آندي كلارك
لا يتوقف العقل عند الجمجمة – فالدفاتر والهواتف والأدوات قد تكون جزءًا من تفكيرنا – والدماغ قبل كل شيء آلة تنبّؤ.
التموضع
فيلسوف علم الإدراك في ساسكس: يمتد العقل خارج الجمجمة إلى الدفاتر والأدوات – نحن «سايبورغات بالفطرة» – والدماغ آلة تنبؤ.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- العقل الممتد (مع تشالمرز)
- الإدراك المتجسّد
- المعالجة التنبؤية
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 4
مارتن هايدغر
تأثّر بـ
Clark drew on Heidegger’s analysis of ready-to-hand equipment, used fluently without being represented, for his action-oriented account of embodied cognition (Being There, 1997). A. Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (1997); M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1927); SEP “Embodied Cognition”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
مارتن هايدغر › 1889–1976
ليف فيغوتسكي
تأثّر بـ
Clark took up Vygotsky’s view of speech as a tool that guides thought, treating public language as external scaffolding for cognition (Being There, 1997). A. Clark, Being There (1997); L. S. Vygotsky, Myshlenie i rech’ (1934; Engl. Thought and Language, 1962)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ليف فيغوتسكي › 1896–1934
موريس ميرلو بونتي
تأثّر بـ
Clark took up Merleau-Ponty’s view of the body as the subject of skilled engagement with the world for an embodied, action-oriented cognitive science (Being There, 1997). A. Clark, Being There (1997); M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (1945); SEP “Embodied Cognition”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
موريس ميرلو بونتي › 1908–1961
دانيال دينيت
تأثّر بـ
Clark took up Dennett’s picture of words as tools that augment cognition, treating public language as an external artefact that reshapes the brain’s computational tasks (‘Magic Words’, 1998). A. Clark, “Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation”, in P. Carruthers and J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought (1998); D. C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
دانيال دينيت › 1942–2024
النقد
ينتقد 2
رينيه ديكارت
انتقد
Clark rejected the Cartesian picture of the mind as an inner, disembodied reasoner: cognition is embodied and can extend into tools and environment (Being There, 1997). A. Clark, Being There (1997); A. Clark & D. J. Chalmers, “The Extended Mind”, Analysis 58 (1998); Supersizing the Mind (2008)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
رينيه ديكارت › 1596–1650
جيري فودور
انتقد
Clark defended connectionist models against Fodor and Pylyshyn’s claim that only a classical language of thought can explain the systematicity of cognition (Microcognition, 1989). A. Clark, Microcognition (1989); Associative Engines (1993); J. Fodor & Z. Pylyshyn, “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture”, Cognition 28 (1988)
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جيري فودور › 1935–2017
الموقف
Clark is a leading advocate of the view that cognition is embodied, embedded and extended. “Being There”, drawing on robotics and developmental psychology as well as on Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, argued that minds evolved not to build detailed inner models of the world but to guide action, letting the body and the environment do part of the work. “The Extended Mind”, written with David Chalmers, argued that when an external resource plays the same role as an inner process – Otto’s notebook standing in for Inga’s biological memory – it is literally part of the mind. “Natural-Born Cyborgs” holds that humans have always been cyborgs, creatures whose thinking incorporates tools, from writing to smartphones. His later work champions predictive processing: the brain is fundamentally a prediction machine that constantly anticipates incoming signals and learns from its errors, so that perception is a kind of controlled hallucination checked by the senses, and action a way of making predictions come true. “The Experience Machine” draws out what this means for pain, placebo effects, mental health and self-knowledge.
الحياة والسياق
Andy Clark (born 1957 in London) studied at the University of Stirling, where he took his doctorate in 1984. He taught at Glasgow and Sussex, directed the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology programme at Washington University in St. Louis from 1993 and the cognitive science programme at Indiana University from 2002, and in 2004 became professor of logic and metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh. Since 2019 he has been professor of cognitive philosophy at the University of Sussex. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and in 2025 he received the inaugural Dennett Prize.
الأعمال الرئيسة
- Microcognition (1989)
- Being There (1997)
- The Extended Mind (with David Chalmers, 1998)
- Natural-Born Cyborgs (2003)
- Supersizing the Mind (2008)
- Surfing Uncertainty (2016)
- The Experience Machine (2023)
يرد في
بحسب الوضع في نوفمبر 2026 · المصادر · حسّن هذه الصفحة · كيف صُنع Agora