J. J. C. Smart

Agora

J. J. C. Smart

1920–2012

A first way ina deliberate simplification – the portrait says more

A sensation such as pain is simply a process in the brain, and the right action is the one with the best consequences.

Placement

Analytic Philosophy · Northern Europe · Mind & Consciousness, Ethics, Metaphysics, Science

British-born philosopher in Adelaide and Canberra: sensations are brain processes (“Sensations and Brain Processes”, 1959); an act utilitarian who called strict rule-following “rule worship”.

Key ideas

Mind–brain identity theory
Topic-neutral analysis
Act utilitarianism
Tenseless view of time

Open in the star map

Influence

Influenced by 3

Henry Sidgwick

influenced by
Smart rested his act utilitarianism on an ultimate attitude of generalised benevolence, close to Sidgwick’s axiom of benevolence (‘An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics’, 1961). J. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (1961); J. J. C. Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973); SEP “Henry Sidgwick”
Evidence: AI draft
Henry Sidgwick › 1838–1900
Gilbert Ryle

influenced by
Smart, who studied with Ryle at Oxford, held a Rylean behaviourism at Adelaide until Place persuaded him that sensations are brain processes (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, 1959). J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Gilbert Ryle › 1900–1976
U. T. Place

influenced by
Convinced by his Adelaide colleague Place, Smart defended the identity of sensations and brain processes and answered objections to Place’s thesis (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, 1959). J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
Evidence: AI draft
U. T. Place › 1924–2000

Influenced 2

David Lewis

influenced
Lewis gave Smart’s identity of experiences and brain processes a new argument: experiences are defined by their causal roles, and the occupants of these roles are physical (1966). D. Lewis, “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
Evidence: AI draft
David Lewis › 1941–2001
Frank Jackson

influenced
Jackson worked within the Australian materialism shaped by Smart: after the knowledge argument (1982) he returned to a physicalism defended by conceptual analysis (From Metaphysics to Ethics, 1998). F. Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (1998); “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”
Evidence: AI draft
Frank Jackson › b. 1943

Criticism

Criticized by 2

Hilary Putnam

criticised by
Putnam objected to Smart’s identity of sensations and brain processes that pain can be realised in different systems, so mental states are functional states (‘Psychological Predicates’, 1967). H. Putnam, “Psychological Predicates” (1967), repr. as “The Nature of Mental States”; J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959)
Evidence: AI draft
Hilary Putnam › 1926–2016
Bernard Williams

criticised by
Answering Smart, Williams argued that utilitarian ‘negative responsibility’ turns agents into channels for the best outcome and attacks their integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973), §§ 3–5 (the cases of George and Jim)
Evidence: AI draft
Bernard Williams › 1929–2003

Works

1959Sensations and Brain Processes
Sensations are brain processes: the identity is contingent and discovered by science, like that of lightning and electrical discharge.
1973Utilitarianism: For and Against
Smart defends act utilitarianism, Williams attacks it – with the cases of George the chemist and of Jim, who is asked to shoot one of twenty captives so that the other nineteen go free.

Position

At Adelaide Smart defended a Rylean, behaviourist account of the mind until discussions with his colleague U. T. Place convinced him otherwise. “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959) argued that sensations are brain processes. The identity is contingent, discovered by science rather than by analysing meanings, just as lightning turned out to be an electrical discharge; so it is no objection that “I have a pain” does not mean “a certain brain process is going on”. To answer the worry that sensations have special properties, he proposed “topic-neutral” translations: a report of an after-image says that something is going on in me like what goes on when I see an orange. Simplicity and Occam’s razor speak for the identity. The theory became known as Australian materialism; Putnam’s argument that the same mental state can be realised in different physical systems was its main challenge. In ethics Smart defended act utilitarianism: the right act is the one with the best consequences, and sticking to a rule when breaking it would be better is “superstitious rule worship”. Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973) paired his defence with Bernard Williams’s attack. In metaphysics he held a tenseless, four-dimensional view of time in which the passage of time is an illusion.

Life & context

John Jamieson Carswell Smart was born in 1920 in Cambridge, England, to Scottish parents; his father was the astronomer W. M. Smart, and his brother Ninian became a scholar of religion. He studied at Glasgow, served in the British Army in India and Burma during the Second World War and then took the BPhil at Oxford. In 1950 he became professor of philosophy at the University of Adelaide, where he remained until 1972, before moving to La Trobe University and in 1976 to the Australian National University in Canberra. He was made a Companion of the Order of Australia in 1990 and died in Melbourne in 2012.