डोनाल्ड डेविडसन
कारण हमारे कर्मों के कारण-हेतु हैं, और दूसरे जो कहते हैं उसे समझने के लिए हमें मानना होगा कि वे जो मानते हैं उसका अधिकांश सत्य है।
पृष्ठभूमि
तर्क-कारण (reasons) ही कार्य-कारण (causes) हैं; हर व्याख्या के लिए उदारता के सिद्धांत की आवश्यकता होती है।
मुख्य विचार
- विसंगत अद्वैतवाद
- मूलगामी व्याख्या
- उदारता का सिद्धांत
गुरु: डब्ल्यू. वी. ओ. क्वाइन
प्रभाव
जिनसे प्रभावित 2
रुडोल्फ कार्नैप
जिनसे प्रभावित ✓
Davidson worked through Carnap’s semantics of extension and intension (Schilpp volume, 1963) before replacing meanings with a Tarskian theory of truth (‘Truth and Meaning’, 1967). D. Davidson, “The Method of Extension and Intension”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); “Truth and Meaning”, Synthese 17 (1967); SEP “Donald Davidson”
साक्ष्य: Wikidata में भी · Wikidata
रुडोल्फ कार्नैप › 1891–1970
आल्फ्रेड टार्स्की
जिनसे प्रभावित ✓
Davidson turned Tarski’s Convention T around: a theory that yields a T-sentence for every sentence of a language serves as a theory of meaning (‘Truth and Meaning’, 1967). D. Davidson, “Truth and Meaning”, Synthese 17 (1967); A. Tarski, “Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych” (1933; German 1935); SEP “Donald Davidson”
आल्फ्रेड टार्स्की › 1901–1983
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया 1
रिचर्ड रोर्टी
जिन्हें प्रभावित किया
Rorty read Davidson’s rejection of the scheme–content distinction and his account of truth as support for pragmatism (‘Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth’, 1986), though Davidson declined the label. R. Rorty, “Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth” (1986), in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991); D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); SEP “Richard Rorty”
साक्ष्य: InPhO में भी · InPhO
रिचर्ड रोर्टी › 1931–2007
आलोचना
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित 1
माइकल डमेट
जिनके द्वारा आलोचित
Dummett objected that Davidson’s truth-conditional theory is merely ‘modest’: it does not explain what knowledge of meaning consists in (‘What is a Theory of Meaning?’, 1975). M. Dummett, “What is a Theory of Meaning?”, in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language (1975); “What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)” (1976)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
माइकल डमेट › 1925–2011
जिनकी आलोचना की 4
गिल्बर्ट राइल
जिनकी आलोचना की
Davidson rejected Ryle’s view that motives explain as dispositions, not as causes: a reason explains only if the agent acted because of it (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, 1963). D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949), ch. 4
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
गिल्बर्ट राइल › 1900–1976
डब्ल्यू. वी. ओ. क्वाइन जिनसे पढ़ा
जिनसे पढ़ा ✓
Davidson attended Quine’s courses as a Harvard student around 1939; his own dissertation (1949) was on Plato’s Philebus, and he later described Quine as the strongest influence on his philosophy. D. Davidson, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (1999)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
जिनकी आलोचना की
Davidson rejected the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, which Quine kept, as a ‘third dogma of empiricism’ (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); “Meaning, Truth and Evidence”, in R. Barrett & R. Gibson (eds.), Perspectives on Quine (1990)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
डब्ल्यू. वी. ओ. क्वाइन › 1908–2000
जी. ई. एम. एन्सकॉम्ब
जिनकी आलोचना की
Davidson rejected the view, associated with Anscombe’s Intention (1957), that reasons are not causes: rationalisation is a species of causal explanation (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, 1963). D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963), 685–700; G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (1957)
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
जी. ई. एम. एन्सकॉम्ब › 1919–2001
थॉमस एस. कुहन
जिनकी आलोचना की
Davidson rejected the incommensurable conceptual schemes he found in Kuhn: an untranslatable language could not be recognised as language (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 47 (1974), 5–20
साक्ष्य: AI मसौदा
थॉमस एस. कुहन › 1922–1996
कृतियाँ
तर्क-कारण ही कार्य-कारण हैं – विट्गेंश्टाइनवादियों के विरुद्ध।
तीसरे हठधर्म के विरुद्ध: ढाँचा और अंतर्वस्तु।
मत
Davidson connected the philosophy of action, mind and language in a remarkably unified way. Against the Wittgensteinians he argued that the reasons for which we act are also causes of our actions. In “Mental Events” he defended anomalous monism: every mental event is a physical event, yet there are no strict laws linking the mental and the physical. In the theory of meaning he asked how a “radical interpreter” could understand a completely foreign language – only by assuming that the speaker mostly holds true beliefs and is rational (the principle of charity). From this he concluded that the idea of radically different, untranslatable conceptual schemes makes no sense. His essays shaped philosophy of language and mind from the 1960s onward.
जीवन और संदर्भ
Davidson was born in Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1917 and studied literature, classics and philosophy at Harvard, where he wrote a dissertation on Plato’s Philebus. After serving in the navy during the Second World War he taught at Stanford, Princeton, Rockefeller University and Chicago, and finally at Berkeley. His influence spread mainly through sharply argued essays.
अन्य प्रमुख कृतियाँ
- Actions, Reasons, and Causes (1963)
- Truth and Meaning (1967)
- Mental Events (1970)
- On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme (1974)
- Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984)
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