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G. E. M. 安斯康姆

1919–2001

初步了解有意简化——人物介绍讲得更多

现代伦理学谈论义务，却没有立法者；我们应当回到品格和德性，并追问人们行动时所意图的是什么。

定位

分析哲学 · 北欧 · 伦理学, 心灵与意识

《现代道德哲学》（1958年）使德性伦理学复兴，并创造了“后果主义”一词。

核心思想

  • 意图
  • 德性伦理学的复兴
  • 后果主义（该术语）

老师: 路德维希·维特根斯坦

学生: 查尔斯·泰勒

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影响

受影响于 3

  • 亚里士多德

    受其影响 ✓

    Anscombe took Aristotle’s practical syllogism as a model of intentional action (Intention, 1957) and urged that ethics start from psychology and the virtues (‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, 1958). G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (1957); “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33 (1958); SEP “Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata

    亚里士多德 › 公元前384—前322年

  • 托马斯·阿奎那

    受其影响 ✓

    Anscombe adopted Aquinas’s account of practical knowledge as ‘the cause of what it understands’ (Intention, 1957) and defended his principle of double effect (‘War and Murder’, 1961). G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (1957); “War and Murder”, in W. Stein (ed.), Nuclear Weapons: A Catholic Response (1961); SEP “Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe”; SEP “Doctrine of Double Effect”

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata

    托马斯·阿奎那 › 约1225–1274年

  • 路德维希·维特根斯坦 师从

    师从 ✓

    Anscombe moved to Newnham College, Cambridge, in 1942 as a research student and attended Wittgenstein’s lectures, which she said freed her from phenomenalism; she became one of his closest students, translated the Philosophical Investigations (1953) and was one of his literary executors. SEP “Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe”; R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (1990)

    依据: 亦见于 Wikidata · Wikidata

    路德维希·维特根斯坦 › 1889–1951

影响了 4

  • 格奥尔格·亨里克·冯·赖特

    影响了

    Von Wright developed Anscombe’s practical syllogism from Intention (1957) into a teleological model of understanding action, set against causal explanation (Explanation and Understanding, 1971). G. H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (1971); G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (1957)

    依据: AI 草稿

    格奥尔格·亨里克·冯·赖特 › 1916–2003

  • 菲利帕·富特

    影响了

    Foot took up Anscombe’s call for an ethics of the virtues and her ‘Aristotelian necessities’, grounding moral evaluation in facts about human life (Natural Goodness, 2001). P. Foot, Natural Goodness (2001); G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33 (1958); “On Promising and Its Justice” (1969); SEP “Philippa Foot”

    依据: 亦见于 InPhO · InPhO

    菲利帕·富特 › 1920–2010

  • 阿拉斯戴尔·麦金泰尔

    影响了

    MacIntyre took up Anscombe’s thesis that the moral ‘ought’ survives from a lost law conception of ethics in diagnosing modern moral discourse (After Virtue, 1981). A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981); G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33 (1958); SEP “Virtue Ethics”

    依据: AI 草稿

    阿拉斯戴尔·麦金泰尔 › 1929–2025

  • 查尔斯·泰勒 教过

    教过

    Taylor’s biography at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna names Anscombe, with Isaiah Berlin, as supervisor of his Oxford DPhil (1961), the basis of The Explanation of Behaviour (1964); other accounts name Berlin alone, so her formal role is uncertain. IWM Vienna, “Charles Taylor – Short Biography”; R. Abbey, Charles Taylor (2000)

    依据: AI 草稿

    查尔斯·泰勒 › 1931年生

批评

受批评于 1

  • 唐纳德·戴维森

    受其批评

    Davidson rejected the view, associated with Anscombe’s Intention (1957), that reasons are not causes: rationalisation is a species of causal explanation (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, 1963). D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963), 685–700; G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (1957)

    依据: AI 草稿

    唐纳德·戴维森 › 1917–2003

批评了 3

  • 伊曼努尔·康德

    批评了

    Anscombe called Kant’s idea of legislating for oneself absurd and objected that universalisability is useless without a rule on relevant descriptions of an act (‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, 1958). G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33 (1958), 1–19

    依据: AI 草稿

    伊曼努尔·康德 › 1724–1804

  • 约翰·斯图尔特·密尔

    批评了

    Anscombe held that Mill, like Kant, ignores the need to stipulate which description of an act is relevant, so his principle lacks content (‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, 1958). G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33 (1958), 1–19

    依据: AI 草稿

    约翰·斯图尔特·密尔 › 1806–1873

  • 亨利·西季威克

    批评了

    Anscombe faulted Sidgwick for denying any moral difference between intended and foreseen consequences, the step that opened the way to what she named ‘consequentialism’ (‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, 1958). G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy 33 (1958), 1–19; H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1874)

    依据: AI 草稿

    亨利·西季威克 › 1838–1900

作品

  • 1957意向

    有意图地行动意味着什么？在某一描述之下。

  • 1958现代道德哲学

    没有立法者，就没有道德上的“应当”——回到亚里士多德。

立场

Anscombe’s short book Intention founded modern action theory: an action is intentional “under a description,” and the question “Why?” – answered with a reason – reveals it. In her essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” she argued that the moral “ought” of duty-based ethics is a relic of a divine law conception that modern philosophers no longer believe in. Without a lawgiver, she suggested, moral philosophy should start again with psychology and the virtues, as in Aristotle. In the same essay she coined the term “consequentialism” for a view she rejected – including the idea that any act might be justified by its good outcomes. Her essay sparked the revival of virtue ethics; Foot and MacIntyre built on it.

生平与背景

Born in Limerick in 1919, Anscombe studied at Oxford, converted to Catholicism and went to Cambridge, where she became one of Wittgenstein’s closest students. She translated the Philosophical Investigations and was one of his literary executors. After many years at Oxford she held Wittgenstein’s former chair in Cambridge from 1970 to 1986. She was married to the philosopher Peter Geach.

其他主要作品

  • Intention (1957)
  • Modern Moral Philosophy (1958)
  • An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1959)
  • The First Person (1975)

来源: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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