Zhu Xi
Wszystko łączy w sobie zasadę leżącą u podstaw z energią witalną, a świat i siebie rozumiemy, badając rzeczy jedna po drugiej.
Umiejscowienie
Dopełniciel neokonfucjanizmu: zasada (li) i siła witalna (qi); wiedza przez badanie rzeczy.
Kluczowe idee
- Li i qi
- Gewu (badanie rzeczy)
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 6
Konfucjusz
pod wpływem
Zhu Xi’s Collected Commentaries on the Analects, printed with the Four Books in 1190, read Confucius through principle and became the standard for the examinations from 1313. Zhu Xi, Lunyu jizhu, in Sishu zhangju jizhu (1190); SEP “Zhu Xi”
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Konfucjusz › według tradycji 551–479 p.n.e.
Mencjusz
pod wpływem
Zhu Xi made the Mencius one of the Four Books and, in his Collected Commentaries (1190), read its good nature and four sprouts through his theory of principle. Zhu Xi, Mengzi jizhu, in Sishu zhangju jizhu (1190); SEP “Zhu Xi”
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Mencjusz › ok. 372–289 p.n.e.
Zhou Dunyi
pod wpływem
Zhu Xi commented on Zhou Dunyi’s Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate, read the supreme ultimate as principle and made Zhou founder of the Learning of the Way. Zhu Xi, Taijitu shuo jie; W.-t. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (1963)
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Zhou Dunyi › 1017–1073
Zhang Zai
pod wpływem
Zhu Xi took over Zhang Zai’s distinction between original nature and the physical nature and his formula that the mind unites nature and feelings (Jinsilu, 1175). Zhu Xi & Lü Zuqian, Jinsilu (1175), tr. W.-t. Chan, Reflections on Things at Hand (1967); Zhuzi yulei
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Zhang Zai › 1020–1077
Cheng Hao
pod wpływem
Zhu Xi compiled the Cheng brothers’ recorded sayings (Er Cheng yishu, 1168) and, with Lü Zuqian, took Cheng Hao’s sayings into Reflections on Things at Hand (1175). Zhu Xi (ed.), Er Cheng yishu (1168); Zhu Xi & Lü Zuqian, Jinsilu (1175), tr. W.-t. Chan, Reflections on Things at Hand (1967)
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Cheng Hao › 1032–1085
Cheng Yi
pod wpływem
Zhu Xi adopted Cheng Yi’s theses that the nature is principle and that investigating things means probing principle, the latter in his supplement to the Great Learning (1189). Zhu Xi, Daxue zhangju (preface 1189), supplement on the investigation of things; W.-t. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (1963)
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Cheng Yi › 1033–1107
Wpływ na 4
Yi Hwang
wpływ na
Yi Hwang compiled the Essentials of Zhu Xi’s Letters (Juja seo jeoryo) and summed up Zhu’s learning of the sage in his Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning (1568). Yi Hwang, Juja seo jeoryo; Seonghak sipdo (1568), tr. M. C. Kalton, To Become a Sage (1988)
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Yi Hwang › 1501–1570
Yi I
wpływ na
Yi I (Yulgok) recast Zhu Xi’s theory of principle and material force as the idea that principle runs through all things while material force sets their limits (itong giguk; letters to Seong Hon, 1572). Yi I, letters to Seong Hon (1572); Seonghak jibyo (1575); E. Y. J. Chung, The Korean Neo-Confucianism of Yi T’oegye and Yi Yulgok (1995); M. C. Kalton et al., The Four-Seven Debate (1994)
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Yi I › 1536–1584
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
wpływ na sporne
In his Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716) Leibniz likened Zhu Xi’s li to God; he knew it only from missionaries, and influence is disputed. G. W. Leibniz, Discours sur la théologie naturelle des Chinois (letter to N. Remond, 1716); N. Longobardi, Traité sur quelques points de la religion des Chinois (1701); D. E. Mungello, Leibniz and Confucianism (1977)
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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz › 1646–1716
Feng Youlan
wpływ na
Feng Youlan’s New Learning of Principle (Xin lixue, 1939) ‘carried on’ rather than merely followed Zhu Xi, recasting principle as logical concepts with the help of Western realism. Feng Youlan, Xin lixue (1939); IEP “Feng Youlan”
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Feng Youlan › 1895–1990
Krytyka
Wzajemna krytyka 1
Lu Jiuyuan ⇄ wzajemnie
krytykuje
Zhu Xi faulted Lu Jiuyuan for neglecting study and the investigation of things and for leaning towards Chan Buddhism, as at the Goose Lake meeting of 1175. Zhu Xi, Zhuzi yulei 124; W.-t. Chan, Chu Hsi: New Studies, 1989
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krytyka ze strony
Lu Jiuyuan held that Zhu Xi’s path of study and investigating things was fragmented, since the mind itself is principle (Goose Lake meeting, 1175; letters of 1188). Lu Jiuyuan, Xiangshan quanji; W.-t. Chan, Chu Hsi: New Studies, 1989
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Lu Jiuyuan › 1139–1193
Krytyka ze strony 8
Wang Yangming wpływ na
wpływ na
