ميراندا فريكر
يمكن أن يقع الظلم على الناس بوصفهم عارفين: حين لا يُصدَّقون بسبب تحيّز مسبق، أو حين يفتقر المجتمع إلى المفاهيم التي تتيح فهم ما يعيشونه.
التموضع
عالمة نظرية معرفة اجتماعية في جامعة نيويورك: يمكن أن يُظلَم الناس بوصفهم عارفين – إذ يُكذَّبون بسبب الأحكام المسبقة (ظلم الشهادة) أو يُترَكون بلا المفاهيم التي تتيح لهم فهم تجربتهم (الظلم التأويلي).
الأفكار الرئيسة
- الظلم المعرفي
- ظلم الشهادة والظلم التأويلي
- فضائل العدالة المعرفية
الأساتذة: بيرنارد وليمز
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 3
أرسطو
تأثّر بـ
Fricker modelled testimonial and hermeneutical justice as Aristotelian virtues of the hearer, a trained, second-nature sensibility that corrects prejudice in judging credibility (Epistemic Injustice, 2007). M. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أرسطو › 384–322 ق.م
ميشال فوكو
تأثّر بـ
Fricker adopted Foucault’s point that power can operate structurally, without a particular agent, in her notion of identity power behind testimonial injustice (Epistemic Injustice, 2007). M. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007); SEP “Michel Foucault”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ميشال فوكو › 1926–1984
بيرنارد وليمز تتلمذ على
تتلمذ على
Fricker’s Oxford DPhil (1996) was co-supervised by Bernard Williams and Sabina Lovibond; in Epistemic Injustice (2007) she takes up Williams’s genealogical method. M. Fricker, personal website (mirandafricker.com, “About”); M. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice (2007)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
بيرنارد وليمز › 1929–2003
النقد
انتقده 2
خوسيه مدينا
انتقده
Medina, largely agreeing with Fricker, objected that her ‘collective hermeneutical resource’ suggests a single pool, and argued for analysing plural interpretive communities (‘Polyphonic Contextualism’, 2012). J. Medina, “Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism”, Social Epistemology 26 (2012) 201–220; The Epistemology of Resistance (2013); M. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice (2007); Fricker’s reply: “How is Hermeneutical Injustice Related to ‘White Ignorance’?”, Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (2013)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
خوسيه مدينا › وُلد 1968
كريستي دوتسون
انتقده
Dotson argued that Fricker’s two forms of epistemic injustice miss ‘contributory injustice’: marginalised groups have interpretive resources, but dominant knowers wilfully ignore them (‘A Cautionary Tale’, 2012). K. Dotson, “A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression”, Frontiers 33 (2012), 24–47; “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression”, Social Epistemology 28 (2014); M. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice (2007)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
كريستي دوتسون › معاصر
الموقف
“Epistemic Injustice” identified a kind of wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice leads a hearer to give a speaker less credibility than they deserve – a woman’s well-founded suspicion dismissed as “female intuition”, a Black man disbelieved by a white jury, as in “To Kill a Mockingbird”. Hermeneutical injustice occurs earlier, when a gap in a society’s shared concepts leaves people unable to make sense of an important area of their own experience; her example is women who suffered sexual harassment before the concept existed and had no name for what was being done to them. Both wrongs harm people not only in their access to information and justice but in their standing as rational beings, and both arise from unequal social power, which she analyses, drawing partly on Foucault, as working through identities and a shared social imagination. The remedy lies partly in virtues: hearers can cultivate “testimonial justice” by correcting for prejudice, and “hermeneutical justice” by attending to what speakers struggle to say. The book founded a lively field of research. Her later work, much of it in conversation with Williams, concerns blame, forgiveness and the social point of moral practices.
الحياة والسياق
Miranda Fricker (born 1966) studied philosophy and modern languages at Oxford and women’s studies at the University of Kent, and took her doctorate at Oxford in 1996 under Sabina Lovibond and Bernard Williams. She taught for many years at Birkbeck, University of London, then from 2012 at the University of Sheffield and from 2016 at the CUNY Graduate Center in New York. Since 2022 she has been at New York University, where she is Julius Silver Professor of Philosophy and co-director of the New York Institute of Philosophy. She is a Fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
الأعمال الرئيسة
- The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy (ed. with Jennifer Hornsby, 2000)
- Epistemic Injustice (2007)
- What’s the Point of Blame? (2016)
- The Epistemic Life of Groups (ed. with Michael Brady, 2016)
يرد في
بحسب الوضع في نوفمبر 2026 · المصادر · حسّن هذه الصفحة · كيف صُنع Agora