डब्ल्यू. वी. ओ. क्वाइन
अर्थ के सत्यों और तथ्य के सत्यों के बीच कोई तीखी रेखा नहीं; हमारे विश्वास अनुभव का सामना एक साथ, एक जाल के रूप में करते हैं।
पृष्ठभूमि
अनुभववाद के दो हठधर्म: विश्लेषणात्मक और संश्लेषणात्मक के बीच कोई तीखी सीमा नहीं है; ज्ञानमीमांसा का प्रकृतिकरण किया जाता है।
मुख्य विचार
- समग्रवाद
- अनुवाद की अनिर्धार्यता
- प्रकृतिकृत ज्ञानमीमांसा
गुरु: अल्फ्रेड नार्थ ह्वाइटहेड
शिष्य: डोनाल्ड डेविडसन, डेविड लेविस, डैनियल डेनेट
प्रभाव
जिनसे प्रभावित 4
जॉन डुई
जिनसे प्रभावित
Quine declared himself bound to Dewey by naturalism and shared his view of meaning as a matter of public behaviour, against the ‘museum myth’ (‘Ontological Relativity’, 1968). W. V. Quine, “Ontological Relativity” (Dewey Lectures 1968), Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (1969); SEP “Willard Van Orman Quine”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
जॉन डुई › 1859–1952
अल्फ्रेड नार्थ ह्वाइटहेड जिनसे पढ़ा
जिनसे पढ़ा
Quine took his PhD at Harvard in 1932, after two years, under Whitehead with The Logic of Sequences, a generalisation of Principia Mathematica. W. V. Quine, The Time of My Life (1985)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
अल्फ्रेड नार्थ ह्वाइटहेड › 1861–1947
बर्टराण्ड रसेल
जिनसे प्रभावित
Quine generalised Principia Mathematica in his dissertation (1932) and used Russell’s theory of descriptions to dissolve the riddle of non-being (‘On What There Is’, 1948). W. V. Quine, The Logic of Sequences: A Generalization of Principia Mathematica (dissertation 1932; publ. 1990); “On What There Is”, Review of Metaphysics 2 (1948); SEP “Willard Van Orman Quine”
साक्ष्य: InPhO में भी · InPhO
बर्टराण्ड रसेल › 1872–1970
ओटो न्यूरथ
जिनसे प्रभावित
Quine set Neurath’s image of sailors rebuilding their ship on the open sea as motto of Word and Object (1960), summing up a naturalism without foundations outside science. W. V. Quine, Word and Object (1960); O. Neurath, “Protokollsätze”, Erkenntnis 3 (1932); SEP “Otto Neurath”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
ओटो न्यूरथ › 1882–1945
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया 6
थॉमस एस. कुहन
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
Kuhn credited Quine with opening for him the puzzles of the analytic–synthetic distinction, a background to his holistic view of scientific concepts (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, preface). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), preface; W. V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
थॉमस एस. कुहन › 1922–1996
हिलरी पट्नम
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
Putnam developed Quine’s point that mathematics is indispensable to science into an argument for mathematical realism (Philosophy of Logic, 1971), known as the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument. H. Putnam, Philosophy of Logic (1971); “The Analytic and the Synthetic” (1962); SEP “Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics”
साक्ष्य: InPhO में भी · InPhO
हिलरी पट्नम › 1926–2016
रिचर्ड रोर्टी
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) Rorty combined Quine’s attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction with Sellars’s on the Given to argue for epistemological behaviourism. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979); W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951); SEP “Richard Rorty”
साक्ष्य: InPhO में भी · InPhO
रिचर्ड रोर्टी › 1931–2007
बिमल कृष्ण माटीलाल
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
Matilal, who studied with Quine at Harvard, applied modern logic and questions of reference and ontology to Indian theories (Logic, Language and Reality, 1985). B. K. Matilal, Logic, Language and Reality (1985); J. Ganeri (ed.), Mind, Language and World: The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal (2002)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
बिमल कृष्ण माटीलाल › 1935–1991
डेविड लेविस जिन्हें पढ़ाया
जिन्हें पढ़ाया
Lewis wrote his Harvard dissertation (1967) under Quine; it became Convention (1969), which answers Quine’s doubts about whether language can rest on convention. D. Lewis, Convention (1969), preface
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
डेविड लेविस › 1941–2001
डैनियल डेनेट जिन्हें पढ़ाया
जिन्हें पढ़ाया ✓
Dennett studied with Quine at Harvard (BA 1963) and wrote his senior thesis in critical engagement with him; for his doctorate he went to Ryle in Oxford. D. C. Dennett, I’ve Been Thinking (2023)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
डैनियल डेनेट › 1942–2024
आलोचना
परस्पर आलोचना 1
रूथ बार्कन मार्कस ⇄ परस्पर
जिनकी आलोचना की
Quine objected that quantified modal logic, which Barcan Marcus first formalised (1946), founders on referential opacity and commits one to ‘Aristotelian essentialism’ (‘Reference and Modality’, 1953). W. V. O. Quine, “Reference and Modality”, in From a Logical Point of View (1953); “Three Grades of Modal Involvement” (1953); R. C. Barcan, Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (1946)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Against Quine, Barcan Marcus argued that quantified modal logic is coherent: proper names are mere ‘tags’, and identities between them hold necessarily (‘Modalities and Intensional Languages’, 1961). R. Barcan Marcus, “Modalities and Intensional Languages”, Synthese 13 (1961), 303–322, with Quine’s comments (Boston Colloquium)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
