taught in Iowa, Minnesota and at Yale. From 1963 he worked at the University of Pittsburgh. With Herbert Feigl he founded the journal Philosophical Studies.
其他主要作品
- Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1956)
- Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man (1962)
- Science, Perception and Reality (1963)
- Science and Metaphysics (1968)
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