唐纳德·戴维森
理由是我们行为的原因，而要理解别人所说的话，我们必须假定他们所相信的大部分是真的。
定位
理由就是原因；每一种解释都需要善意原则。
核心思想
- 异常一元论
- 彻底解释
- 善意原则
老师: W. V. O. 奎因
影响
受影响于 2
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普
受其影响 ✓
Davidson worked through Carnap’s semantics of extension and intension (Schilpp volume, 1963) before replacing meanings with a Tarskian theory of truth (‘Truth and Meaning’, 1967). D. Davidson, “The Method of Extension and Intension”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); “Truth and Meaning”, Synthese 17 (1967); SEP “Donald Davidson”
依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普 › 1891–1970
阿尔弗雷德·塔斯基
受其影响 ✓
Davidson turned Tarski’s Convention T around: a theory that yields a T-sentence for every sentence of a language serves as a theory of meaning (‘Truth and Meaning’, 1967). D. Davidson, “Truth and Meaning”, Synthese 17 (1967); A. Tarski, “Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych” (1933; German 1935); SEP “Donald Davidson”
阿尔弗雷德·塔斯基 › 1901–1983
影响了 1
理查德·罗蒂
影响了
Rorty read Davidson’s rejection of the scheme–content distinction and his account of truth as support for pragmatism (‘Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth’, 1986), though Davidson declined the label. R. Rorty, “Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth” (1986), in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991); D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); SEP “Richard Rorty”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
理查德·罗蒂 › 1931–2007
批评
受批评于 1
迈克尔·达米特
受其批评
Dummett objected that Davidson’s truth-conditional theory is merely ‘modest’: it does not explain what knowledge of meaning consists in (‘What is a Theory of Meaning?’, 1975). M. Dummett, “What is a Theory of Meaning?”, in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language (1975); “What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)” (1976)
依据: AI 草稿
迈克尔·达米特 › 1925–2011
批评了 4
吉尔伯特·赖尔
批评了
Davidson rejected Ryle’s view that motives explain as dispositions, not as causes: a reason explains only if the agent acted because of it (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, 1963). D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949), ch. 4
依据: AI 草稿
吉尔伯特·赖尔 › 1900–1976
W. V. O. 奎因 师从
师从 ✓
Davidson attended Quine’s courses as a Harvard student around 1939; his own dissertation (1949) was on Plato’s Philebus, and he later described Quine as the strongest influence on his philosophy. D. Davidson, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (1999)
依据: AI 草稿
批评了
Davidson rejected the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, which Quine kept, as a ‘third dogma of empiricism’ (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); “Meaning, Truth and Evidence”, in R. Barrett & R. Gibson (eds.), Perspectives on Quine (1990)
依据: AI 草稿
W. V. O. 奎因 › 1908–2000
G. E. M. 安斯康姆
批评了
Davidson rejected the view, associated with Anscombe’s Intention (1957), that reasons are not causes: rationalisation is a species of causal explanation (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, 1963). D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963), 685–700; G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (1957)
依据: AI 草稿
G. E. M. 安斯康姆 › 1919–2001
托马斯·S. 库恩
批评了
Davidson rejected the incommensurable conceptual schemes he found in Kuhn: an untranslatable language could not be recognised as language (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 47 (1974), 5–20
依据: AI 草稿
托马斯·S. 库恩 › 1922–1996
作品
- 1963行动、理由与原因
理由就是原因——反对维特根斯坦主义者。
- 1974论概念图式这一观念本身
反对第三个教条：图式与内容。
立场
Davidson connected the philosophy of action, mind and language in a remarkably unified way. Against the Wittgensteinians he argued that the reasons for which we act are also causes of our actions. In “Mental Events” he defended anomalous monism: every mental event is a physical event, yet there are no strict laws linking the mental and the physical. In the theory of meaning he asked how a “radical interpreter” could understand a completely foreign language – only by assuming that the speaker mostly holds true beliefs and is rational (the principle of charity). From this he concluded that the idea of radically different, untranslatable conceptual schemes makes no sense. His essays shaped philosophy of language and mind from the 1960s onward.
生平与背景
Davidson was born in Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1917 and studied literature, classics and philosophy at Harvard, where he wrote a dissertation on Plato’s Philebus. After serving in the navy during the Second World War he taught at Stanford, Princeton, Rockefeller University and Chicago, and finally at Berkeley. His influence spread mainly through sharply argued essays.
其他主要作品
- Actions, Reasons, and Causes (1963)
- Truth and Meaning (1967)
- Mental Events (1970)
- On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme (1974)
- Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984)
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