AgoraOtwarty plac myśli

J.J.C. Smart

1920–2012

Pierwsze przybliżeniecelowe uproszczenie – portret mówi więcej

Wrażenie takie jak ból jest po prostu procesem w mózgu, a słusznym działaniem jest to o najlepszych skutkach.

Umiejscowienie

Filozofia analityczna · Europa Północna · Umysł i świadomość, Etyka, Metafizyka, Nauka

Brytyjski z urodzenia filozof w Adelaide i Canberze: wrażenia są procesami mózgowymi („Sensations and Brain Processes”, 1959); utylitarysta czynów, który ścisłe przestrzeganie reguł nazywał „kultem reguł”.

Kluczowe idee

  • Teoria tożsamości umysłu i mózgu
  • Analiza neutralna tematycznie
  • Utylitaryzm czynów
  • Beztensowe ujęcie czasu

Otwórz na mapie gwiazd

Wpływ

Pod wpływem 3

  • Henry Sidgwick

    pod wpływem

    Smart rested his act utilitarianism on an ultimate attitude of generalised benevolence, close to Sidgwick’s axiom of benevolence (‘An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics’, 1961). J. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (1961); J. J. C. Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973); SEP “Henry Sidgwick”

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Henry Sidgwick › 1838–1900

  • Gilbert Ryle

    pod wpływem

    Smart, who studied with Ryle at Oxford, held a Rylean behaviourism at Adelaide until Place persuaded him that sensations are brain processes (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, 1959). J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”

    Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO

    Gilbert Ryle › 1900–1976

  • U. T. Place

    pod wpływem

    Convinced by his Adelaide colleague Place, Smart defended the identity of sensations and brain processes and answered objections to Place’s thesis (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, 1959). J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”

    Źródło: szkic AI

    U. T. Place › 1924–2000

Wpływ na 2

  • David Lewis

    wpływ na

    Lewis gave Smart’s identity of experiences and brain processes a new argument: experiences are defined by their causal roles, and the occupants of these roles are physical (1966). D. Lewis, “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”

    Źródło: szkic AI

    David Lewis › 1941–2001

  • Frank Jackson

    wpływ na

    Jackson worked within the Australian materialism shaped by Smart: after the knowledge argument (1982) he returned to a physicalism defended by conceptual analysis (From Metaphysics to Ethics, 1998). F. Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (1998); “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982); J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959); SEP “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument”

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Frank Jackson › ur. 1943

Krytyka

Krytyka ze strony 2

  • Hilary Putnam

    krytyka ze strony

    Putnam objected to Smart’s identity of sensations and brain processes that pain can be realised in different systems, so mental states are functional states (‘Psychological Predicates’, 1967). H. Putnam, “Psychological Predicates” (1967), repr. as “The Nature of Mental States”; J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959)

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Hilary Putnam › 1926–2016

  • Bernard Williams

    krytyka ze strony

    Answering Smart, Williams argued that utilitarian ‘negative responsibility’ turns agents into channels for the best outcome and attacks their integrity (Utilitarianism: For and Against, 1973). B. Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973), §§ 3–5 (the cases of George and Jim)

    Źródło: szkic AI

    Bernard Williams › 1929–2003

Dzieła

  • Wrażenia są procesami mózgowymi: tożsamość jest przygodna i odkrywana przez naukę, jak tożsamość błyskawicy i wyładowania elektrycznego.

  • Smart broni utylitaryzmu czynów, Williams go atakuje – na przykładach chemika George’a i Jima, od którego żąda się, by zastrzelił jednego z dwudziestu jeńców, aby pozostałych dziewiętnastu wyszło na wolność.

Stanowisko

At Adelaide Smart defended a Rylean, behaviourist account of the mind until discussions with his colleague U. T. Place convinced him otherwise. “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959) argued that sensations are brain processes. The identity is contingent, discovered by science rather than by analysing meanings, just as lightning turned out to be an electrical discharge; so it is no objection that “I have a pain” does not mean “a certain brain process is going on”. To answer the worry that sensations have special properties, he proposed “topic-neutral” translations: a report of an after-image says that something is going on in me like what goes on when I see an orange. Simplicity and Occam’s razor speak for the identity. The theory became known as Australian materialism; Putnam’s argument that the same mental state can be realised in different physical systems was its main challenge. In ethics Smart defended act utilitarianism: the right act is the one with the best consequences, and sticking to a rule when breaking it would be better is “superstitious rule worship”. Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973) paired his defence with Bernard Williams’s attack. In metaphysics he held a tenseless, four-dimensional view of time in which the passage of time is an illusion.

Życie i kontekst

John Jamieson Carswell Smart was born in 1920 in Cambridge, England, to Scottish parents; his father was the astronomer W. M. Smart, and his brother Ninian became a scholar of religion. He studied at Glasgow, served in the British Army in India and Burma during the Second World War and then took the BPhil at Oxford. In 1950 he became professor of philosophy at the University of Adelaide, where he remained until 1972, before moving to La Trobe University and in 1976 to the Australian National University in Canberra. He was made a Companion of the Order of Australia in 1990 and died in Melbourne in 2012.

Dalsze główne dzieła

  • Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism (1956)
  • An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (1961)
  • Philosophy and Scientific Realism (1963)
  • Utilitarianism: For and Against (with Bernard Williams, 1973)
  • Our Place in the Universe (1989)

Pojawia się w

Źródła: Wikipedia · Wikidata

Stan na listopad 2026 · Źródła · Ulepsz tę stronę · Jak powstaje Agora

Otwórz na mapie gwiazd