索尔·克里普克
一个名称在每一个可能的情形中都指称同一个东西，所以有些真理是必然的，尽管我们是通过经验发现它们的。
定位
《命名与必然性》：名称是严格指示词；存在后验的必然真理。
核心思想
- 严格指示词
- 可能世界
- 遵守规则的悖论
影响
受影响于 3
大卫·休谟
受其影响 ✓
Kripke modelled the ‘sceptical solution’ he ascribed to Wittgenstein on Hume’s treatment of causation: a sceptical paradox about meaning is answered by community practice, not facts (1982). S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982); D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748); SEP “Rule-Following and Intentionality”
依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata
大卫·休谟 › 1711–1776
路德维希·维特根斯坦
受其影响 ✓
Kripke presented Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks as a sceptical paradox – no fact fixes that ‘plus’ means addition – stressing it was the argument ‘as it struck Kripke’ (1982). S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Rule-Following and Intentionality”
路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951
鲁思·巴肯·马库斯
受其影响 存在争议
Kripke’s models for quantified modal logic (1959, 1963) took up Barcan’s systems and formula (1946); whether rigid designation derives from her ‘tags’ (1961) is disputed. R. C. Barcan, “A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (1946); R. Barcan Marcus, “Modalities and Intensional Languages”, Synthese 13 (1961); S. A. Kripke, “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic” (1963); Naming and Necessity (lectures 1970; publ. 1972, 1980); Q. Smith and S. Soames, Synthese 104 (1995); SEP “Ruth Barcan Marcus”
依据: AI 草稿
鲁思·巴肯·马库斯 › 1921–2012
影响了 1
大卫·查尔默斯
影响了
Chalmers took up Kripke’s modal argument against mind–brain identity and explained a posteriori necessities like ‘water is H₂O’ with two-dimensional semantics (The Conscious Mind, 1996). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980); SEP “Zombies”
依据: AI 草稿
大卫·查尔默斯 › 1966年生
批评
受批评于 1
戴维·刘易斯
受其批评
Lewis rejected Kripke’s view that possible worlds are stipulated and share individuals, defending counterpart theory against the ‘Humphrey objection’ (On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986, ch. 4). D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (1986), ch. 4; “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968); S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980)
依据: AI 草稿
戴维·刘易斯 › 1941–2001
批评了 5
戈特洛布·弗雷格
批评了
Kripke rejected the Fregean view that a name’s descriptive sense fixes its reference: names are rigid designators, tied to bearers by a causal chain (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; book 1980), Lectures I–II
依据: AI 草稿
戈特洛布·弗雷格 › 1848–1925
伯特兰·罗素
批评了
Kripke rejected Russell’s view that ordinary names are disguised descriptions: ‘Aristotle’ names Aristotle even in worlds where he did nothing we describe him by (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lectures I–II; B. Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” (1911)
依据: AI 草稿
伯特兰·罗素 › 1872–1970
阿尔弗雷德·塔斯基
批评了
Kripke judged Tarski’s language hierarchy unfit for natural language and built, via fixed points, a language containing its own truth predicate (‘Outline of a Theory of Truth’, 1975). S. Kripke, “Outline of a Theory of Truth”, Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), 690–716
依据: AI 草稿
阿尔弗雷德·塔斯基 › 1901–1983
W. V. O. 奎因
批评了
Kripke rejected Quine’s claim that quantified modal logic and essentialism are unintelligible: with rigid designators, de re necessity is coherent and intuitively grounded (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lecture I; “Identity and Necessity” (1971)
依据: AI 草稿
W. V. O. 奎因 › 1908–2000
约翰·塞尔
批评了
Kripke rejected Searle’s cluster theory of names: no weighted set of descriptions fixes reference, since the bearer might satisfy none of them (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lecture I; J. R. Searle, “Proper Names”, Mind 67 (1958)
依据: AI 草稿
约翰·塞尔 › 1932–2025
作品
- 1972命名与必然性
名称是严格指示词——反对描述理论。
- 1982维特根斯坦论规则和私人语言
遵守规则的怀疑论悖论。
立场
Early on Kripke gave modal logic – the logic of necessity and possibility – what became its standard semantics in terms of possible worlds. In Naming and Necessity he overturned the dominant view of Frege and Russell that proper names abbreviate descriptions. Names, he argued, are “rigid designators”: “Aristotle” refers to the same person in every possible world, whatever that person might have done. Reference is fixed by a causal chain reaching back to an initial “baptism.” From this followed the striking thesis that there are necessary truths known only by experience, such as “water is H₂O.” His later reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations provoked a long debate. Kripke helped make metaphysics respectable again in analytic philosophy.
生平与背景
Kripke was born in 1940 on Long Island and grew up in Omaha. While still a teenager he published a completeness proof for modal logic that made his name. He studied at Harvard and taught at Rockefeller University and Princeton, later at the City University of New York. His lectures on naming, given at Princeton in 1970, were published in 1972 and as a book in 1980.
其他主要作品
- Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic (1963)
- Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
- Naming and Necessity (1980)
- Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982)
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