P. F. 斯特劳森

Agora

P. F. 斯特劳森

1919–2006

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

如果不存在法国国王，那么说“法国国王是秃头”并不是假的，而是落了空——而且我们责备和怨恨的实践并不需要形而上学的支撑。

定位

分析哲学 · 北欧 · 语言, 形而上学, 认识论, 伦理学

牛津的哲学家：与罗素相反，“当今的法国国王是秃头”预设而不是断言存在一位国王；他提出关于物体和人的“描述的形而上学”；责任建立在怨恨等反应态度之上。

核心思想

预设（《论指称》）
描述的形而上学
人作为基本殊相
反应态度

老师: H. P. 格莱斯

学生: 约翰·塞尔

在星图中打开

影响

受影响于 3

大卫·休谟

受其影响
Strawson took from Hume a naturalist answer to scepticism: belief in bodies and induction are inescapable natural commitments that neither need nor admit justification (Skepticism and Naturalism, 1985). P. F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (1985); SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”
依据: AI 草稿
大卫·休谟 › 1711–1776
伊曼努尔·康德

受其影响
Strawson reconstructed the analytic core of Kant’s Critique – the conditions of any experience intelligible to us – while rejecting transcendental idealism (The Bounds of Sense, 1966). P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (1966); Individuals (1959); SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
伊曼努尔·康德 › 1724–1804
H. P. 格莱斯师从

师从
Grice was one of Strawson’s two philosophy tutors, with J. D. Mabbott, when Strawson read PPE at St John’s College, Oxford (1937–40); they later wrote ‘In Defense of a Dogma’ (1956) together. SEP “Peter Frederick Strawson”; P. F. Strawson, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson (1998)
依据: AI 草稿
H. P. 格莱斯 › 1913–1988

影响了 1

约翰·塞尔教过

教过
Strawson was Searle’s tutor at Oxford; Searle credited him without hesitation with having truly taught him how to do philosophy, recalled tutorials for which his essay was due a day in advance, and the two became close friends. J. R. Searle, interview with T. Crane, CRASSH, University of Cambridge (9 June 2014)
依据: AI 草稿
约翰·塞尔 › 1932–2025

批评

批评了 2

伯特兰·罗素

批评了
Strawson objected that Russell’s theory of descriptions confuses sentences with uses: ‘The King of France is bald’ presupposes, not asserts, that a king exists (‘On Referring’, 1950). P. F. Strawson, “On Referring”, Mind 59 (1950), 320–344; Russell’s reply: “Mr. Strawson on Referring”, Mind 66 (1957)
依据: AI 草稿
伯特兰·罗素 › 1872–1970
W. V. O. 奎因

批评了
In ‘In Defense of a Dogma’ (1956), written with Grice, Strawson argued that Quine’s doubts about analyticity would make the notions of synonymy and meaning itself unintelligible. H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson, “In Defense of a Dogma”, Philosophical Review 65 (1956); P. F. Strawson, “Propositions, Concepts and Logical Truths”, Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1957)
依据: AI 草稿
W. V. O. 奎因 › 1908–2000

作品

1950论指称
反对罗素的摹状词理论：如果没有法国国王，“法国国王是秃头”既不真也不假。
1959个体：描述的形而上学论文
描述而不是修正我们思想的结构：物质物体和人是基本的个别事物。

立场

“On Referring” (1950) challenged Russell’s theory of descriptions. Russell had analysed “The King of France is bald” as asserting that there is exactly one king of France and that he is bald, which makes the sentence false. Strawson replied that sentences do not refer – people use them to refer – and that the use of the sentence presupposes that there is a king; if there is none, the question of truth or falsity does not arise. Introduction to Logical Theory (1952) argued that the logical constants do not match the words of ordinary language, a view Grice later answered with his theory of implicature. In Individuals (1959) Strawson contrasted the “revisionary metaphysics” of Descartes or Leibniz with a “descriptive metaphysics” that lays bare the actual structure of our thought, as Aristotle and Kant had done. For us material bodies and persons are the basic particulars, and a person is not a mind attached to a body but something to which both mental and physical predicates apply. The Bounds of Sense (1966) reconstructed Kant’s Critique without transcendental idealism. “Freedom and Resentment” (1962) shifted the debate on free will: our practices of resentment, gratitude and blame are part of human life and need no metaphysical justification.

生平与背景

Peter Frederick Strawson was born in Ealing, London, in 1919 and studied philosophy, politics and economics at St John’s College, Oxford, where H. P. Grice was his tutor. He served in the Royal Artillery and the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers from 1940 to 1946, leaving as a captain. After a year at Bangor he became a fellow of University College, Oxford, in 1948, and from 1968 to 1987 was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College. He was knighted in 1977. Among those he supervised was John Searle; his son Galen Strawson is also a philosopher. He died in London in 2006.