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杰里·福多

1935–2017

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

思考是在一种内部符号语言中进行的计算，而知觉和语言则运行于专门化的、很大程度上天生的模块之上。

定位

分析哲学 · 北美 · 心灵与意识, 语言, 科学

麻省理工学院和罗格斯大学的认知科学哲学家：思维是在“思想语言”中对心理表征的计算；知觉依靠专门化的模块运行。

核心思想

  • 思想语言
  • 心灵的计算理论
  • 心灵的模块性
  • 概念天赋论

老师: 希拉里·普特南

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影响

受影响于 2

  • 艾伦·图灵

    受其影响

    Fodor built his computational theory of mind on Turing’s model of computation: thinking is rule-governed manipulation of symbols in a language of thought (The Language of Thought, 1975). J. A. Fodor, The Language of Thought (1975); The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way (2000); SEP “The Computational Theory of Mind”

    依据: AI 草稿

    艾伦·图灵 › 1912–1954

  • 希拉里·普特南 师从

    师从

    Fodor took his PhD at Princeton in 1960 under Putnam with a dissertation in the philosophy of language, The Uses of ‘Use’. Mathematics Genealogy Project, entry J. A. Fodor (Princeton 1960)

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    希拉里·普特南 › 1926–2016

批评

受批评于 2

  • 丹尼尔·丹尼特

    受其批评

    Dennett objected to Fodor’s language of thought that ascribing beliefs does not require explicitly stored sentences in the head (‘A Cure for the Common Code?’, 1977). D. C. Dennett, “A Cure for the Common Code?”, Mind 86 (1977), repr. in Brainstorms (1978); The Intentional Stance (1987)

    依据: AI 草稿

    丹尼尔·丹尼特 › 1942–2024

  • 安迪·克拉克

    受其批评

    Clark defended connectionist models against Fodor and Pylyshyn’s claim that only a classical language of thought can explain the systematicity of cognition (Microcognition, 1989). A. Clark, Microcognition (1989); Associative Engines (1993); J. Fodor & Z. Pylyshyn, “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture”, Cognition 28 (1988)

    依据: AI 草稿

    安迪·克拉克 › 1957年生

批评了 3

  • 查尔斯·达尔文

    批评了

    With Piattelli-Palmarini, Fodor argued that natural selection cannot distinguish traits selected for from coextensive ‘free riders’ and so does not explain adaptation (What Darwin Got Wrong, 2010). J. Fodor & M. Piattelli-Palmarini, What Darwin Got Wrong (2010), part II

    依据: AI 草稿

    查尔斯·达尔文 › 1809–1882

  • 路德维希·维特根斯坦

    批评了

    With Chihara, Fodor attacked Wittgensteinian criteria for mental concepts (1965) and later argued that learning a language presupposes an innate language of thought (The Language of Thought, 1975). C. Chihara & J. Fodor, “Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein”, American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965); J. Fodor, The Language of Thought (1975), ch. 2

    依据: AI 草稿

    路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951

  • 吉尔伯特·赖尔

    批评了

    Against Ryle’s logical behaviourism Fodor argued that psychology must posit inner mental states that cause behaviour, not mere dispositions to behave (Psychological Explanation, 1968). J. Fodor, Psychological Explanation (1968); “The Mind–Body Problem”, Scientific American 244 (1981)

    依据: AI 草稿

    吉尔伯特·赖尔 › 1900–1976

作品

  • 1975思想语言

    认知心理学预设了一个带有自身句法的内部表征系统——一种思维即计算的“心语”（mentalese）。

  • 1983心灵的模块性

    知觉和语言由快速而封装的输入模块处理；相反，中心思维则是整体论的，也难以解释。

立场

Fodor was the leading defender of the computational theory of mind. Against behaviourism, in Psychological Explanation (1968), and against Wittgensteinian views of mental concepts, in a 1965 paper with Charles Chihara, he argued that psychology must postulate inner mental states that cause behaviour. The Language of Thought (1975) claimed that these states are representations in an inner language with its own syntax and semantics – “mentalese” – and that thinking is the computation of such symbols. Only this, he argued, explains why thought is productive and systematic: whoever can think that John loves Mary can also think that Mary loves John. With Zenon Pylyshyn he used this argument in 1988 against connectionist models of the mind. The Modularity of Mind (1983) distinguished fast, encapsulated input systems for perception and language from central processes such as belief fixation, which are holistic and, he thought, beyond the reach of current cognitive science. He also held that most lexical concepts are innate and criticised semantic holism. His late book What Darwin Got Wrong (2010, with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini) argued that natural selection cannot explain why particular traits were selected; most biologists rejected it.

生平与背景

Jerry Fodor was born in New York City in 1935. He studied at Columbia University and took his doctorate at Princeton in 1960 under Hilary Putnam. From 1959 to 1986 he taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he worked closely with linguists and psychologists in the circle around Noam Chomsky. After two years at the City University of New York he moved in 1988 to Rutgers University, where he remained until his retirement in 2016. He wrote many essays and reviews for the London Review of Books. He died in New York in 2017.

其他主要作品

  • Psychological Explanation (1968)
  • The Language of Thought (1975)
  • The Modularity of Mind (1983)
  • Psychosemantics (1987)
  • Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (1998)
  • The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way (2000)
  • What Darwin Got Wrong (with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010)

来源: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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