迈克尔·达米特

Agora

迈克尔·达米特

1925–2011

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

理解一个陈述就是知道什么算作表明它为真，因此我们不应当假定每个陈述都非真即假，而不管我们是否有可能查明。

定位

分析哲学 · 北欧 · 语言, 逻辑学, 形而上学

牛津的语言哲学家和弗雷格研究者：实在论与反实在论之争是关于真理的争论——一个陈述是否可以在我们能够认出它为真的能力之外为真。他还在英国参与反对种族主义的运动。

核心思想

反实在论
意义与使用／显示
直觉主义逻辑
对弗雷格的诠释

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影响

受影响于 2

戈特洛布·弗雷格

受其影响
Dummett read Frege as the founder of analytic philosophy, whose theory of sense makes the theory of meaning the foundation of philosophy (Frege: Philosophy of Language, 1973). M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (1973); Origins of Analytical Philosophy (1993); SEP “Gottlob Frege”
依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO
戈特洛布·弗雷格 › 1848–1925
路德维希·维特根斯坦

受其影响
Dummett turned Wittgenstein’s idea that meaning is use into the demand that understanding be manifest in use, the basis of his anti-realism (1976; Truth and Other Enigmas, 1978). M. Dummett, “What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II)” (1976), in The Seas of Language (1993); Truth and Other Enigmas (1978); “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); SEP “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics”
依据: AI 草稿
路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951

批评

批评了 1

唐纳德·戴维森

批评了
Dummett objected that Davidson’s truth-conditional theory is merely ‘modest’: it does not explain what knowledge of meaning consists in (‘What is a Theory of Meaning?’, 1975). M. Dummett, “What is a Theory of Meaning?”, in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language (1975); “What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)” (1976)
依据: AI 草稿
唐纳德·戴维森 › 1917–2003

作品

1959真理
一个陈述的意义不能由可能超出任何可能认识的真值条件来给出——这是反实在论的起点。
1973弗雷格：语言哲学
弗雷格被解读为分析哲学的奠基者：意义理论是全部哲学的基础。

立场

Dummett read Frege as the founder of analytic philosophy, whose central lesson is that the theory of meaning is the foundation of philosophy; his Frege: Philosophy of Language (1973) made this reading influential. In “Truth” (1959) and later papers he argued that many old metaphysical disputes – about the past, about other minds, about mathematical objects – are really disputes about meaning. The realist holds that every statement is determinately true or false, whether or not we could ever know which; the anti-realist ties meaning to the conditions under which we could recognise a statement as true. Following Wittgenstein’s idea that meaning is use, Dummett held that knowledge of meaning must be manifested in how speakers use sentences, and no one can manifest a grasp of truth conditions that transcend all possible recognition. If this is right, the law of excluded middle cannot be assumed everywhere, and intuitionistic logic, which he studied in Elements of Intuitionism (1977), becomes the logic of an anti-realist. He criticised Davidson’s truth-conditional theory of meaning on these grounds. His books on immigration and on voting theory applied the same insistence on clear argument to politics.

生平与背景

Michael Dummett was born in London in 1925 and educated at Winchester College. He served in the army from 1943 to 1947, in the Royal Artillery and then in the Intelligence Corps in India and Malaya. In 1944 he became a Roman Catholic. He studied philosophy, politics and economics at Christ Church, Oxford, and in 1950 was elected a fellow of All Souls College. From the mid-1960s he and his wife Ann worked against racism and for the rights of immigrants in Britain, and he set his philosophy aside for some years for this work. From 1979 to 1992 he was Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford. He also wrote on voting systems and on the history of tarot cards. He was knighted in 1999 for his contributions to philosophy and to the cause of racial justice and died in Oxford in 2011.