弗兰克·杰克逊
一位知道关于颜色的一切物理事实的科学家,在第一次看到红色时仍然学到了新东西——至少他曾这样论证,后来又改变了主意。
定位
澳大利亚哲学家:玛丽是一位一直只见过黑白两色的色彩科学家,她第一次看到红色时学到了新东西——所以物理知识并不是全部知识(1982年)。后来他自己否定了这一论证。
核心思想
- 知识论证(玛丽的房间)
- 副现象的感受质
- 概念分析(“堪培拉计划”)
影响
受影响于 1
J. J. C. 斯马特
受其影响
Jackson worked within the Australian materialism shaped by Smart: after the knowledge argument (1982) he returned to a physicalism defended by conceptual analysis (From Metaphysics to Ethics, 1998). F. Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (1998); “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”
依据: AI 草稿
J. J. C. 斯马特 › 1920–2012
影响了 1
大卫·查尔默斯
影响了
Chalmers used Jackson’s knowledge argument about Mary against materialism (The Conscious Mind, 1996) and defended with Jackson the a priori entailment of macroscopic truths by physical ones (2001). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); D. J. Chalmers and F. Jackson, “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation”, Philosophical Review 110 (2001); F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); SEP “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”
依据: AI 草稿
大卫·查尔默斯 › 1966年生
批评
受批评于 2
戴维·刘易斯
受其批评
Lewis answered Jackson’s knowledge argument with the ability hypothesis: on seeing red, Mary gains abilities to recognise, imagine and remember, not new information (‘What Experience Teaches’, 1988). D. Lewis, “What Experience Teaches”, Proceedings of the Russellian Society 13 (1988); F. Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know”, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986)
依据: AI 草稿
戴维·刘易斯 › 1941–2001
丹尼尔·丹尼特
受其批评
Dennett argued that Jackson’s Mary, knowing all physical facts, would learn nothing on seeing colour and would spot a blue-painted banana as a trick (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 12; F. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); Jackson later gave up the argument (“Postscript on Qualia”, 1998)
依据: AI 草稿
丹尼尔·丹尼特 › 1942–2024
作品
- 1982副现象的感受质
玛丽的房间:关于颜色视觉的全部物理知识,并不是关于看到红色是什么样子的知识。
1995年的约翰·洛克讲座:概念分析告诉我们,在物理世界中应当把颜色、心灵和价值安置在哪里。
立场
“Epiphenomenal Qualia” (1982) contains one of the best-known thought experiments in the philosophy of mind. Mary is a brilliant scientist who has spent her life in a black-and-white room and has learned everything physical there is to know about colour and colour vision. When she leaves the room and sees a ripe tomato, she seems to learn something new: what it is like to see red. If so, not all knowledge is physical knowledge, and physicalism is false. Jackson took the further step of accepting that such “qualia” have no physical effects. He distinguished his argument from Nagel’s question of what it is like to be a bat, which concerns another point of view rather than complete physical knowledge. Replies became a literature of their own: Lewis argued that Mary gains abilities, not information; Dennett denied that she would be surprised; Chalmers built on the argument against physicalism. From the late 1990s Jackson himself became a physicalist and argued that the intuition that Mary learns a new fact is mistaken. In From Metaphysics to Ethics (1998) he defended conceptual analysis as the way to locate colour, mind and value in a physical world, a method later called the “Canberra plan”. He has also written on perception, conditionals and consequentialism.
生平与背景
Frank Cameron Jackson was born in Melbourne in 1943. Both his parents taught philosophy; his father, Allan Cameron Jackson, had studied with Wittgenstein in Cambridge. He studied mathematics and philosophy at the University of Melbourne and took his doctorate at La Trobe University. After posts at Adelaide and La Trobe he succeeded his father in the chair of philosophy at Monash University in 1978. From 1986 he worked at the Australian National University in Canberra, and from 2007 to 2014 he was a regular visiting professor at Princeton. He gave the John Locke Lectures at Oxford in 1995 and was made an Officer of the Order of Australia in 2006.
其他主要作品
- Perception: A Representative Theory (1977)
- Epiphenomenal Qualia (1982)
- What Mary Didn’t Know (1986)
- Conditionals (1987)
- From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (1998)
- Language, Names, and Information (2010)
出现在
- 争论 ‘意识是什么?’
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