卡尔·古斯塔夫·亨普尔
对某事做出科学解释，就是表明它是从一般规律连同特定的情形推出来的。
定位
柏林小组的逻辑经验主义者：解释一个事件，就是从普遍定律和初始条件推导出它（演绎—律则模型）；乌鸦悖论表明确证是多么令人费解。
核心思想
- 演绎—律则解释
- 乌鸦悖论
- 对可证实性标准的批判
学生: 罗伯特·诺齐克
影响
受影响于 3
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普 师从
师从
Hempel studied with Carnap, Schlick and Waismann in Vienna in the autumn semester of 1929 and in 1937–38 worked with Carnap at the University of Chicago; his doctorate (Berlin, 1934) was taken elsewhere. SEP “Carl Hempel”
依据: AI 草稿
鲁道夫·卡尔纳普 › 1891–1970
汉斯·赖欣巴哈 师从
师从
Hempel studied with Reichenbach in Berlin from 1929, went to Vienna that autumn at his suggestion and belonged to his Berlin Group; after Reichenbach’s emigration his doctorate on probability (1934) was examined by Wolfgang Köhler and Nicolai Hartmann. SEP “Carl Hempel”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
汉斯·赖欣巴哈 › 1891–1953
雅尼娜·霍西亚松-林登鲍姆
受其影响
Hempel discussed Hosiasson-Lindenbaum’s probabilistic answer to the raven paradox, on which a non-black non-raven confirms only to a tiny degree (‘Studies in the Logic of Confirmation’, 1945). C. G. Hempel, “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation”, Mind 54 (1945); J. Hosiasson-Lindenbaum, “On Confirmation”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 5 (1940); SEP “Confirmation”
依据: AI 草稿
雅尼娜·霍西亚松-林登鲍姆 › 1899–1942
批评
批评了 1
A. J. 艾耶尔
批评了
Hempel argued that Ayer’s verifiability criterion, even as revised in 1946, either admits metaphysics or excludes scientific laws (‘Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning’, 1950). C. G. Hempel, “Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11 (1950), 41–63; A. Church, review of Ayer, Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (1949)
依据: AI 草稿
A. J. 艾耶尔 › 1910–1989
作品
立场
Hempel gave logical empiricism its classical accounts of confirmation and explanation, and was at the same time one of its sharpest internal critics. “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation” (1945) showed a paradox: if every black raven confirms “all ravens are black”, and this law is logically equivalent to “everything non-black is a non-raven”, then a white shoe confirms it too. With Oppenheim he set out the deductive-nomological model in 1948: an explanation is an argument whose premises contain at least one general law and particular conditions, and whose conclusion describes what is to be explained. He had already applied the model to history in 1942, and later added inductive-statistical explanations for probabilistic laws. Explanation and prediction have the same logical form. In “Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning” (1950) he showed that every proposed formulation of the verifiability criterion, including Ayer’s, either excludes scientific laws or lets in metaphysics, and concluded that cognitive significance comes in degrees. In his late papers he engaged closely with Kuhn, his colleague at Princeton, and moved towards a more pragmatic view of scientific rationality.
生平与背景
Carl Gustav Hempel was born in Oranienburg near Berlin in 1905. He studied mathematics, physics and philosophy in Göttingen, Heidelberg and Berlin, spent 1929–30 in Vienna, where he met Carnap, Schlick and Waismann, and belonged to Hans Reichenbach’s Berlin Group. His doctorate on probability (1934) was completed after Reichenbach had been dismissed. Because his wife was of Jewish descent he left Germany for Belgium, where he worked with Paul Oppenheim, and in 1937 went to Chicago as Carnap’s assistant. He taught at City College in New York, at Yale (1948–1955), at Princeton (1955–1973), where Robert Nozick was among his doctoral students, and finally at Pittsburgh. He died near Princeton in 1997.
其他主要作品
- The Function of General Laws in History (1942)
- Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (1945)
- Studies in the Logic of Explanation (with Paul Oppenheim, 1948)
- Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning (1950)
- Aspects of Scientific Explanation (1965)
- Philosophy of Natural Science (1966)
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