थॉमस एस. कुहन
विज्ञान स्थिर गति से नहीं बढ़ता; वह एक साझे ढाँचे के भीतर काम करता है जब तक कि संकट क्रांति के लिए बाध्य न करे जो उसे नए ढाँचे से बदल देती है।
पृष्ठभूमि
विज्ञान ज्ञान के निरंतर संचय से नहीं, बल्कि प्रतिमान-परिवर्तनों से विकसित होता है।
मुख्य विचार
- प्रतिमान
- वैज्ञानिक क्रांति
- अतुलनीयता
प्रभाव
जिनसे प्रभावित 4
लुडविग विट्गेंश्टाइन
जिनसे प्रभावित
Kuhn used Wittgenstein’s family resemblance to explain how paradigms can guide research without a shared set of rules (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
लुडविग विट्गेंश्टाइन › 1889–1951
माइकेल पोलान्यी
जिनसे प्रभावित ✓
Kuhn referred to Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge (1958) for tacit knowledge gained through practice rather than rules, on which paradigms as shared exemplars rely (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1958); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
माइकेल पोलान्यी › 1891–1976
ज़ाँ प्याज़े
जिनसे प्रभावित ✓
Kuhn named Piaget’s studies of the successive worlds of the growing child among the sources of his idea of scientific revolutions (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, preface). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), preface; SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
ज़ाँ प्याज़े › 1896–1980
डब्ल्यू. वी. ओ. क्वाइन
जिनसे प्रभावित
Kuhn credited Quine with opening for him the puzzles of the analytic–synthetic distinction, a background to his holistic view of scientific concepts (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, preface). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), preface; W. V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
डब्ल्यू. वी. ओ. क्वाइन › 1908–2000
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया 3
पॉल फेएराबेंड
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
At Berkeley Feyerabend commented on Kuhn’s draft of Structure (letters, 1960–61); both introduced ‘incommensurability’ in 1962, and Feyerabend later criticised Kuhn’s normal science (‘Consolations for the Specialist’, 1970). P. Hoyningen-Huene (ed.), “Two Letters of Paul Feyerabend to Thomas S. Kuhn on a Draft of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 26 (1995); P. K. Feyerabend, “Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism” (1962); “Consolations for the Specialist” (1970); SEP “Paul Feyerabend”
साक्ष्य: InPhO में भी · InPhO
पॉल फेएराबेंड › 1924–1994
सैंड्रा हार्डिंग
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
Harding built on the post-Kuhnian view that scientific knowledge is shaped by its historical and social setting to ask about androcentric bias (The Science Question in Feminism, 1986). S. Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (1986); T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); SEP “Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
सैंड्रा हार्डिंग › 1935–2025
ब्रूनो लातूर
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
Latour followed Kuhn’s turn from the logic of science to the practice of scientific communities, but studied laboratories ethnographically rather than paradigms (Laboratory Life, with S. Woolgar, 1979). B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life (1979); B. Latour, Science in Action (1987); T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
ब्रूनो लातूर › 1947–2022
आलोचना
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित 2
डोनाल्ड डेविडसन
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Davidson rejected the incommensurable conceptual schemes he found in Kuhn: an untranslatable language could not be recognised as language (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 47 (1974), 5–20
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
डोनाल्ड डेविडसन › 1917–2003
इम्रे लक़तोस
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Lakatos objected that Kuhn makes theory change a matter of ‘mob psychology’ and proposed rationally reconstructed research programmes instead (‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, 1970). I. Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970), 91–196
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
इम्रे लक़तोस › 1922–1974
जिनकी आलोचना की 1
कार्ल पॉपर
जिनकी आलोचना की
Kuhn objected to Popper that normal science solves puzzles without testing its paradigm, which single anomalies do not overturn (‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, 1970). T. S. Kuhn, “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970); Popper’s reply “Normal Science and Its Dangers”, ibid.
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
कार्ल पॉपर › 1902–1994
कृतियाँ
सामान्य विज्ञान, विसंगति, प्रतिमान-परिवर्तन।
मत
Kuhn challenged the image of science as a steady accumulation of truths. Most of the time, he argued, scientists practise “normal science”: they solve puzzles within a paradigm – a shared framework of theories, methods and exemplary achievements that is not itself questioned. When anomalies pile up, a crisis can arise, and finally a scientific revolution in which a new paradigm replaces the old, as with Copernicus, Newton or Einstein. Since paradigms define different problems and standards, they are partly “incommensurable”: there is no neutral measure to compare them. Kuhn thus put history and sociology at the centre of philosophy of science; “paradigm shift” became a household word.
जीवन और संदर्भ
Kuhn was born in Cincinnati in 1922 and took his doctorate in physics at Harvard. Teaching science to humanities students led him to the history of science, where he discovered how differently Aristotle had thought about motion. He taught at Harvard, Berkeley, Princeton and MIT; his book on scientific revolutions became one of the most cited academic works of the century.
अन्य प्रमुख कृतियाँ
- The Copernican Revolution (1957)
- The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)
- The Essential Tension (1977)
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