托马斯·里德

Agora

托马斯·里德

1710–1796

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

有些基本信念，比如外部世界存在，不过是常识——我们无法证明它们，但没有它们我们就无法生活。

定位

经验主义、启蒙运动与自由主义 · 北欧 · 认识论, 心灵与意识

苏格兰常识学派的创立者：他反对休谟，为每个人都必须视为理所当然的第一原则辩护，例如外部世界的存在。

核心思想

常识
直接实在论
对“观念论”的批判

在星图中打开

影响

影响了 1

弗里德里希·海因里希·雅各比

影响了
Jacobi drew on Scottish common-sense philosophy, Reid’s included, for his realist thesis in David Hume (1787) that perception gives immediate certainty of things, as M. Kuehn has shown. F. H. Jacobi, David Hume über den Glauben (1787); M. Kuehn, Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768–1800 (1987); G. di Giovanni, “Hume, Jacobi, and Common Sense” (1998)
依据: AI 草稿
弗里德里希·海因里希·雅各比 › 1743–1819

批评

批评了 3

约翰·洛克受其影响

受其影响
Reid kept Locke’s primary–secondary quality distinction but recast it: primary qualities are conceived directly, secondary only relatively (Essays on the Intellectual Powers, 1785). T. Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764); Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785); SEP “Thomas Reid”
依据: AI 草稿
批评了
With the ‘brave officer’ Reid argued that Locke’s memory criterion of personal identity breaks transitivity: the general would be and not be the flogged boy (Essays, 1785, III.6). T. Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), III.6; J. Locke, Essay II.xxvii; SEP “Thomas Reid”
依据: AI 草稿
约翰·洛克 › 1632–1704
乔治·贝克莱

批评了
Reid traced Berkeley’s denial of matter to the ‘ideal system’, the assumption that we perceive only ideas, which he rejected for common-sense direct realism (Inquiry, 1764). T. Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), Dedication, ch. I; Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), II.10; SEP “Thomas Reid”
依据: AI 草稿
乔治·贝克莱 › 1685–1753
大卫·休谟

批评了
Reid argued that Hume’s scepticism follows from the theory of ideas and answered it with first principles of common sense (Inquiry into the Human Mind, 1764). T. Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), Dedication, chs. I and VII; SEP “Thomas Reid”
依据: AI 草稿
大卫·休谟 › 1711–1776

作品

1764根据常识原理对人类心灵的探究
感官给予我们的是世界本身，而不只是观念——反对贝克莱和休谟的怀疑论。

立场

Reid traced modern skepticism to one assumption shared by Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume: that the mind perceives only its own ideas, never things themselves. Give up this “theory of ideas”, he argued, and perception turns out to be a direct grasp of the external world. Some principles – that there is an outer world, that memory is broadly reliable, that other people have minds – are first principles of common sense that all reasoning presupposes and none can prove. Doubting them is not more rigorous, merely inconsistent. His work founded the Scottish School of Common Sense and has found new defenders in contemporary epistemology.

生平与背景

Thomas Reid was born in 1710 at Strachan near Aberdeen, studied at Marischal College and served for years as a parish minister. In 1751 he became a professor at King’s College, Aberdeen, where he helped found a philosophical society that debated Hume’s work. In 1764 he succeeded Adam Smith in the chair of moral philosophy at Glasgow. He died in Glasgow in 1796.