米兰达·弗里克

立场

“Epistemic Injustice” identified a kind of wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice leads a hearer to give a speaker less credibility than they deserve – a woman’s well-founded suspicion dismissed as “female intuition”, a Black man disbelieved by a white jury, as in “To Kill a Mockingbird”. Hermeneutical injustice occurs earlier, when a gap in a society’s shared concepts leaves people unable to make sense of an important area of their own experience; her example is women who suffered sexual harassment before the concept existed and had no name for what was being done to them. Both wrongs harm people not only in their access to information and justice but in their standing as rational beings, and both arise from unequal social power, which she analyses, drawing partly on Foucault, as working through identities and a shared social imagination. The remedy lies partly in virtues: hearers can cultivate “testimonial justice” by correcting for prejudice, and “hermeneutical justice” by attending to what speakers struggle to say. The book founded a lively field of research. Her later work, much of it in conversation with Williams, concerns blame, forgiveness and the social point of moral practices.

生平与背景

Miranda Fricker (born 1966) studied philosophy and modern languages at Oxford and women’s studies at the University of Kent, and took her doctorate at Oxford in 1996 under Sabina Lovibond and Bernard Williams. She taught for many years at Birkbeck, University of London, then from 2012 at the University of Sheffield and from 2016 at the CUNY Graduate Center in New York. Since 2022 she has been at New York University, where she is Julius Silver Professor of Philosophy and co-director of the New York Institute of Philosophy. She is a Fellow of the British Academy and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

主要作品

• The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy (ed. with Jennifer Hornsby, 2000)
• Epistemic Injustice (2007)
• What’s the Point of Blame? (2016)
• The Epistemic Life of Groups (ed. with Michael Brady, 2016)

出现在

• 争论 ‘谁被相信？认知不正义’