منسيوس
الناس صالحون بالفطرة – يولد كل إنسان ببذور الرحمة والعدل، وهي لا تحتاج إلا إلى الظروف الملائمة لتنمو.
التموضع
الطبيعة البشرية خيّرة: في كل إنسان أربعة براعم للفضيلة.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- خيرية الطبيعة البشرية
- البراعم الأربعة
- تفويض السماء
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 1
كونفوشيوس
تأثّر بـ ✓
Mencius, said to have studied with followers of Confucius’ grandson Zisi, wished above all to learn from Confucius and developed his humaneness (ren) into humane government (Mengzi). Mengzi; Sima Qian, Shiji, biography of Mencius and Xunzi; SEP “Mencius”
كونفوشيوس › تقليديًا 551–479 ق.م
أثّر في 14
تشانغ زاي
أثّر في
Zhang Zai kept Mencius’ good nature as the nature of Heaven and Earth, distinguishing it from the physical nature formed by each person’s endowment of qi (Zhengmeng, 1076). Zhang Zai, Zhengmeng (1076); W.-t. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (1963)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
تشانغ زاي › 1020–1077
تشنغ هاو
أثّر في
Cheng Hao’s ‘On Understanding Humaneness’ (Shi ren pian) draws on Mencius: all things are complete in me, and cultivation must neither forget nor forcibly help growth. Cheng Hao, Shi ren pian, in Er Cheng yishu; W.-t. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (1963)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
تشنغ هاو › 1032–1085
تشنغ يي
أثّر في
Cheng Yi upheld Mencius’ thesis that human nature is good by identifying the nature with principle and tracing evil to the endowment of material force (qi). Er Cheng yishu; W.-t. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (1963)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
تشنغ يي › 1033–1107
تشو شي
أثّر في
Zhu Xi made the Mencius one of the Four Books and, in his Collected Commentaries (1190), read its good nature and four sprouts through his theory of principle. Zhu Xi, Mengzi jizhu, in Sishu zhangju jizhu (1190); SEP “Zhu Xi”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
تشو شي › 1130–1200
لو جيوان (لو شيانغشان)
أثّر في
Lu Jiuyuan said he learned the Way by reading the Mencius on his own, taking from it the original mind (benxin) and the rule of securing first what is greater in us. Lu Jiuyuan, Xiangshan quanji, recorded sayings; W.-t. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (1963)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
لو جيوان (لو شيانغشان) › 1139–1193
وانغ يانغ مينغ
أثّر في
Wang Yangming took his central term, innate knowing (liangzhi), from Mencius and made its extension the core of moral cultivation (Instructions for Practical Living). Wang Yangming, Chuanxi lu, tr. W.-t. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living (1963); SEP “Wang Yangming”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
وانغ يانغ مينغ › 1472–1529
عرض الكل (14)عرض أقل
هان يو
أثّر في
Han Yu made Mencius the last bearer of the Way and in ‘Reading Xunzi’ judged him wholly pure, Xunzi and Yang Xiong pure with small flaws. Han Yu, Yuan Dao; Du Xunzi; C. Hartman, Han Yü and the T’ang Search for Unity (1986)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
هان يو › 768–824
يي هوانغ
أثّر في
In the Four–Seven Debate with Gi Daeseung (1559–66) Yi Hwang set Mencius’ four sprouts, issued by principle, apart from the seven feelings issued by material force. M. C. Kalton et al., The Four-Seven Debate (1994); E. Y. J. Chung, The Korean Neo-Confucianism of Yi T’oegye and Yi Yulgok (1995)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
يي هوانغ › 1501–1570
هوانغ زونغشي
أثّر في
Huang Zongxi’s Waiting for the Dawn (Mingyi daifang lu, 1663) drew on Mencius’ priority of the people to argue that the ruler exists for the realm. Huang Zongxi, Mingyi daifang lu (1663), tr. W. T. de Bary, Waiting for the Dawn (1993)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
هوانغ زونغشي › 1610–1695
إيتو جنساي
أثّر في
