دونالد ديفيدسن
الأسباب هي علل أفعالنا، ولكي نفهم ما يقوله الآخرون علينا أن نفترض أن معظم ما يعتقدونه صحيح.
التموضع
الأسباب علل؛ وكل تأويل يقتضي مبدأ الإحسان.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- الواحدية الشاذة
- التأويل الجذري
- مبدأ الإحسان
الأساتذة: ويلارد فان أورمان كواين
التأثير
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رودولف كارناب
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Davidson worked through Carnap’s semantics of extension and intension (Schilpp volume, 1963) before replacing meanings with a Tarskian theory of truth (‘Truth and Meaning’, 1967). D. Davidson, “The Method of Extension and Intension”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); “Truth and Meaning”, Synthese 17 (1967); SEP “Donald Davidson”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في Wikidata · Wikidata
رودولف كارناب › 1891–1970
ألفريد تارسكي
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Davidson turned Tarski’s Convention T around: a theory that yields a T-sentence for every sentence of a language serves as a theory of meaning (‘Truth and Meaning’, 1967). D. Davidson, “Truth and Meaning”, Synthese 17 (1967); A. Tarski, “Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych” (1933; German 1935); SEP “Donald Davidson”
ألفريد تارسكي › 1901–1983
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ريتشارد رورتي
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Rorty read Davidson’s rejection of the scheme–content distinction and his account of truth as support for pragmatism (‘Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth’, 1986), though Davidson declined the label. R. Rorty, “Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth” (1986), in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991); D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); SEP “Richard Rorty”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ريتشارد رورتي › 1931–2007
النقد
انتقده 1
مايكل دوميت
انتقده
Dummett objected that Davidson’s truth-conditional theory is merely ‘modest’: it does not explain what knowledge of meaning consists in (‘What is a Theory of Meaning?’, 1975). M. Dummett, “What is a Theory of Meaning?”, in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language (1975); “What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)” (1976)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
مايكل دوميت › 1925–2011
ينتقد 4
غلبرت رايل
انتقد
Davidson rejected Ryle’s view that motives explain as dispositions, not as causes: a reason explains only if the agent acted because of it (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, 1963). D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949), ch. 4
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
غلبرت رايل › 1900–1976
ويلارد فان أورمان كواين تتلمذ على
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Davidson attended Quine’s courses as a Harvard student around 1939; his own dissertation (1949) was on Plato’s Philebus, and he later described Quine as the strongest influence on his philosophy. D. Davidson, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (1999)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
انتقد
Davidson rejected the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, which Quine kept, as a ‘third dogma of empiricism’ (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); “Meaning, Truth and Evidence”, in R. Barrett & R. Gibson (eds.), Perspectives on Quine (1990)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ويلارد فان أورمان كواين › 1908–2000
إليزابيث أنسكوم
انتقد
Davidson rejected the view, associated with Anscombe’s Intention (1957), that reasons are not causes: rationalisation is a species of causal explanation (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, 1963). D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963), 685–700; G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (1957)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إليزابيث أنسكوم › 1919–2001
توماس كون
انتقد
Davidson rejected the incommensurable conceptual schemes he found in Kuhn: an untranslatable language could not be recognised as language (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 47 (1974), 5–20
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
توماس كون › 1922–1996
الأعمال
الأسباب علل – ضد أتباع فيتغنشتاين.
ضد العقيدة الثالثة: المخطط والمضمون.
الموقف
Davidson connected the philosophy of action, mind and language in a remarkably unified way. Against the Wittgensteinians he argued that the reasons for which we act are also causes of our actions. In “Mental Events” he defended anomalous monism: every mental event is a physical event, yet there are no strict laws linking the mental and the physical. In the theory of meaning he asked how a “radical interpreter” could understand a completely foreign language – only by assuming that the speaker mostly holds true beliefs and is rational (the principle of charity). From this he concluded that the idea of radically different, untranslatable conceptual schemes makes no sense. His essays shaped philosophy of language and mind from the 1960s onward.
الحياة والسياق
Davidson was born in Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1917 and studied literature, classics and philosophy at Harvard, where he wrote a dissertation on Plato’s Philebus. After serving in the navy during the Second World War he taught at Stanford, Princeton, Rockefeller University and Chicago, and finally at Berkeley. His influence spread mainly through sharply argued essays.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- Truth and Meaning (1967)
- Mental Events (1970)
- Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984)
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