ويلارد فان أورمان كواين
لا حدّ فاصلًا حادًّا بين حقائق المعنى وحقائق الواقع؛ فمعتقداتنا تواجه التجربة معًا، كأنها شبكة واحدة.
التموضع
«عقيدتان من عقائد التجريبية»: لا حدّ فاصل حادًّا بين التحليلي والتركيبي؛ وتُطبَّع نظرية المعرفة.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- الكلانية
- عدم تعيّن الترجمة
- نظرية المعرفة المُطبَّعة
الأساتذة: ألفريد نورث وايتهيد
التلاميذ: دونالد ديفيدسن, ديفيد لويس, دانيال دينيت
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 4
جون ديوي
تأثّر بـ
Quine declared himself bound to Dewey by naturalism and shared his view of meaning as a matter of public behaviour, against the ‘museum myth’ (‘Ontological Relativity’, 1968). W. V. Quine, “Ontological Relativity” (Dewey Lectures 1968), Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (1969); SEP “Willard Van Orman Quine”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جون ديوي › 1859–1952
ألفريد نورث وايتهيد تتلمذ على
تتلمذ على
Quine took his PhD at Harvard in 1932, after two years, under Whitehead with The Logic of Sequences, a generalisation of Principia Mathematica. W. V. Quine, The Time of My Life (1985)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ألفريد نورث وايتهيد › 1861–1947
بيرتراند راسل
تأثّر بـ
Quine generalised Principia Mathematica in his dissertation (1932) and used Russell’s theory of descriptions to dissolve the riddle of non-being (‘On What There Is’, 1948). W. V. Quine, The Logic of Sequences: A Generalization of Principia Mathematica (dissertation 1932; publ. 1990); “On What There Is”, Review of Metaphysics 2 (1948); SEP “Willard Van Orman Quine”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
بيرتراند راسل › 1872–1970
أتو نويرات
تأثّر بـ
Quine set Neurath’s image of sailors rebuilding their ship on the open sea as motto of Word and Object (1960), summing up a naturalism without foundations outside science. W. V. Quine, Word and Object (1960); O. Neurath, “Protokollsätze”, Erkenntnis 3 (1932); SEP “Otto Neurath”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أتو نويرات › 1882–1945
أثّر في 6
توماس كون
أثّر في
Kuhn credited Quine with opening for him the puzzles of the analytic–synthetic distinction, a background to his holistic view of scientific concepts (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, preface). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), preface; W. V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
توماس كون › 1922–1996
هيلاري بوتنام
أثّر في
Putnam developed Quine’s point that mathematics is indispensable to science into an argument for mathematical realism (Philosophy of Logic, 1971), known as the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument. H. Putnam, Philosophy of Logic (1971); “The Analytic and the Synthetic” (1962); SEP “Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
هيلاري بوتنام › 1926–2016
ريتشارد رورتي
أثّر في
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) Rorty combined Quine’s attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction with Sellars’s on the Given to argue for epistemological behaviourism. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951); SEP “Richard Rorty”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ريتشارد رورتي › 1931–2007
بيمال كريشنا ماتيلال
أثّر في
Matilal, who studied with Quine at Harvard, applied modern logic and questions of reference and ontology to Indian theories (Logic, Language and Reality, 1985). B. K. Matilal, Logic, Language and Reality (1985); J. Ganeri (ed.), Mind, Language and World: The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal (2002)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
بيمال كريشنا ماتيلال › 1935–1991
ديفيد لويس علّم
علّم
Lewis wrote his Harvard dissertation (1967) under Quine; it became Convention (1969), which answers Quine’s doubts about whether language can rest on convention. D. Lewis, Convention (1969), preface
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ديفيد لويس › 1941–2001
دانيال دينيت علّم
علّم ✓
Dennett studied with Quine at Harvard (BA 1963) and wrote his senior thesis in critical engagement with him; for his doctorate he went to Ryle in Oxford. D. C. Dennett, I’ve Been Thinking (2023)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
دانيال دينيت › 1942–2024
النقد
نقد متبادل 1
روث بركان ماركوس ⇄ متبادل
انتقد
Quine objected that quantified modal logic, which Barcan Marcus first formalised (1946), founders on referential opacity and commits one to ‘Aristotelian essentialism’ (‘Reference and Modality’, 1953). W. V. O. Quine, “Reference and Modality”, in From a Logical Point of View (1953); “Three Grades of Modal Involvement” (1953); R. C. Barcan, Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (1946)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
انتقده
