تشو شي
يجمع كل شيء بين مبدأ كامن (لي) وطاقة حيوية (تشي)، ونفهم العالم وأنفسنا بدراسة الأشياء واحدًا واحدًا.
التموضع
مكمِّل الكونفوشيوسية الجديدة: المبدأ (لي) والقوة الحيوية (تشي)؛ والمعرفة بتحقيق الأشياء.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- لي وتشي
- غه وو (تحقيق الأشياء)
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 6
كونفوشيوس
تأثّر بـ
Zhu Xi’s Collected Commentaries on the Analects, printed with the Four Books in 1190, read Confucius through principle and became the standard for the examinations from 1313. Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, in Sishu zhangju jizhu (1190); SEP “Zhu Xi”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
كونفوشيوس › تقليديًا 551–479 ق.م
منسيوس
تأثّر بـ
Zhu Xi made the Mencius one of the Four Books and, in his Collected Commentaries (1190), read its good nature and four sprouts through his theory of principle. Zhu Xi, Mengzi jizhu, in Sishu zhangju jizhu (1190); SEP “Zhu Xi”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
منسيوس › نحو 372–289 ق.م
تشو دونيي
تأثّر بـ
Zhu Xi commented on Zhou Dunyi’s Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate, read the supreme ultimate as principle and made Zhou founder of the Learning of the Way. Zhu Xi, Taijitu shuo jie; W.-t. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (1963)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
تشو دونيي › 1017–1073
تشانغ زاي
تأثّر بـ
Zhu Xi took over Zhang Zai’s distinction between original nature and the physical nature and his formula that the mind unites nature and feelings (Jinsilu, 1175). Zhu Xi & Lü Zuqian, Jinsilu (1175), tr. W.-t. Chan, Reflections on Things at Hand (1967); Zhuzi yulei
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
تشانغ زاي › 1020–1077
تشنغ هاو
تأثّر بـ
Zhu Xi compiled the Cheng brothers’ recorded sayings (Er Cheng yishu, 1168) and, with Lü Zuqian, took Cheng Hao’s sayings into Reflections on Things at Hand (1175). Zhu Xi (ed.), Er Cheng yishu (1168); Zhu Xi & Lü Zuqian, Jinsilu (1175), tr. W.-t. Chan, Reflections on Things at Hand (1967)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
تشنغ هاو › 1032–1085
تشنغ يي
تأثّر بـ
Zhu Xi adopted Cheng Yi’s theses that the nature is principle and that investigating things means probing principle, the latter in his supplement to the Great Learning (1189). Zhu Xi, Daxue zhangju (preface 1189), supplement on the investigation of things; W.-t. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (1963)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
تشنغ يي › 1033–1107
أثّر في 4
يي هوانغ
أثّر في
Yi Hwang compiled the Essentials of Zhu Xi’s Letters (Juja seo jeoryo) and summed up Zhu’s learning of the sage in his Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning (1568). Yi Hwang, Juja seo jeoryo; Seonghak sipdo (1568), tr. M. C. Kalton, To Become a Sage (1988)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
يي هوانغ › 1501–1570
يي إي
أثّر في
Yi I (Yulgok) recast Zhu Xi’s theory of principle and material force as the idea that principle runs through all things while material force sets their limits (itong giguk; letters to Seong Hon, 1572). Yi I, letters to Seong Hon (1572); Seonghak jibyo (1575); E. Y. J. Chung, The Korean Neo-Confucianism of Yi T’oegye and Yi Yulgok (1995); M. C. Kalton et al., The Four-Seven Debate (1994)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
يي إي › 1536–1584
غوتفريد لايبنتس
أثّر في مختلف عليها
In his Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716) Leibniz likened Zhu Xi’s li to God; he knew it only from missionaries, and influence is disputed. G. W. Leibniz, Discours sur la théologie naturelle des Chinois (letter to N. Remond, 1716); N. Longobardi, Traité sur quelques points de la religion des Chinois (1701); D. E. Mungello, Leibniz and Confucianism (1977)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
غوتفريد لايبنتس › 1646–1716
فونغ يو لان
أثّر في
Feng Youlan’s New Learning of Principle (Xin lixue, 1939) ‘carried on’ rather than merely followed Zhu Xi, recasting principle as logical concepts with the help of Western realism. Feng Youlan, Xin lixue (1939); IEP “Feng Youlan”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
فونغ يو لان › 1895–1990
النقد
نقد متبادل 1
لو جيوان (لو شيانغشان) ⇄ متبادل
انتقد
Zhu Xi faulted Lu Jiuyuan for neglecting study and the investigation of things and for leaning towards Chan Buddhism, as at the Goose Lake meeting of 1175. Zhu Xi, Zhuzi yulei 124; W.-t. Chan, Chu Hsi: New Studies, 1989
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
انتقده
Lu Jiuyuan held that Zhu Xi’s path of study and investigating things was fragmented, since the mind itself is principle (Goose Lake meeting, 1175; letters of 1188). Lu Jiuyuan, Xiangshan quanji; W.-t. Chan, Chu Hsi: New Studies, 1989
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
لو جيوان (لو شيانغشان) › 1139–1193
انتقده 8
وانغ يانغ مينغ أثّر في
أثّر في
