戴维·刘易斯
每一个可能世界都与我们的世界同样真实——而谈论可能性就是谈论在那些其他世界里发生的事情。
定位
模态实在论:所有可能世界都与我们的世界同样真实地存在。
核心思想
- 模态实在论
- 约定
- 休谟式随附性
老师: W. V. O. 奎因
影响
受影响于 5
戈特弗里德·威廉·莱布尼茨
受其影响
Lewis took up Leibniz’s possible worlds but as concrete, real worlds; his world-bound individuals with counterparts are often compared to Leibniz’s view (On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986). D. Lewis, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968); On the Plurality of Worlds (1986); SEP “David Lewis”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
戈特弗里德·威廉·莱布尼茨 › 1646–1716
大卫·休谟
受其影响
Lewis named his thesis of ‘Humean supervenience’ after Hume, the denier of necessary connections: everything supervenes on the local distribution of particular qualities (Philosophical Papers II, 1986). D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol. II (1986), introduction; “Humean Supervenience Debugged”, Mind 103 (1994); SEP “David Lewis”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
大卫·休谟 › 1711–1776
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普
受其影响
Lewis adapted the Ramsey–Carnap method for theoretical terms to define mental states by their causal roles (‘How to Define Theoretical Terms’, 1970; ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, 1972). D. Lewis, “How to Define Theoretical Terms”, Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970); “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972); SEP “David Lewis”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普 › 1891–1970
W. V. O. 奎因 师从
师从
Lewis wrote his Harvard dissertation (1967) under Quine; it became Convention (1969), which answers Quine’s doubts about whether language can rest on convention. D. Lewis, Convention (1969), preface
依据: AI 草稿
W. V. O. 奎因 › 1908–2000
J. J. C. 斯马特
受其影响
Lewis gave Smart’s identity of experiences and brain processes a new argument: experiences are defined by their causal roles, and the occupants of these roles are physical (1966). D. Lewis, “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
依据: AI 草稿
J. J. C. 斯马特 › 1920–2012
批评
受批评于 1
萨莉·哈斯兰格
受其批评
Haslanger defended endurance against Lewis’s argument from temporary intrinsics: things can change their intrinsic properties without having temporal parts (‘Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics’, Analysis, 1989). S. Haslanger, “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”, Analysis 49 (1989), 119–125; D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (1986), 202–204
依据: AI 草稿
萨莉·哈斯兰格 › 1955年生
批评了 2
索尔·克里普克
批评了
Lewis rejected Kripke’s view that possible worlds are stipulated and share individuals, defending counterpart theory against the ‘Humphrey objection’ (On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986, ch. 4). D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (1986), ch. 4; “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968); S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980)
依据: AI 草稿
索尔·克里普克 › 1940–2022
弗兰克·杰克逊
批评了
Lewis answered Jackson’s knowledge argument with the ability hypothesis: on seeing red, Mary gains abilities to recognise, imagine and remember, not new information (‘What Experience Teaches’, 1988). D. Lewis, “What Experience Teaches”, Proceedings of the Russellian Society 13 (1988); F. Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know”, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986)
依据: AI 草稿
弗兰克·杰克逊 › 1943年生
作品
- 1986论世界的多元性
可能世界与我们的世界同样真实——以对应体关系取代同一性。
立场
Lewis built a systematic metaphysics of unusual clarity. His best-known and most controversial thesis is modal realism: talk of what is possible or necessary refers to other possible worlds that exist just as concretely as ours, only spatiotemporally separate from it. Things in other worlds are not identical with us but our “counterparts.” Lewis defended this view not out of eccentricity but because it explains modality, counterfactual conditionals, properties and content more economically than its rivals. He also gave an analysis of conventions in game-theoretic terms, a theory of counterfactuals and causation, and the programme of “Humean supervenience,” according to which everything depends on the local distribution of physical qualities.
生平与背景
Lewis was born in Oberlin, Ohio, in 1941 and wrote his dissertation at Harvard under Quine. After teaching at UCLA he spent the rest of his career at Princeton from 1970, with frequent stays in Australia, which he regarded as a second philosophical home. He died in 2001; his papers, collected in several volumes, are among the most cited in analytic philosophy.
其他主要作品
- Convention (1969)
- Counterfactuals (1973)
- Philosophical Papers I–II (1983–86)
- On the Plurality of Worlds (1986)
出现在
- 争论 ‘意识是什么?’
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