रूथ बार्कन मार्कस › 1921–2012
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित 4
एच. पी. ग्राइस
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
With Strawson, Grice defended the analytic–synthetic distinction against Quine: its ordinary use is shared and teachable, so its intelligibility cannot be denied (‘In Defense of a Dogma’, 1956). H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson, “In Defense of a Dogma”, Philosophical Review 65 (1956), 141–158
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
एच. पी. ग्राइस › 1913–1988
डोनाल्ड डेविडसन जिन्हें पढ़ाया
जिन्हें पढ़ाया ✓
Davidson attended Quine’s courses as a Harvard student around 1939; his own dissertation (1949) was on Plato’s Philebus, and he later described Quine as the strongest influence on his philosophy. D. Davidson, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (1999)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Davidson rejected the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, which Quine kept, as a ‘third dogma of empiricism’ (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); “Meaning, Truth and Evidence”, in R. Barrett & R. Gibson (eds.), Perspectives on Quine (1990)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
डोनाल्ड डेविडसन › 1917–2003
पी. एफ़. स्ट्रॉसन
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
In ‘In Defense of a Dogma’ (1956), written with Grice, Strawson argued that Quine’s doubts about analyticity would make the notions of synonymy and meaning itself unintelligible. H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson, “In Defense of a Dogma”, Philosophical Review 65 (1956); P. F. Strawson, “Propositions, Concepts and Logical Truths”, Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1957)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
पी. एफ़. स्ट्रॉसन › 1919–2006
शॉल क्रिपके
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Kripke rejected Quine’s claim that quantified modal logic and essentialism are unintelligible: with rigid designators, de re necessity is coherent and intuitively grounded (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lecture I; “Identity and Necessity” (1971)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
शॉल क्रिपके › 1940–2022
जिनकी आलोचना की 1
रुडोल्फ कार्नैप जिनसे प्रभावित
जिनसे प्रभावित
Quine met Carnap in Prague (1933), read Logische Syntax in typescript and presented it in Harvard lectures (1934); he called Carnap his teacher (‘Homage to Rudolf Carnap’, 1970). W. V. Quine, “Lectures on Carnap” (1934), in R. Creath (ed.), Dear Carnap, Dear Van (1990); “Homage to Rudolf Carnap” (1970); SEP “Willard Van Orman Quine”
साक्ष्य: InPhO में भी · InPhO
जिनकी आलोचना की
In ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951) Quine rejected Carnap’s analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism: statements face the tribunal of experience only as a corporate body. W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951), 20–43; “Carnap and Logical Truth” (1963)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
रुडोल्फ कार्नैप › 1891–1970
कृतियाँ
विश्लेषणात्मक–संश्लेषणात्मक भेद और न्यूनीकरणवाद के विरुद्ध।
- 1960शब्द और वस्तु
“गावागाई” और अनुवाद की अनिर्धार्यता।
मनोविज्ञान के एक अध्याय के रूप में ज्ञानमीमांसा।
मत
Quine questioned two pillars of logical empiricism. There is, he argued in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” no sharp line between analytic truths (true by meaning alone) and synthetic truths (true by experience). Nor can individual sentences be tested in isolation: our beliefs face experience only as a whole, like a web in which even logic could in principle be revised. From this followed a radical naturalism: philosophy is not a foundation prior to science but continuous with it, and epistemology becomes a chapter of psychology. With the thought experiment of “gavagai” he argued that translation is indeterminate: incompatible translation manuals can fit all possible evidence equally well, and there is no further fact of the matter about which is right. His holism and naturalism set the agenda of analytic philosophy for decades.
जीवन और संदर्भ
Quine was born in Akron, Ohio, in 1908 and earned his doctorate at Harvard under Alfred North Whitehead. A European journey in 1932–33 brought him to Carnap in Prague and to the logicians of Vienna and Warsaw. Apart from naval service in the Second World War he spent his whole career at Harvard, and is often counted the most influential American philosopher of his generation.
अन्य प्रमुख कृतियाँ
- On What There Is (1948)
- Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951)
- From a Logical Point of View (1953)
- Word and Object (1960)
- Epistemology Naturalized (1969)
इनमें आता है
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