جون سمارت
الإحساس، كالألم، ليس إلا عملية في الدماغ، والفعل الصحيح هو الذي له أفضل العواقب.
التموضع
فيلسوف بريطاني المولد في أديلايد وكانبرا: الأحاسيس عمليات دماغية («الأحاسيس والعمليات الدماغية»، 1959)؛ ونفعي في الفعل سمّى اتباع القاعدة الصارم «عبادة القاعدة».
الأفكار الرئيسة
- نظرية هوية العقل والدماغ
- التحليل المحايد موضوعيًا
- نفعية الفعل
- النظرة اللازمنية إلى الزمن
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 3
هنري سيدجويك
تأثّر بـ
Smart rested his act utilitarianism on an ultimate attitude of generalised benevolence, close to Sidgwick’s axiom of benevolence (‘An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics’, 1961). J. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (1961); J. J. C. Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973); SEP “Henry Sidgwick”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
هنري سيدجويك › 1838–1900
غلبرت رايل
تأثّر بـ
Smart, who studied with Ryle at Oxford, held a Rylean behaviourism at Adelaide until Place persuaded him that sensations are brain processes (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, 1959). J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
غلبرت رايل › 1900–1976
يولين بليس
تأثّر بـ
Convinced by his Adelaide colleague Place, Smart defended the identity of sensations and brain processes and answered objections to Place’s thesis (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, 1959). J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
يولين بليس › 1924–2000
أثّر في 2
ديفيد لويس
أثّر في
Lewis gave Smart’s identity of experiences and brain processes a new argument: experiences are defined by their causal roles, and the occupants of these roles are physical (1966). D. Lewis, “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ديفيد لويس › 1941–2001
فرانك كاميرون جاكسون
أثّر في
Jackson worked within the Australian materialism shaped by Smart: after the knowledge argument (1982) he returned to a physicalism defended by conceptual analysis (From Metaphysics to Ethics, 1998). F. Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (1998); “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
فرانك كاميرون جاكسون › وُلد 1943
النقد
انتقده 2
هيلاري بوتنام
انتقده
Putnam objected to Smart’s identity of sensations and brain processes that pain can be realised in different systems, so mental states are functional states (‘Psychological Predicates’, 1967). H. Putnam, “Psychological Predicates” (1967), repr. as “The Nature of Mental States”; J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
هيلاري بوتنام › 1926–2016
بيرنارد وليمز
انتقده
Answering Smart, Williams argued that utilitarian ‘negative responsibility’ turns agents into channels for the best outcome and attacks their integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973), §§ 3–5 (the cases of George and Jim)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
بيرنارد وليمز › 1929–2003
الأعمال
الأحاسيس عمليات دماغية: الهوية عرضية يكشفها العلم، كهوية البرق والتفريغ الكهربائي.
يدافع سمارت عن نفعية الفعل ويهاجمها ويليامز – بحالتي جورج الكيميائي وجيم الذي يُطلب منه إطلاق النار على واحد من عشرين أسيرًا ليُفرج عن التسعة عشر الآخرين.
الموقف
At Adelaide Smart defended a Rylean, behaviourist account of the mind until discussions with his colleague U. T. Place convinced him otherwise. “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959) argued that sensations are brain processes. The identity is contingent, discovered by science rather than by analysing meanings, just as lightning turned out to be an electrical discharge; so it is no objection that “I have a pain” does not mean “a certain brain process is going on”. To answer the worry that sensations have special properties, he proposed “topic-neutral” translations: a report of an after-image says that something is going on in me like what goes on when I see an orange. Simplicity and Occam’s razor speak for the identity. The theory became known as Australian materialism; Putnam’s argument that the same mental state can be realised in different physical systems was its main challenge. In ethics Smart defended act utilitarianism: the right act is the one with the best consequences, and sticking to a rule when breaking it would be better is “superstitious rule worship”. Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973) paired his defence with Bernard Williams’s attack. In metaphysics he held a tenseless, four-dimensional view of time in which the passage of time is an illusion.
الحياة والسياق
John Jamieson Carswell Smart was born in 1920 in Cambridge, England, to Scottish parents; his father was the astronomer W. M. Smart, and his brother Ninian became a scholar of religion. He studied at Glasgow, served in the British Army in India and Burma during the Second World War and then took the BPhil at Oxford. In 1950 he became professor of philosophy at the University of Adelaide, where he remained until 1972, before moving to La Trobe University and in 1976 to the Australian National University in Canberra. He was made a Companion of the Order of Australia in 1990 and died in Melbourne in 2012.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism (1956)
- An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (1961)
- Philosophy and Scientific Realism (1963)
- Our Place in the Universe (1989)
يرد في
- نقاش «ما الوعي؟»
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