行动、理由与原因

简介

Davidson’s essay appeared in the Journal of Philosophy in 1963. Many philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein, Ryle and Anscombe held that reasons cannot be causes, because a reason is logically connected with the action it explains, whereas cause and effect must be logically independent. Davidson replies that a primary reason – a belief together with a desire or other pro-attitude – explains an action only if the agent acted because of it, and this “because” is causal. The objection fails, he argues, because causal relations hold between events however they are described, and singular causal statements do not require that we know the laws behind them. The essay made causal theories of action the standard view.

联系

批评了

• 心的概念1949 · 吉尔伯特·赖尔
• 意向1957 · G. E. M. 安斯康姆

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