Daniel Dennett
Consciousness is no mystery but the work of many parallel processes in the brain, without an inner observer – there is no inner theatre where it all comes together.
Placement
Consciousness can be explained: no Cartesian theater, but “multiple drafts”; Darwin’s dangerous idea.
Key ideas
- Intentional stance
- Multiple Drafts
- Critique of qualia
Teachers: Gilbert Ryle, W. V. O. Quine
Influence
Influenced by 5
Charles Darwin
influenced by
Dennett read Darwin’s natural selection as an algorithmic process that yields design without a designer, a ‘universal acid’ for traditional ideas of purpose (Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 1995). D. C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (1995); C. Darwin, On the Origin of Species (1859)
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Charles Darwin › 1809–1882
Ludwig Wittgenstein
influenced by
Dennett, a student of Ryle, drew on Wittgenstein’s attack on private inner objects in denying that experience has ineffable, intrinsic qualia (‘Quining Qualia’, 1988; Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, “Quining Qualia”, in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science (1988); Consciousness Explained (1991)
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951
Gilbert Ryle studied with
studied with
Dennett wrote his Oxford DPhil (1965) under Ryle; the revised thesis became Content and Consciousness (1969). D. C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (1969), preface; I’ve Been Thinking (2023)
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Gilbert Ryle › 1900–1976
W. V. O. Quine studied with
studied with ✓
Dennett studied with Quine at Harvard (BA 1963) and wrote his senior thesis in critical engagement with him; for his doctorate he went to Ryle in Oxford. D. C. Dennett, I’ve Been Thinking (2023)
Evidence: AI draft
W. V. O. Quine › 1908–2000
Alan Turing
influenced by
Dennett defended Turing’s test as a fair criterion (‘Can Machines Think?’, 1985) and paired Turing with Darwin on competence without comprehension (From Bacteria to Bach and Back, 2017). D. C. Dennett, “Can Machines Think?” (1985), in Brainchildren (1998); From Bacteria to Bach and Back (2017); SEP “The Turing Test”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Alan Turing › 1912–1954
Influenced 1
Andy Clark
influenced
Clark took up Dennett’s picture of words as tools that augment cognition, treating public language as an external artefact that reshapes the brain’s computational tasks (‘Magic Words’, 1998). A. Clark, “Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation”, in P. Carruthers and J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought (1998); D. C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995)
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Andy Clark › b. 1957
Criticism
Criticized by 1
David Chalmers
criticised by
Chalmers argued that Dennett’s functional account of consciousness addresses only the ‘easy problems’ and denies the explanandum, experience itself (‘Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness’, 1995). D. J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995); The Conscious Mind (1996); reply: D. C. Dennett, “Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness”, JCS 3 (1996)
Evidence: AI draft
David Chalmers › b. 1966
Criticizes 5
René Descartes
criticised
Dennett attacked the ‘Cartesian Theater’, a central place in the brain where it all comes together for consciousness, surviving as ‘Cartesian materialism’ (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 5; D. C. Dennett & M. Kinsbourne, “Time and the Observer”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1992)
Evidence: AI draft
René Descartes › 1596–1650
John Searle
criticised
Dennett called Searle’s Chinese Room an ‘intuition pump’ that directs attention to the rule-following man instead of the whole system (‘The Milk of Human Intentionality’, 1980). D. C. Dennett, “The Milk of Human Intentionality”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980); Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 14
Evidence: AI draft
John Searle › 1932–2025
Jerry Fodor
criticised
Dennett objected to Fodor’s language of thought that ascribing beliefs does not require explicitly stored sentences in the head (‘A Cure for the Common Code?’, 1977). D. C. Dennett, “A Cure for the Common Code?”, Mind 86 (1977), repr. in Brainstorms (1978); The Intentional Stance (1987)
Evidence: AI draft
Jerry Fodor › 1935–2017
Thomas Nagel
criticised
Dennett denied Nagel’s claim that subjective experience escapes objective science: much about what it is like to be a bat can be learned (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 14; T. Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review 83 (1974); Nagel’s reply: “Is Consciousness an Illusion?”, New York Review of Books, 9 March 2017
Evidence: AI draft
Thomas Nagel › b. 1937
Frank Jackson
criticised
Dennett argued that Jackson’s Mary, knowing all physical facts, would learn nothing on seeing colour and would spot a blue-painted banana as a trick (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 12; F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); Jackson later gave up the argument (“Postscript on Qualia”, 1998)
Evidence: AI draft
Frank Jackson › b. 1943
Works
To ascribe beliefs is to adopt a predictive stance.
No Cartesian theater – multiple drafts.
Natural selection as a universal acid.
Position
Dennett sought to explain the mind entirely within a scientific, Darwinian world view. With the “intentional stance” he argued that attributing beliefs and desires is a strategy for predicting behaviour that works for people, animals and even chess computers – and that this success is all there is to having beliefs. In Consciousness Explained he rejected the “Cartesian theater,” the idea of a central place in the brain where everything comes together for an inner observer; instead, many parallel processes produce “multiple drafts.” He regarded qualia as a confused notion. In Darwin’s Dangerous Idea he described natural selection as a “universal acid” that dissolves traditional ideas of design and purpose. Dennett also defended a compatibilist account of free will.
Life & context
Dennett was born in Boston in 1942, studied at Harvard and wrote his doctorate at Oxford under Gilbert Ryle. For more than four decades he taught at Tufts University, where he co-directed the Center for Cognitive Studies. He worked closely with cognitive scientists and biologists and became one of the best-known public intellectuals of his time. He died in 2024.
Further main works
- Brainstorms (1978)
- Freedom Evolves (2003)
Appears in
- Journey ‘The Riddle of Consciousness’ · Stop 9 of 10
- Debate ‘Can Machines Think or Feel?’
- Debate ‘What Is Consciousness?’
- Debate ‘Are We Free? Free Will in an Age of Neuroscience’
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