In Zhuzi wannian dinglun (1518) Wang Yangming selected letters of Zhu Xi to argue that Zhu had late in life approached Wang’s own learning of the mind. Wang Yangming, Zhuzi wannian dinglun (1518); W.-t. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living (1963)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
انتقده
Wang Yangming rejected Zhu Xi’s investigation of external things, which he had tried in vain on bamboo: principle is in the mind, and knowing is acting (Chuanxi lu). Wang Yangming, Chuanxi lu (1518 ff.), tr. W.-t. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, 1963; SEP “Wang Yangming”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
وانغ يانغ مينغ › 1472–1529
إيتو جنساي
انتقده
Itō Jinsai rejected Zhu Xi’s metaphysics of principle as alien to Confucius and Mencius, reading the Way as humaneness in everyday human relations (Gomō jigi, 1683). Itō Jinsai, Gomō jigi (1683, publ. 1705), tr. J. A. Tucker, 1998
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إيتو جنساي › 1627–1705
نيكولا مالبرانش
انتقده
Malebranche’s Dialogue between a Christian Philosopher and a Chinese Philosopher (1708) attacks the Neo-Confucian li, as systematised by Zhu Xi and known to him from missionary reports, as an impersonal principle that confuses God with matter – in his eyes close to Spinoza. N. Malebranche, Entretien d’un philosophe chrétien et d’un philosophe chinois sur l’existence et la nature de Dieu (1708); D. E. Mungello, “Malebranche and Chinese Philosophy”, Journal of the History of Ideas 41 (1980)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
نيكولا مالبرانش › 1638–1715
أوغيو سورائي
انتقده
Ogyū Sorai rejected Zhu Xi’s principle as speculation: the Way is not inherent in human nature but the rites and institutions of the ancient kings (Bendō, 1717). Ogyū Sorai, Bendō (1717), tr. J. A. Tucker, Ogyū Sorai’s Philosophical Masterworks, 2006
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أوغيو سورائي › 1666–1728
داي جن
انتقده
Dai Zhen rejected Zhu Xi’s principle as something bestowed by Heaven and residing in the mind: principle is the order within things and desires, found by study (1777). Dai Zhen, Mengzi ziyi shuzheng (1777), tr. A. Chin & M. Freeman, Tai Chen on Mencius, 1990
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
داي جن › 1724–1777
مو زونغسان
انتقده
Mou Zongsan judged that Zhu Xi made a side branch the main line: his principle merely exists and is inactive, unlike Mencius’ moral mind (Xinti yu xingti). Mou Zongsan, Xinti yu xingti (1968–69); N. S. Chan, The Thought of Mou Zongsan, 2011
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
مو زونغسان › 1909–1995
عرض الكل (8)عرض أقل
وانغ فوتسي
انتقده
Wang Fuzhi rejected Zhu Xi’s priority of principle over material force: principle is only the pattern of qi and cannot exist apart from it (Du Sishu daquan shuo). Wang Fuzhi, Du Sishu daquan shuo; SEP “Wang Fuzhi”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
وانغ فوتسي › 1619–1692
جونغ ياك يونغ
انتقده
Jeong Yak-yong (Dasan) rejected Zhu Xi’s identification of human nature with principle, defining it as an inclination (giho) to delight in goodness, realised through practice. Jeong Yak-yong, Maengja youi; M. Setton, Chŏng Yagyong: Korea’s Challenge to Orthodox Neo-Confucianism, 1997
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جونغ ياك يونغ › 1762–1836
ينتقد 1
غوتاما بودا
انتقد
Zhu Xi criticised Buddhism for taking human nature and principle to be empty and for abandoning family and social duties (Zhuzi yulei 126). Zhu Xi, Zhuzi yulei, juan 126; W.-t. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 1963
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
غوتاما بودا › نحو 480–400 ق.م · يُؤرَّخ عرفًا 563–483 ق.م
الأعمال
كرّس «المحاورات» و«منسيوس» وغيرهما نصوصًا قانونية – أساس امتحانات الخدمة المدنية من 1313 إلى 1905.
الموقف
Zhu Xi wove the Neo-Confucian thought of the Cheng brothers and others into a comprehensive system. Everything consists of qi, vital matter-energy, and li, principle – the pattern that makes each thing what it is and that is ultimately one, the Supreme Ultimate. Human nature is principle and therefore good, but it is clouded by turbid qi. Through the “investigation of things” and careful study, one comes to understand principle and to recover one’s original nature. He made the Four Books the core of the canon, and from the fourteenth century until 1905 his commentaries were the basis of the Chinese civil service examinations.
الحياة والسياق
Zhu Xi lived under the Southern Song dynasty, passed the highest state examination at eighteen and held various official posts, but spent most of his life teaching and writing, notably at the White Deer Grotto Academy, which he restored. At times politically out of favour, his teaching was even banned as “false learning” shortly before his death.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- Reflections on Things at Hand (Jinsi lu, with Lü Zuqian, 1175)
- Commentaries on the Four Books (c. 1190)
- Classified Conversations of Master Zhu (Zhuzi yulei, compiled 1270)
يرد في
- رحلة «الحوار الصيني» · المحطة 7 من 9
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