U. T. 普莱斯

Agora

U. T. 普莱斯

1924–2000

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

意识可能最终被证明是一个大脑过程，就像闪电被证明是电一样——由科学而不是词语的意义来裁决。

定位

分析哲学 · 北欧 · 心灵与意识, 科学

英国哲学家和心理学家：《意识是一种脑过程吗？》（1956年）论证，意识可能是一种脑过程，正如闪电是一种放电——这是由科学而不是由分析词义所发现的同一性。

核心思想

心灵的同一论
“现象学谬误”
为倾向而对行为主义的辩护

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影响

影响了 1

J. J. C. 斯马特

影响了
Convinced by his Adelaide colleague Place, Smart defended the identity of sensations and brain processes and answered objections to Place’s thesis (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, 1959). J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
依据: AI 草稿
J. J. C. 斯马特 › 1920–2012

批评

批评了 1

吉尔伯特·赖尔受其影响

受其影响
Place, who studied at Oxford under Ryle’s influence, started from Ryle’s treatment of attention and noticing in ‘The Concept of Heed’ (1954), the preliminary to his identity thesis. U. T. Place, “The Concept of Heed”, British Journal of Psychology 45 (1954); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
依据: AI 草稿
批评了
Place accepted Ryle’s dispositional analysis of belief and intelligence but held that consciousness and sensations are inner brain processes (‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, 1956). U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956), 44–50
依据: AI 草稿
吉尔伯特·赖尔 › 1900–1976

作品

1956意识是一种大脑过程吗？
意识是一种大脑过程这一论题，是一个合理的科学假说，不应以逻辑理由加以排斥。

立场

Place accepted much of Ryle’s behaviourism: beliefs, knowledge and intelligence are dispositions to behave. But in “The Concept of Heed” (1954) he argued that consciousness, sensation and mental imagery cannot be analysed in this way. “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” (1956) proposed instead that they are processes in the brain. The claim is not that “consciousness” means “brain process” – plainly it does not – but that the two may turn out to be the same thing, as a cloud turns out to be a mass of water droplets or lightning a motion of electric charges. Such an identity is a scientific hypothesis and cannot be ruled out by logic. Place also named the “phenomenological fallacy”: the mistake of supposing that when we describe our experience as green, there must be something green inside us, rather than describing it by reference to how things look in normal conditions. His paper, together with Herbert Feigl’s and Smart’s, started the mind–brain identity theory. In later life he defended B. F. Skinner’s radical behaviourism against Noam Chomsky.

生平与背景

Ullin Thomas Place was born in 1924 in Northallerton, Yorkshire, and educated at Rugby School. He won a scholarship to Corpus Christi College, Oxford, in 1942, but as a conscientious objector worked in the Friends’ Ambulance Unit from 1943 to 1946. He graduated in philosophy and psychology in 1949, strongly influenced by Gilbert Ryle, and took a diploma in anthropology. From 1951 he lectured in psychology at the University of Adelaide, where the philosophy department was headed by J. J. C. Smart. He left Adelaide at the beginning of 1955, worked for many years as a clinical psychologist in Britain and later taught philosophy and psychology, mainly at the University of Leeds. He died in Thirsk in 2000 and left his brain to the University of Adelaide.