Against Quine, Barcan Marcus argued that quantified modal logic is coherent: proper names are mere ‘tags’, and identities between them hold necessarily (‘Modalities and Intensional Languages’, 1961). R. Barcan Marcus, “Modalities and Intensional Languages”, Synthese 13 (1961), 303–322, with Quine’s comments (Boston Colloquium)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
روث بركان ماركوس › 1921–2012
انتقده 4
هربرت بول جرايس
انتقده
With Strawson, Grice defended the analytic–synthetic distinction against Quine: its ordinary use is shared and teachable, so its intelligibility cannot be denied (‘In Defense of a Dogma’, 1956). H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson, “In Defense of a Dogma”, Philosophical Review 65 (1956), 141–158
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
هربرت بول جرايس › 1913–1988
دونالد ديفيدسن علّم
علّم ✓
Davidson attended Quine’s courses as a Harvard student around 1939; his own dissertation (1949) was on Plato’s Philebus, and he later described Quine as the strongest influence on his philosophy. D. Davidson, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (1999)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
انتقده
Davidson rejected the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, which Quine kept, as a ‘third dogma of empiricism’ (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); “Meaning, Truth and Evidence”, in R. Barrett & R. Gibson (eds.), Perspectives on Quine (1990)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
دونالد ديفيدسن › 1917–2003
بي. إف. ستروسون
انتقده
In ‘In Defense of a Dogma’ (1956), written with Grice, Strawson argued that Quine’s doubts about analyticity would make the notions of synonymy and meaning itself unintelligible. H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson, “In Defense of a Dogma”, Philosophical Review 65 (1956); P. F. Strawson, “Propositions, Concepts and Logical Truths”, Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1957)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
بي. إف. ستروسون › 1919–2006
شاول كريبك
انتقده
Kripke rejected Quine’s claim that quantified modal logic and essentialism are unintelligible: with rigid designators, de re necessity is coherent and intuitively grounded (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lecture I; “Identity and Necessity” (1971)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
شاول كريبك › 1940–2022
ينتقد 1
رودولف كارناب تأثّر بـ
تأثّر بـ
Quine met Carnap in Prague (1933), read Logische Syntax in typescript and presented it in Harvard lectures (1934); he called Carnap his teacher (‘Homage to Rudolf Carnap’, 1970). W. V. Quine, “Lectures on Carnap” (1934), in R. Creath (ed.), Dear Carnap, Dear Van (1990); “Homage to Rudolf Carnap” (1970); SEP “Willard Van Orman Quine”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
انتقد
In ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951) Quine rejected Carnap’s analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism: statements face the tribunal of experience only as a corporate body. W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951), 20–43; “Carnap and Logical Truth” (1963)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
رودولف كارناب › 1891–1970
الأعمال
- 1951مذهبان للتجريبية
ضد التمييز بين التحليلي والتركيبي وضد الاختزالية.
- 1960الكلمة والموضوع
«غافاغاي» وعدم تعيّن الترجمة.
نظرية المعرفة بوصفها فصلًا من علم النفس.
الموقف
Quine questioned two pillars of logical empiricism. There is, he argued in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” no sharp line between analytic truths (true by meaning alone) and synthetic truths (true by experience). Nor can individual sentences be tested in isolation: our beliefs face experience only as a whole, like a web in which even logic could in principle be revised. From this followed a radical naturalism: philosophy is not a foundation prior to science but continuous with it, and epistemology becomes a chapter of psychology. With the thought experiment of “gavagai” he argued that translation is indeterminate: incompatible translation manuals can fit all possible evidence equally well, and there is no further fact of the matter about which is right. His holism and naturalism set the agenda of analytic philosophy for decades.
الحياة والسياق
Quine was born in Akron, Ohio, in 1908 and earned his doctorate at Harvard under Alfred North Whitehead. A European journey in 1932–33 brought him to Carnap in Prague and to the logicians of Vienna and Warsaw. Apart from naval service in the Second World War he spent his whole career at Harvard, and is often counted the most influential American philosopher of his generation.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- On What There Is (1948)
- Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951)
- From a Logical Point of View (1953)
- Word and Object (1960)
يرد في
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