爱丽丝·克拉里
正确地看待世界本身就是一种道德成就，而动物的生命带有意义，这是一种超然的、只讲数字计算的伦理学所看不到的。
定位
新学院大学的维特根斯坦式道德哲学家：正确地看待世界本身就是道德工作，动物处在“伦理之内”——而有效利他主义的数字计算忽略了结构性的不公正。
核心思想
- 道德感知与“更宽的”客观性
- 处在伦理之内的动物
- 对有效利他主义的批判
影响
受影响于 4
路德维希·维特根斯坦
受其影响
Crary co-edited The New Wittgenstein (2000) and drew on Wittgenstein to argue that moral thought pervades our concepts, not only explicit judgements (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary and R. Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein (2000); A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007)
依据: AI 草稿
路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951
西奥多·W. 阿多诺
受其影响
Crary joined Wittgenstein’s later thought with Frankfurt School critical theory, defending a ‘wide’ conception of rationality on which social critique can be objective (‘Wittgenstein Goes to Frankfurt’, 2018). A. Crary, “Wittgenstein Goes to Frankfurt (and Finds Something Useful to Say)”, Nordic Wittgenstein Review 7 (2018); Inside Ethics (2016)
依据: AI 草稿
西奥多·W. 阿多诺 › 1903–1969
艾丽丝·默多克
受其影响
Crary followed Murdoch in holding that moral work lies in learning to see situations justly, so that the world, rightly perceived, has moral features (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007); I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (1970)
依据: AI 草稿
艾丽丝·默多克 › 1919–1999
希拉里·普特南
受其影响
Crary, whose Harvard undergraduate thesis Putnam supervised, shared his rejection of the fact–value dichotomy, arguing that moral concepts reveal real features of the world (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007); H. Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (2002)
依据: AI 草稿
希拉里·普特南 › 1926–2016
批评
批评了 1
彼得·辛格
批评了
Crary objected that Singer ranks beings by individual capacities, a ‘moral individualism’ that does justice neither to animals nor to people with severe cognitive disabilities (Inside Ethics, 2016). A. Crary, Inside Ethics: On the Demands of Moral Thought (2016)
依据: AI 草稿
彼得·辛格 › 1946年生
作品
动物与人类都处于“伦理之内”：它们的道德地位显现在对其生命的一种本身已具道德性的理解之中，而非一张中立的能力清单里。
立场
Crary rejects the widespread view that moral thinking consists in applying principles to morally neutral facts. Following Wittgenstein, Iris Murdoch and Cora Diamond, she argues in “Beyond Moral Judgment” and “Inside Ethics” that the world, rightly perceived, already contains morally significant features: learning to see a situation justly, with the right concepts and sensibilities, is itself moral work, and emotions can be ways of knowing. Applied to animals, this means that what animals are and what we owe them cannot be read off neutral lists of capacities. Animals are “inside ethics” – beings whose lives have a meaning that an attentive observer can perceive – and the same holds for human beings with severe cognitive disabilities, whom capacity-based arguments tend to degrade. “Animal Crisis”, written with Lori Gruen, links the treatment of animals with racism, colonialism and environmental destruction. She is also one of the most prominent critics of effective altruism: in essays and in a volume co-edited with Carol J. Adams and Gruen she argues that its quantifying approach overlooks structural injustice and the knowledge of affected communities, and that longtermism diverts attention from present harms.
生平与背景
Alice Crary (born 1967) studied philosophy at Harvard, where Hilary Putnam supervised her undergraduate thesis on Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell was among her teachers, and took her doctorate at the University of Pittsburgh in 1999 under John McDowell. She has taught at the New School for Social Research in New York since 2000, chaired its philosophy department and is now Walter A. Eberstadt University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy; in 2018–19 she held a professorship at Regent’s Park College, Oxford. Her work connects Wittgensteinian moral philosophy with feminism, animal ethics, disability studies and critical theory.
其他主要作品
- The New Wittgenstein (ed. with Rupert Read, 2000)
- Beyond Moral Judgment (2007)
- Animal Crisis (with Lori Gruen, 2022)
- The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does (ed. with Carol J. Adams and Lori Gruen, 2023)
出现在
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