In Zhuzi wannian dinglun (1518) Wang Yangming selected letters of Zhu Xi to argue that Zhu had late in life approached Wang’s own learning of the mind. Wang Yangming, Zhuzi wannian dinglun (1518); W.-t. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living (1963)
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
krytyka ze strony
Wang Yangming rejected Zhu Xi’s investigation of external things, which he had tried in vain on bamboo: principle is in the mind, and knowing is acting (Chuanxi lu). Wang Yangming, Chuanxi lu (1518 ff.), tr. W.-t. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, 1963; SEP “Wang Yangming”
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Wang Yangming › 1472–1529
Jinsai Itō
krytyka ze strony
Itō Jinsai rejected Zhu Xi’s metaphysics of principle as alien to Confucius and Mencius, reading the Way as humaneness in everyday human relations (Gomō jigi, 1683). Itō Jinsai, Gomō jigi (1683, publ. 1705), tr. J. A. Tucker, 1998
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Jinsai Itō › 1627–1705
Nicolas Malebranche
krytyka ze strony
Malebranche’s Dialogue between a Christian Philosopher and a Chinese Philosopher (1708) attacks the Neo-Confucian li, as systematised by Zhu Xi and known to him from missionary reports, as an impersonal principle that confuses God with matter – in his eyes close to Spinoza. N. Malebranche, Entretien d’un philosophe chrétien et d’un philosophe chinois sur l’existence et la nature de Dieu (1708); D. E. Mungello, “Malebranche and Chinese Philosophy”, Journal of the History of Ideas 41 (1980)
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Nicolas Malebranche › 1638–1715
Sorai Ogyū
krytyka ze strony
Ogyū Sorai rejected Zhu Xi’s principle as speculation: the Way is not inherent in human nature but the rites and institutions of the ancient kings (Bendō, 1717). Ogyū Sorai, Bendō (1717), tr. J. A. Tucker, Ogyū Sorai’s Philosophical Masterworks, 2006
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Sorai Ogyū › 1666–1728
Dai Zhen
krytyka ze strony
Dai Zhen rejected Zhu Xi’s principle as something bestowed by Heaven and residing in the mind: principle is the order within things and desires, found by study (1777). Dai Zhen, Mengzi ziyi shuzheng (1777), tr. A. Chin & M. Freeman, Tai Chen on Mencius, 1990
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Dai Zhen › 1724–1777
Mou Zongsan
krytyka ze strony
Mou Zongsan judged that Zhu Xi made a side branch the main line: his principle merely exists and is inactive, unlike Mencius’ moral mind (Xinti yu xingti). Mou Zongsan, Xinti yu xingti (1968–69); N. S. Chan, The Thought of Mou Zongsan, 2011
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Mou Zongsan › 1909–1995
Pokaż wszystko (8)Pokaż mniej
Wang Fuzhi
krytyka ze strony
Wang Fuzhi rejected Zhu Xi’s priority of principle over material force: principle is only the pattern of qi and cannot exist apart from it (Du Sishu daquan shuo). Wang Fuzhi, Du Sishu daquan shuo; SEP “Wang Fuzhi”
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Wang Fuzhi › 1619–1692
Jeong Yak-yong (Dasan)
krytyka ze strony
Jeong Yak-yong (Dasan) rejected Zhu Xi’s identification of human nature with principle, defining it as an inclination (giho) to delight in goodness, realised through practice. Jeong Yak-yong, Maengja youi; M. Setton, Chŏng Yagyong: Korea’s Challenge to Orthodox Neo-Confucianism, 1997
Źródło: szkic AI
Jeong Yak-yong (Dasan) › 1762–1836
Krytykuje 1
Budda Siakjamuni
krytykuje
Zhu Xi criticised Buddhism for taking human nature and principle to be empty and for abandoning family and social duties (Zhuzi yulei 126). Zhu Xi, Zhuzi yulei, juan 126; W.-t. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 1963
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Budda Siakjamuni › ok. 480–400 p.n.e. · datowane umownie 563–483 p.n.e.
Dzieła
Ustanowiły kanon Dialogów konfucjańskich, Mengzi i innych ksiąg – podstawa egzaminów urzędniczych od 1313 do 1905 roku.
Stanowisko
Zhu Xi wove the Neo-Confucian thought of the Cheng brothers and others into a comprehensive system. Everything consists of qi, vital matter-energy, and li, principle – the pattern that makes each thing what it is and that is ultimately one, the Supreme Ultimate. Human nature is principle and therefore good, but it is clouded by turbid qi. Through the “investigation of things” and careful study, one comes to understand principle and to recover one’s original nature. He made the Four Books the core of the canon, and from the fourteenth century until 1905 his commentaries were the basis of the Chinese civil service examinations.
Życie i kontekst
Zhu Xi lived under the Southern Song dynasty, passed the highest state examination at eighteen and held various official posts, but spent most of his life teaching and writing, notably at the White Deer Grotto Academy, which he restored. At times politically out of favour, his teaching was even banned as “false learning” shortly before his death.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- Reflections on Things at Hand (Jinsi lu, with Lü Zuqian, 1175)
- Commentaries on the Four Books (c. 1190)
- Classified Conversations of Master Zhu (Zhuzi yulei, compiled 1270)
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