伯纳德·威廉斯
道德无法被塞进一个整齐的理论里——运气决定了我们因什么而受到责备，而我们自己最深的承诺也很重要。
定位
道德运气、正直，以及道德理论的局限。
核心思想
- 道德运气
- 正直
- 内在理由
学生: 米兰达·弗里克
影响
受影响于 3
亚里士多德
受其影响
Williams began ethics with Socrates’ question how one should live and examined Aristotle’s attempt to ground ethics in human well-being (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 1985). B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985); Shame and Necessity (1993); SEP “Bernard Williams”
依据: AI 草稿
亚里士多德 › 公元前384—前322年
弗里德里希·尼采
受其影响 ✓
Williams used Nietzsche’s genealogy to explain values through their history, but in vindicating rather than debunking form, for the virtues of truth (Truth and Truthfulness, 2002). B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (2002); “Nietzsche’s Minimalist Moral Psychology” (1993); SEP “Bernard Williams”
弗里德里希·尼采 › 1844–1900
路德维希·维特根斯坦
受其影响
Williams asked whether Wittgenstein’s later philosophy implies a transcendental idealism of the first-person plural (‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’, 1974) and discussed Wittgensteinian arguments on thick ethical concepts (1985). B. Williams, “Wittgenstein and Idealism” (1974), in Moral Luck (1981); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985); SEP “Bernard Williams”
依据: AI 草稿
路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951
影响了 3
玛莎·努斯鲍姆
影响了
Nussbaum took up Williams’s ‘moral luck’ and his doubts about systematic moral theory in her study of Greek tragedy and ethics (The Fragility of Goodness, 1986). M. C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (1986); B. Williams, “Moral Luck”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 50 (1976)
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
玛莎·努斯鲍姆 › 1947年生
米兰达·弗里克 教过
教过
Fricker’s Oxford DPhil (1996) was co-supervised by Bernard Williams and Sabina Lovibond; in Epistemic Injustice (2007) she takes up Williams’s genealogical method. M. Fricker, personal website (mirandafricker.com, “About”); M. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice (2007)
依据: AI 草稿
米兰达·弗里克 › 1966年生
阿米娅·斯里尼瓦桑
影响了
Srinivasan asked when genealogies of belief undermine and when they vindicate, a contrast set out in Williams’s Truth and Truthfulness (2002), and introduced ‘genealogical luck’ (2019). A. Srinivasan, “Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2019); B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness (2002)
依据: AI 草稿
阿米娅·斯里尼瓦桑 › 1984年生
批评
受批评于 2
德里克·帕菲特
受其批评
Parfit rejected Williams’s view that all reasons are internal, grounded in motivations: reasons are given by facts that count in favour of acting (On What Matters, 2011). D. Parfit, “Reasons and Motivation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 71 (1997); On What Matters (2011), vol. 1; B. Williams, “Internal and External Reasons” (1980)
依据: AI 草稿
德里克·帕菲特 › 1942–2017
克里斯蒂娜·科尔斯戈德
受其批评
Korsgaard argued against Williams that motivational scepticism about practical reason depends on content scepticism: if pure practical reason exists, it can motivate (‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, 1986). C. M. Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason”, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), 5–25; B. Williams, “Internal and External Reasons” (1980); Williams’s response in Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (1996)
依据: AI 草稿
克里斯蒂娜·科尔斯戈德 › 1952年生
批评了 4
伊曼努尔·康德
批评了
Williams objected that Kantian impartiality alienates agents from their attachments: a husband rescuing his wife on impartial grounds has ‘one thought too many’ (‘Persons, Character and Morality’, 1976). B. Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality” (1976), in Moral Luck (1981); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), ch. 10
依据: AI 草稿
伊曼努尔·康德 › 1724–1804
杰里米·边沁
批评了
Williams argued that utilitarianism as founded by Bentham sums welfare impersonally and leaves no room for agents’ own projects and integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), ch. 5
依据: AI 草稿
杰里米·边沁 › 1748–1832
约翰·斯图尔特·密尔
批评了
Williams’s critique of utilitarianism, aimed chiefly at Smart, extends to Mill’s: it weighs lives impersonally and leaves no place for integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), chs. 5–6
依据: AI 草稿
约翰·斯图尔特·密尔 › 1806–1873
J. J. C. 斯马特
批评了
Answering Smart, Williams argued that utilitarian ‘negative responsibility’ turns agents into channels for the best outcome and attacks their integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973), §§ 3–5 (the cases of George and Jim)
依据: AI 草稿
J. J. C. 斯马特 › 1920–2012
作品
- 1973功利主义：赞成与反对
斯马特为行为功利主义辩护，威廉斯则攻击它——以化学家乔治的案例和吉姆的案例为例，后者被要求枪杀二十名俘虏中的一人，以便其余十九人获释。
- 1976道德运气
高更与卡车司机：道德也取决于运气。
- 1985伦理学与哲学的限度
反对“道德体系”——主张厚伦理概念。
立场
Williams was a sharp sceptic of systematic moral theory. Utilitarianism and Kantianism, he argued, look at action from an impersonal standpoint that ignores what gives human lives their shape: personal projects, attachments and integrity. In his famous case of Jim, who is told that if he shoots one villager the other nineteen will be spared, the point is not that the answer is obvious but that the utilitarian ignores what it means for Jim to do it. With the concept of “moral luck” he showed that our moral assessment depends on factors beyond our control. Williams defended “thick” ethical concepts such as cruelty or courage against thin, abstract notions of “ought.” His later work on truthfulness and Greek ethics broadened this into a historically aware philosophy.
生平与背景
Williams was born in Essex in 1929, studied classics and philosophy at Oxford and flew Spitfires in Canada with the Royal Air Force during national service. He taught in London and Cambridge, where he was Knightbridge Professor and Provost of King’s College, then at Berkeley and finally Oxford. He chaired a government committee on obscenity and film censorship and was knighted in 1999.
其他主要作品
- Utilitarianism: For and Against (with J. J. C. Smart, 1973)
- Moral Luck (1976)
- Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985)
- Shame and Necessity (1993)
- Truth and Truthfulness (2002)
出现在
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