शॉल क्रिपके
एक नाम हर संभव स्थिति में उसी वस्तु को निर्देशित करता है, इसलिए कुछ सत्य अनिवार्य हैं यद्यपि हमने उन्हें अनुभव से खोजा।
पृष्ठभूमि
नेमिंग एंड नेसेसिटी: नाम दृढ़ निर्देशक हैं; ऐसे अनिवार्य सत्य हैं जो अनुभव-जन्य (a posteriori) हैं।
मुख्य विचार
- दृढ़ निर्देशक
- संभव संसार
- नियम-पालन का विरोधाभास
प्रभाव
जिनसे प्रभावित 3
डेविड ह्यूम
जिनसे प्रभावित ✓
Kripke modelled the ‘sceptical solution’ he ascribed to Wittgenstein on Hume’s treatment of causation: a sceptical paradox about meaning is answered by community practice, not facts (1982). S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982); D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748); SEP “Rule-Following and Intentionality”
साक्ष्य: Wikidata में भी · Wikidata
डेविड ह्यूम › 1711–1776
लुडविग विट्गेंश्टाइन
जिनसे प्रभावित ✓
Kripke presented Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks as a sceptical paradox – no fact fixes that ‘plus’ means addition – stressing it was the argument ‘as it struck Kripke’ (1982). S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Rule-Following and Intentionality”
लुडविग विट्गेंश्टाइन › 1889–1951
रूथ बार्कन मार्कस
जिनसे प्रभावित विवादित
Kripke’s models for quantified modal logic (1959, 1963) took up Barcan’s systems and formula (1946); whether rigid designation derives from her ‘tags’ (1961) is disputed. R. C. Barcan, “A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication”, Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (1946); R. Barcan Marcus, “Modalities and Intensional Languages”, Synthese 13 (1961); S. A. Kripke, “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic” (1963); Naming and Necessity (lectures 1970; publ. 1972, 1980); Q. Smith and S. Soames, Synthese 104 (1995); SEP “Ruth Barcan Marcus”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
रूथ बार्कन मार्कस › 1921–2012
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया 1
डेविड चाल्मर्स
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
Chalmers took up Kripke’s modal argument against mind–brain identity and explained a posteriori necessities like ‘water is H₂O’ with two-dimensional semantics (The Conscious Mind, 1996). D. J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996); S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980); SEP “Zombies”
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
डेविड चाल्मर्स › जन्म 1966
आलोचना
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित 1
डेविड लेविस
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Lewis rejected Kripke’s view that possible worlds are stipulated and share individuals, defending counterpart theory against the ‘Humphrey objection’ (On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986, ch. 4). D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (1986), ch. 4; “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968); S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1980)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
डेविड लेविस › 1941–2001
जिनकी आलोचना की 5
गॉटलोब फ़्रेगे
जिनकी आलोचना की
Kripke rejected the Fregean view that a name’s descriptive sense fixes its reference: names are rigid designators, tied to bearers by a causal chain (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; book 1980), Lectures I–II
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
गॉटलोब फ़्रेगे › 1848–1925
बर्टराण्ड रसेल
जिनकी आलोचना की
Kripke rejected Russell’s view that ordinary names are disguised descriptions: ‘Aristotle’ names Aristotle even in worlds where he did nothing we describe him by (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lectures I–II; B. Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” (1911)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
बर्टराण्ड रसेल › 1872–1970
आल्फ्रेड टार्स्की
जिनकी आलोचना की
Kripke judged Tarski’s language hierarchy unfit for natural language and built, via fixed points, a language containing its own truth predicate (‘Outline of a Theory of Truth’, 1975). S. Kripke, “Outline of a Theory of Truth”, Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), 690–716
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
आल्फ्रेड टार्स्की › 1901–1983
डब्ल्यू. वी. ओ. क्वाइन
जिनकी आलोचना की
Kripke rejected Quine’s claim that quantified modal logic and essentialism are unintelligible: with rigid designators, de re necessity is coherent and intuitively grounded (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lecture I; “Identity and Necessity” (1971)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
डब्ल्यू. वी. ओ. क्वाइन › 1908–2000
जॉन सर्ल
जिनकी आलोचना की
Kripke rejected Searle’s cluster theory of names: no weighted set of descriptions fixes reference, since the bearer might satisfy none of them (Naming and Necessity, 1972/1980). S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (1972; 1980), Lecture I; J. R. Searle, “Proper Names”, Mind 67 (1958)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
जॉन सर्ल › 1932–2025
कृतियाँ
नाम दृढ़ निर्देशक हैं – वर्णन-सिद्धांत के विरुद्ध।
नियम-पालन का संशयात्मक विरोधाभास।
मत
Early on Kripke gave modal logic – the logic of necessity and possibility – what became its standard semantics in terms of possible worlds. In Naming and Necessity he overturned the dominant view of Frege and Russell that proper names abbreviate descriptions. Names, he argued, are “rigid designators”: “Aristotle” refers to the same person in every possible world, whatever that person might have done. Reference is fixed by a causal chain reaching back to an initial “baptism.” From this followed the striking thesis that there are necessary truths known only by experience, such as “water is H₂O.” His later reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations provoked a long debate. Kripke helped make metaphysics respectable again in analytic philosophy.
जीवन और संदर्भ
Kripke was born in 1940 on Long Island and grew up in Omaha. While still a teenager he published a completeness proof for modal logic that made his name. He studied at Harvard and taught at Rockefeller University and Princeton, later at the City University of New York. His lectures on naming, given at Princeton in 1970, were published in 1972 and as a book in 1980.
अन्य प्रमुख कृतियाँ
- Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic (1963)
- Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
- Naming and Necessity (1980)
- Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982)
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