Donald Davidson
Racje są przyczynami naszych działań, a by rozumieć to, co mówią inni, musimy zakładać, że większość tego, w co wierzą, jest prawdziwa.
Umiejscowienie
Racje są przyczynami; każda interpretacja wymaga zasady życzliwości.
Kluczowe idee
- Monizm anomalny
- Radykalna interpretacja
- Zasada życzliwości
Nauczyciele: Willard Van Orman Quine
Wpływ
Pod wpływem 2
Rudolf Carnap
pod wpływem ✓
Davidson worked through Carnap’s semantics of extension and intension (Schilpp volume, 1963) before replacing meanings with a Tarskian theory of truth (‘Truth and Meaning’, 1967). D. Davidson, “The Method of Extension and Intension”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (1963); “Truth and Meaning”, Synthese 17 (1967); SEP “Donald Davidson”
Źródło: także w Wikidanych · Wikidata
Rudolf Carnap › 1891–1970
Alfred Tarski
pod wpływem ✓
Davidson turned Tarski’s Convention T around: a theory that yields a T-sentence for every sentence of a language serves as a theory of meaning (‘Truth and Meaning’, 1967). D. Davidson, “Truth and Meaning”, Synthese 17 (1967); A. Tarski, “Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych” (1933; German 1935); SEP “Donald Davidson”
Alfred Tarski › 1901–1983
Wpływ na 1
Richard Rorty
wpływ na
Rorty read Davidson’s rejection of the scheme–content distinction and his account of truth as support for pragmatism (‘Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth’, 1986), though Davidson declined the label. R. Rorty, “Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth” (1986), in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991); D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); SEP “Richard Rorty”
Źródło: także w InPhO · InPhO
Richard Rorty › 1931–2007
Krytyka
Krytyka ze strony 1
Michael Dummett
krytyka ze strony
Dummett objected that Davidson’s truth-conditional theory is merely ‘modest’: it does not explain what knowledge of meaning consists in (‘What is a Theory of Meaning?’, 1975). M. Dummett, “What is a Theory of Meaning?”, in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language (1975); “What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)” (1976)
Źródło: szkic AI
Michael Dummett › 1925–2011
Krytykuje 4
Gilbert Ryle
krytykuje
Davidson rejected Ryle’s view that motives explain as dispositions, not as causes: a reason explains only if the agent acted because of it (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, 1963). D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949), ch. 4
Źródło: szkic AI
Gilbert Ryle › 1900–1976
Willard Van Orman Quine nauczyciel(ka)
nauczyciel(ka) ✓
Davidson attended Quine’s courses as a Harvard student around 1939; his own dissertation (1949) was on Plato’s Philebus, and he later described Quine as the strongest influence on his philosophy. D. Davidson, “Intellectual Autobiography”, in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (1999)
Źródło: szkic AI
krytykuje
Davidson rejected the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, which Quine kept, as a ‘third dogma of empiricism’ (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974); “Meaning, Truth and Evidence”, in R. Barrett & R. Gibson (eds.), Perspectives on Quine (1990)
Źródło: szkic AI
Willard Van Orman Quine › 1908–2000
Elizabeth Anscombe
krytykuje
Davidson rejected the view, associated with Anscombe’s Intention (1957), that reasons are not causes: rationalisation is a species of causal explanation (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, 1963). D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963), 685–700; G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (1957)
Źródło: szkic AI
Elizabeth Anscombe › 1919–2001
Thomas Kuhn
krytykuje
Davidson rejected the incommensurable conceptual schemes he found in Kuhn: an untranslatable language could not be recognised as language (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 47 (1974), 5–20
Źródło: szkic AI
Thomas Kuhn › 1922–1996
Dzieła
Racje są przyczynami – przeciw wittgensteinistom.
Przeciw trzeciemu dogmatowi: schemat i treść.
Stanowisko
Davidson connected the philosophy of action, mind and language in a remarkably unified way. Against the Wittgensteinians he argued that the reasons for which we act are also causes of our actions. In “Mental Events” he defended anomalous monism: every mental event is a physical event, yet there are no strict laws linking the mental and the physical. In the theory of meaning he asked how a “radical interpreter” could understand a completely foreign language – only by assuming that the speaker mostly holds true beliefs and is rational (the principle of charity). From this he concluded that the idea of radically different, untranslatable conceptual schemes makes no sense. His essays shaped philosophy of language and mind from the 1960s onward.
Życie i kontekst
Davidson was born in Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1917 and studied literature, classics and philosophy at Harvard, where he wrote a dissertation on Plato’s Philebus. After serving in the navy during the Second World War he taught at Stanford, Princeton, Rockefeller University and Chicago, and finally at Berkeley. His influence spread mainly through sharply argued essays.
Dalsze główne dzieła
- Actions, Reasons, and Causes (1963)
- Truth and Meaning (1967)
- Mental Events (1970)
- On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme (1974)
- Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984)
Stan na listopad 2026 · Źródła · Ulepsz tę stronę · Jak powstaje Agora