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G. E. 摩尔

1873–1958

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善不能用其他任何东西来定义，而像“我有两只手”这样的常识信念，比任何否认它们的哲学都更确定。

定位

分析哲学 · 北欧 · 伦理学, 认识论

为常识辩护，并提出自然主义谬误：“善”是不可定义的。

核心思想

  • 自然主义谬误
  • 常识
  • 摩尔悖论

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影响

受影响于 1

  • 亨利·西季威克

    受其影响

    Moore credited Sidgwick, his Cambridge teacher, with seeing that the basic ethical notion is indefinable, and argued at length with the Methods of Ethics in Principia Ethica (1903). G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903); H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1874); SEP “Henry Sidgwick”; SEP “Moore’s Moral Philosophy”

    依据: AI 草稿

    亨利·西季威克 › 1838–1900

影响了 4

  • 伯特兰·罗素

    影响了 ✓

    Russell followed Moore’s revolt against idealism, adopting his realism of propositions and concepts (‘The Nature of Judgment’, 1899), as the preface to The Principles of Mathematics (1903) acknowledges. G. E. Moore, “The Nature of Judgment”, Mind 8 (1899); B. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics (1903), preface; My Philosophical Development (1959); SEP “Bertrand Russell”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata · InPhO

    伯特兰·罗素 › 1872–1970

  • 苏珊·斯泰宾

    影响了

    Stebbing developed the Cambridge analysis practised by Moore into ‘directional analysis’ aimed at basic facts (1932); recent research qualifies the older view of her as Moore’s follower. L. S. Stebbing, “The Method of Analysis in Metaphysics”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 33 (1932–33); SEP “Susan Stebbing”

    依据: AI 草稿

    苏珊·斯泰宾 › 1885–1943

  • 路德维希·维特根斯坦

    影响了

    Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (written 1949–51; publ. 1969) starts from Moore’s defence of common sense (1925, 1939) and recasts his truisms as hinges of our practices. L. Wittgenstein, Über Gewißheit / On Certainty (written 1949–51; publ. 1969); G. E. Moore, “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925); “Proof of an External World” (1939); SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951

  • J. L. 奥斯汀

    影响了

    Austin made Moore’s reading of ‘could have done otherwise’ as ‘could, if I had chosen’ (Ethics, 1912) the starting point of ‘Ifs and Cans’ (1956). J. L. Austin, “Ifs and Cans”, Proceedings of the British Academy 42 (1956); G. E. Moore, Ethics (1912); SEP “John Langshaw Austin”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    J. L. 奥斯汀 › 1911–1960

批评

批评了 3

  • 乔治·贝克莱

    批评了

    In ‘The Refutation of Idealism’ (1903) Moore attacked the principle esse est percipi, distinguishing the act of awareness from its object, which need not exist only when perceived. G. E. Moore, “The Refutation of Idealism”, Mind 12 (1903), 433–453; G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), § 3

    依据: AI 草稿

    乔治·贝克莱 › 1685–1753

  • 格奥尔格·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔

    批评了

    Moore broke with British Hegelianism and rejected the Hegelian doctrine that parts of an organic whole have no meaning apart from it (Principia Ethica, 1903, § 22). G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903), §§ 18–22; “The Refutation of Idealism” (1903)

    依据: AI 草稿

    格奥尔格·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔 › 1770–1831

  • 约翰·斯图尔特·密尔

    批评了

    Moore charged Mill with the naturalistic fallacy for inferring ‘desirable’ from ‘desired’, as if ‘desirable’ meant ‘able to be desired’ like ‘visible’ (Principia Ethica, 1903, §§ 39–40). G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903), ch. III, §§ 39–40; J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1861), ch. 4

    依据: AI 草稿

    约翰·斯图尔特·密尔 › 1806–1873

作品

  • 1903伦理学原理

    自然主义谬误：“善”是不可定义的。

  • 1903驳唯心论

    反对“esse est percipi”（存在即被感知）。

  • 1925为常识辩护

    一份常识性的清单——“现在存在一个活的人的身体，那就是我的身体”——无论哲学家怎么说，我都确定地知道这些。

立场

With Russell, Moore led the revolt against the British idealism that dominated philosophy around 1900. In “The Refutation of Idealism” he insisted that the object of an experience is distinct from the act of experiencing it. In ethics he argued that “good” is a simple, indefinable property; any attempt to define it in natural terms such as pleasure commits the “naturalistic fallacy”. Against sceptics he defended common sense: we know with certainty that we have hands and that the earth has existed for many years, more certainly than any philosophical premise that would deny it. His method of careful conceptual analysis set the style of analytic philosophy.

生平与背景

Moore studied at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he became a friend of Russell and a member of the Apostles society. His ethics strongly influenced the Bloomsbury circle around Keynes and Virginia Woolf. He taught at Cambridge for most of his life, held the professorship of philosophy there from 1925 to 1939 and edited the journal Mind for many years.

其他主要作品

  • Principia Ethica (1903)
  • The Refutation of Idealism (1903)
  • A Defence of Common Sense (1925)
  • Proof of an External World (1939)

来源: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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