बर्नार्ड विलियम्स
नैतिकता को एक सुघड़ सिद्धांत में नहीं निचोड़ा जा सकता – संयोग आकार देता है कि हमें किसके लिए दोषी ठहराया जाता है, और हमारी अपनी गहनतम प्रतिबद्धताएँ मायने रखती हैं।
पृष्ठभूमि
नैतिक भाग्य, अखंडता और नैतिक सिद्धांत की सीमाएँ।
मुख्य विचार
- नैतिक भाग्य
- अखंडता
- आंतरिक कारण
शिष्य: मिरांडा फ़्रिकर
प्रभाव
जिनसे प्रभावित 3
अरस्तू
जिनसे प्रभावित
Williams began ethics with Socrates’ question how one should live and examined Aristotle’s attempt to ground ethics in human well-being (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 1985). B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985); Shame and Necessity (1993); SEP “Bernard Williams”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
अरस्तू › 384–322 ईसा पूर्व
फ़्रीडरिश नीत्शे
जिनसे प्रभावित ✓
Williams used Nietzsche’s genealogy to explain values through their history, but in vindicating rather than debunking form, for the virtues of truth (Truth and Truthfulness, 2002). B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (2002); “Nietzsche’s Minimalist Moral Psychology” (1993); SEP “Bernard Williams”
फ़्रीडरिश नीत्शे › 1844–1900
लुडविग विट्गेंश्टाइन
जिनसे प्रभावित
Williams asked whether Wittgenstein’s later philosophy implies a transcendental idealism of the first-person plural (‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’, 1974) and discussed Wittgensteinian arguments on thick ethical concepts (1985). B. Williams, “Wittgenstein and Idealism” (1974), in Moral Luck (1981); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985); SEP “Bernard Williams”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
लुडविग विट्गेंश्टाइन › 1889–1951
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया 3
मार्था नस्बॉम
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
Nussbaum took up Williams’s ‘moral luck’ and his doubts about systematic moral theory in her study of Greek tragedy and ethics (The Fragility of Goodness, 1986). M. C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (1986); B. Williams, “Moral Luck”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 50 (1976)
साक्ष्य: InPhO में भी · InPhO
मार्था नस्बॉम › जन्म 1947
मिरांडा फ़्रिकर जिन्हें पढ़ाया
जिन्हें पढ़ाया
Fricker’s Oxford DPhil (1996) was co-supervised by Bernard Williams and Sabina Lovibond; in Epistemic Injustice (2007) she takes up Williams’s genealogical method. M. Fricker, personal website (mirandafricker.com, “About”); M. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice (2007)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
मिरांडा फ़्रिकर › जन्म 1966
अमिया श्रीनिवासन
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
Srinivasan asked when genealogies of belief undermine and when they vindicate, a contrast set out in Williams’s Truth and Truthfulness (2002), and introduced ‘genealogical luck’ (2019). A. Srinivasan, “Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2019); B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness (2002)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
अमिया श्रीनिवासन › जन्म 1984
आलोचना
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित 2
डेरेक पारफ़िट
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Parfit rejected Williams’s view that all reasons are internal, grounded in motivations: reasons are given by facts that count in favour of acting (On What Matters, 2011). D. Parfit, “Reasons and Motivation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 71 (1997); On What Matters (2011), vol. 1; B. Williams, “Internal and External Reasons” (1980)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
डेरेक पारफ़िट › 1942–2017
क्रिस्टीन कोर्सगार्ड
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Korsgaard argued against Williams that motivational scepticism about practical reason depends on content scepticism: if pure practical reason exists, it can motivate (‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, 1986). C. M. Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason”, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), 5–25; B. Williams, “Internal and External Reasons” (1980); Williams’s response in Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (1996)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
क्रिस्टीन कोर्सगार्ड › जन्म 1952
जिनकी आलोचना की 4
इमानुएल कांट
जिनकी आलोचना की
Williams objected that Kantian impartiality alienates agents from their attachments: a husband rescuing his wife on impartial grounds has ‘one thought too many’ (‘Persons, Character and Morality’, 1976). B. Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality” (1976), in Moral Luck (1981); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), ch. 10
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
इमानुएल कांट › 1724–1804
जेरेमी बेन्थम
जिनकी आलोचना की
Williams argued that utilitarianism as founded by Bentham sums welfare impersonally and leaves no room for agents’ own projects and integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), ch. 5
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
जेरेमी बेन्थम › 1748–1832
जॉन स्टुअर्ट मिल
जिनकी आलोचना की
Williams’s critique of utilitarianism, aimed chiefly at Smart, extends to Mill’s: it weighs lives impersonally and leaves no place for integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973); Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), chs. 5–6
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
जॉन स्टुअर्ट मिल › 1806–1873
जे. जे. सी. स्मार्ट
जिनकी आलोचना की
Answering Smart, Williams argued that utilitarian ‘negative responsibility’ turns agents into channels for the best outcome and attacks their integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973), §§ 3–5 (the cases of George and Jim)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
जे. जे. सी. स्मार्ट › 1920–2012
कृतियाँ
स्मार्ट कर्म-उपयोगितावाद का बचाव करते हैं, विलियम्स उस पर प्रहार करते हैं – रसायनज्ञ जॉर्ज और जिम के मामलों के साथ, जिनसे बीस बंदियों में से एक को गोली मारने को कहा जाता है ताकि बाकी उन्नीस छूट जाएँ।
- 1976नैतिक भाग्य
गोगें और लॉरी-चालक: नैतिकता भाग्य पर भी निर्भर करती है।
“नैतिकता-प्रणाली” के विरुद्ध – सघन नैतिक अवधारणाओं के पक्ष में।
मत
Williams was a sharp sceptic of systematic moral theory. Utilitarianism and Kantianism, he argued, look at action from an impersonal standpoint that ignores what gives human lives their shape: personal projects, attachments and integrity. In his famous case of Jim, who is told that if he shoots one villager the other nineteen will be spared, the point is not that the answer is obvious but that the utilitarian ignores what it means for Jim to do it. With the concept of “moral luck” he showed that our moral assessment depends on factors beyond our control. Williams defended “thick” ethical concepts such as cruelty or courage against thin, abstract notions of “ought.” His later work on truthfulness and Greek ethics broadened this into a historically aware philosophy.
जीवन और संदर्भ
Williams was born in Essex in 1929, studied classics and philosophy at Oxford and flew Spitfires in Canada with the Royal Air Force during national service. He taught in London and Cambridge, where he was Knightbridge Professor and Provost of King’s College, then at Berkeley and finally Oxford. He chaired a government committee on obscenity and film censorship and was knighted in 1999.
अन्य प्रमुख कृतियाँ
- Utilitarianism: For and Against (with J. J. C. Smart, 1973)
- Moral Luck (1976)
- Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985)
- Shame and Necessity (1993)
- Truth and Truthfulness (2002)
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