Itō Jinsai read Mencius’ four sprouts as starting points to be extended into virtue in daily life, not as signs of an inner principle (Gomō jigi, 1683). Itō Jinsai, Gomō jigi (1683, publ. 1705), tr. J. A. Tucker (1998); Mōshi kogi
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إيتو جنساي › 1627–1705
داي جن
أثّر في
Dai Zhen’s Evidential Study of the Meaning of Terms in the Mencius (1777) recovered Mencius’ terms philologically to show that principle lies within feelings and desires. Dai Zhen, Mengzi ziyi shuzheng (1777), tr. A. Chin & M. Freeman, Tai Chen on Mencius (1990)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
داي جن › 1724–1777
جونغ ياك يونغ
أثّر في
Jeong Yak-yong read Mencius’ four sprouts as beginnings of virtues completed only in action, so that humaneness exists only after it is practised (Maengja youi, 1814). Jeong Yak-yong, Maengja youi (1814); M. Setton, Chŏng Yagyong: Korea’s Challenge to Orthodox Neo-Confucianism (1997)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جونغ ياك يونغ › 1762–1836
كانج يووي
أثّر في
In The Subtle Meaning of the Mencius (Mengzi wei, 1901) Kang Youwei read Mencius’ priority of the people as an early statement of popular rights and constitutional government. Kang Youwei, Mengzi wei (1901); K.-c. Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World: K’ang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian (1975)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
كانج يووي › 1858–1927
مو زونغسان
أثّر في
Mou Zongsan took Mencius’ original mind as the moral mind that is itself creative reality and opened On the Highest Good (1985) by commenting on the Mencius. Mou Zongsan, Xinti yu xingti (1968–69); Yuanshan lun (1985); IEP “Mou Zongsan”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
مو زونغسان › 1909–1995
النقد
انتقده 2
زونزي
انتقده
Xunzi rejected Mencius’ view that human nature is good: goodness is the product of deliberate effort (wei), rites and teachers (Xunzi 23, ‘Xing e’). Xunzi, ch. 23 ‘Xing e’; SEP “Xunzi”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
زونزي › نحو 310–235 ق.م
وانغ تشونغ
انتقده
Wang Chong criticised Mencius’ arguments as inconsistent and rejected his view that human nature is wholly good (Lunheng 13 ‘Benxing’, 30 ‘Ci Meng’). Wang Chong, Lunheng, chs. 13, 30, tr. A. Forke, Lun-hêng, 1907–11
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
وانغ تشونغ › نحو 27–100
ينتقد 1
موزي
انتقد
Mencius condemned Mozi’s impartial love as denying one’s father – no better than the beasts – and set out to refute the Mohists and Yang Zhu (Mengzi 3B9). Mengzi 3B9, 7A26; SEP “Mencius”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
موزي › نحو 470–391 ق.م
الأعمال
- نحو 300 ق.ممنسيوس (منغزي)
حوارات في خيرية الطبيعة البشرية والحكم الإنساني.
الموقف
Mencius defended Confucianism with the thesis that human nature is good. Everyone has the “four sprouts” of virtue – compassion, shame, deference and a sense of right and wrong: anyone who suddenly sees a child about to fall into a well feels alarm and compassion. Virtue does not come from outside but grows from these beginnings if they are tended like young plants. Politically, he held that a ruler keeps the Mandate of Heaven only as long as he cares for the people; a tyrant may rightly be overthrown. Through Zhu Xi his book became one of the Four Books of the Confucian canon.
الحياة والسياق
Mengzi, latinised as Mencius, was born in the small state of Zou about a century after Confucius and is said to have studied with disciples of Confucius’ grandson Zisi. Like Confucius, he travelled for many years among the courts of the Warring States, advising rulers on humane government, mostly in vain. His conversations were collected in the book that bears his name.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- Mengzi (c. 300 BCE)
يرد في
- رحلة «الحوار الصيني» · المحطة 4 من 9
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