约翰·塞尔

Agora

约翰·塞尔

1932–2025

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

一台操纵符号的计算机并不比一个在中文屋里遵循规则的人更理解这些符号——心灵不仅仅是程序。

定位

分析哲学 · 北美 · 语言, 心灵与意识, 社会与历史

中文屋：句法不是语义——这是反对强人工智能的论证。

核心思想

中文屋
意向性
社会本体论

老师: J. L. 奥斯汀, P. F. 斯特劳森

在星图中打开

影响

受影响于 5

戈特洛布·弗雷格

受其影响
Searle developed Frege’s view that proper names have a sense into a cluster theory of names (‘Proper Names’, 1958) and defended a Fregean account of reference (Intentionality, 1983). J. R. Searle, “Proper Names”, Mind 67 (1958); Speech Acts (1969); Intentionality (1983)
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
戈特洛布·弗雷格 › 1848–1925
路德维希·维特根斯坦

受其影响 ✓
Searle acknowledged the later Wittgenstein, especially On Certainty, as a source of his thesis that intentional states work only against a non-representational Background (Intentionality, 1983). J. R. Searle, Intentionality (1983); The Construction of Social Reality (1995); L. Wittgenstein, Über Gewißheit (publ. 1969)
依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata · InPhO
路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951
J. L. 奥斯汀师从

师从
At Oxford, where he studied from 1952 as a Rhodes Scholar, Searle was taught by Austin as well as by Strawson, Berlin and Hampshire; his Speech Acts (1969) developed Austin’s theory, although he said Austin’s attention to linguistic minutiae left him unmoved. J. R. Searle, interview with T. Crane, CRASSH, University of Cambridge (9 June 2014)
依据: AI 草稿
J. L. 奥斯汀 › 1911–1960
H. P. 格莱斯

受其影响
Searle adopted Grice’s analysis of meaning through the intended recognition of intentions but held that it must include linguistic conventions (Speech Acts, 1969). J. R. Searle, Speech Acts (1969); H. P. Grice, “Meaning”, Philosophical Review 66 (1957); SEP “Paul Grice”
依据: AI 草稿
H. P. 格莱斯 › 1913–1988
P. F. 斯特劳森师从

师从
Strawson was Searle’s tutor at Oxford; Searle credited him without hesitation with having truly taught him how to do philosophy, recalled tutorials for which his essay was due a day in advance, and the two became close friends. J. R. Searle, interview with T. Crane, CRASSH, University of Cambridge (9 June 2014)
依据: AI 草稿
P. F. 斯特劳森 › 1919–2006

批评

受批评于 3

索尔·克里普克

受其批评
Kripke rejected Searle’s cluster theory of names: no weighted set of descriptions fixes reference, since the bearer might satisfy none of them (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lecture I; J. R. Searle, “Proper Names”, Mind 67 (1958)
依据: AI 草稿
索尔·克里普克 › 1940–2022
丹尼尔·丹尼特

受其批评
Dennett called Searle’s Chinese Room an ‘intuition pump’ that directs attention to the rule-following man instead of the whole system (‘The Milk of Human Intentionality’, 1980). D. C. Dennett, “The Milk of Human Intentionality”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980); Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 14
依据: AI 草稿
丹尼尔·丹尼特 › 1942–2024
大卫·查尔默斯

受其批评
Chalmers rejected Searle’s Chinese Room argument: by the principle of organisational invariance, a system with the right functional organisation would be conscious (The Conscious Mind, 1996, ch. 9). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996), chs. 7, 9; J. R. Searle, “Consciousness and the Philosophers”, New York Review of Books, 6 March 1997, and the ensuing exchange
依据: AI 草稿
大卫·查尔默斯 › 1966年生

批评了 2

艾伦·图灵

批评了
Searle’s Chinese Room targeted the Turing test as a criterion of understanding: a program passing it by symbol manipulation need not understand anything (‘Minds, Brains, and Programs’, 1980). J. R. Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980), 417–457; A. M. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Mind 59 (1950)
依据: AI 草稿
艾伦·图灵 › 1912–1954
雅克·德里达

批评了
Searle replied that Derrida’s ‘Signature Event Context’ misreads Austin: iterability does not undermine intention, and setting aside parasitic speech is a research strategy (‘Reiterating the Differences’, 1977). J. R. Searle, “Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida”, Glyph 1 (1977), 198–208; J. Derrida, “Limited Inc a b c …”, Glyph 2 (1977)
依据: AI 草稿
雅克·德里达 › 1930–2004

作品

1969言语行为
对奥斯汀言语行为理论的系统化。
1977重申差异：答德里达
塞尔对德里达解读奥斯汀的尖锐回应。
1980心灵、大脑与程序（中文屋）
符号操作不等于理解。

立场

Searle systematised Austin’s speech act theory, showing how promises, assertions and orders follow constitutive rules. He then turned to the mind: intentionality – the directedness of thoughts toward the world – is a biological feature of brains, as real as digestion. His most famous argument is the Chinese Room: a person who follows rules for manipulating Chinese symbols without understanding Chinese could produce perfect answers, yet would understand nothing. Hence computers that only process syntax do not thereby possess semantics, and “strong AI” is false. Searle did not deny that a machine could think – brains, he said, are machines – only that running a program could ever be enough; critics answer that the whole system, not the person in the room, might understand. Later he explained how social reality – money, marriages, states – arises from collective acceptance of the form “X counts as Y in context C.”

生平与背景

Searle was born in Denver in 1932 and studied at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, where he was influenced by J. L. Austin and Peter Strawson. From 1959 he taught at the University of California, Berkeley, for most of his career. He became widely known beyond philosophy through public debates on artificial intelligence and his controversy with Jacques Derrida. In 2019 the university revoked his emeritus status after finding that he had violated its policies on sexual harassment and retaliation. He died in 2025.