عمل · الفلسفة التحليلية
العقل والحقيقة والتاريخ (Reason, Truth and History)
أدمغة في جِرار – ولماذا لا يمكن أن نكون أدمغة كهذه.
مقدمة
A book of 1981 in which Putnam sets out his “internal realism”. The first chapter imagines that we are brains in a vat, fed experiences by a computer, and argues that the hypothesis refutes itself: if we were such brains, our words “brain” and “vat” would not refer to real brains and vats, so we could not even state it truly. Putnam rejects both metaphysical realism – the idea of a “God’s eye view” of a ready-made world – and relativism; truth is rational acceptability under idealised conditions. Later chapters extend the argument to ethics and reject a sharp distinction between facts and values. Putnam himself gave up internal realism in the 1990s.
الصلات
يستند إلى
- معنى ‘المعنى’ (The Meaning of ‘Meaning’)1975 · هيلاري بوتنام
ينتقد
- تأملات في الفلسفة الأولى1641 · رينيه ديكارت
مزيد من أعمال هيلاري بوتنام
بحسب الوضع في نوفمبر 2026 · حسّن هذه الصفحة · كيف صُنع Agora