J. J. C. 斯马特

Agora

J. J. C. 斯马特

1920–2012

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

诸如疼痛之类的感觉只是大脑中的一个过程，而正确的行动就是带来最好后果的行动。

定位

分析哲学 · 北欧 · 心灵与意识, 伦理学, 形而上学, 科学

出生于英国、任教于阿德莱德和堪培拉的哲学家：感觉就是脑过程（《感觉与脑过程》，1959年）；行为功利主义者，他把严格遵守规则称为“规则崇拜”。

核心思想

心脑同一论
主题中立的分析
行为功利主义
无时态的时间观

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影响

受影响于 3

亨利·西季威克

受其影响
Smart rested his act utilitarianism on an ultimate attitude of generalised benevolence, close to Sidgwick’s axiom of benevolence (‘An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics’, 1961). J. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (1961); J. J. C. Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973); SEP “Henry Sidgwick”
依据: AI 草稿
亨利·西季威克 › 1838–1900
吉尔伯特·赖尔

受其影响
Smart, who studied with Ryle at Oxford, held a Rylean behaviourism at Adelaide until Place persuaded him that sensations are brain processes (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, 1959). J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
吉尔伯特·赖尔 › 1900–1976
U. T. 普莱斯

受其影响
Convinced by his Adelaide colleague Place, Smart defended the identity of sensations and brain processes and answered objections to Place’s thesis (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, 1959). J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
依据: AI 草稿
U. T. 普莱斯 › 1924–2000

影响了 2

戴维·刘易斯

影响了
Lewis gave Smart’s identity of experiences and brain processes a new argument: experiences are defined by their causal roles, and the occupants of these roles are physical (1966). D. Lewis, “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
依据: AI 草稿
戴维·刘易斯 › 1941–2001
弗兰克·杰克逊

影响了
Jackson worked within the Australian materialism shaped by Smart: after the knowledge argument (1982) he returned to a physicalism defended by conceptual analysis (From Metaphysics to Ethics, 1998). F. Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (1998); “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”
依据: AI 草稿
弗兰克·杰克逊 › 1943年生

批评

受批评于 2

希拉里·普特南

受其批评
Putnam objected to Smart’s identity of sensations and brain processes that pain can be realised in different systems, so mental states are functional states (‘Psychological Predicates’, 1967). H. Putnam, “Psychological Predicates” (1967), repr. as “The Nature of Mental States”; J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959)
依据: AI 草稿
希拉里·普特南 › 1926–2016
伯纳德·威廉斯

受其批评
Answering Smart, Williams argued that utilitarian ‘negative responsibility’ turns agents into channels for the best outcome and attacks their integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973), §§ 3–5 (the cases of George and Jim)
依据: AI 草稿
伯纳德·威廉斯 › 1929–2003

作品

1959感觉与大脑过程
感觉就是大脑过程：这种同一性是偶然的，由科学发现，就像闪电与放电的同一性那样。
1973功利主义：赞成与反对
斯马特为行为功利主义辩护，威廉斯则攻击它——以化学家乔治的案例和吉姆的案例为例，后者被要求枪杀二十名俘虏中的一人，以便其余十九人获释。

立场

At Adelaide Smart defended a Rylean, behaviourist account of the mind until discussions with his colleague U. T. Place convinced him otherwise. “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959) argued that sensations are brain processes. The identity is contingent, discovered by science rather than by analysing meanings, just as lightning turned out to be an electrical discharge; so it is no objection that “I have a pain” does not mean “a certain brain process is going on”. To answer the worry that sensations have special properties, he proposed “topic-neutral” translations: a report of an after-image says that something is going on in me like what goes on when I see an orange. Simplicity and Occam’s razor speak for the identity. The theory became known as Australian materialism; Putnam’s argument that the same mental state can be realised in different physical systems was its main challenge. In ethics Smart defended act utilitarianism: the right act is the one with the best consequences, and sticking to a rule when breaking it would be better is “superstitious rule worship”. Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973) paired his defence with Bernard Williams’s attack. In metaphysics he held a tenseless, four-dimensional view of time in which the passage of time is an illusion.

生平与背景

John Jamieson Carswell Smart was born in 1920 in Cambridge, England, to Scottish parents; his father was the astronomer W. M. Smart, and his brother Ninian became a scholar of religion. He studied at Glasgow, served in the British Army in India and Burma during the Second World War and then took the BPhil at Oxford. In 1950 he became professor of philosophy at the University of Adelaide, where he remained until 1972, before moving to La Trobe University and in 1976 to the Australian National University in Canberra. He was made a Companion of the Order of Australia in 1990 and died in Melbourne in 2012.