Gilbert Ryle
The mind is not a ghost hidden inside the body; to have a mind is to have abilities and tendencies to act intelligently, not a hidden inner stage.
Placement
Critique of the Cartesian “ghost in the machine”: talk of the mind is talk of abilities and dispositions to act intelligently, not of a hidden inner theatre.
Key ideas
- Ghost in the machine
- Category mistake
- Knowing-how vs. knowing-that
Students: A. J. Ayer, Kwasi Wiredu, Daniel Dennett
Influence
Influenced by 2
Edmund Husserl
influenced by
Ryle studied Husserl’s Logical Investigations in the 1920s, lectured on Brentano, Meinong and Husserl, and read phenomenology as a form of conceptual analysis (‘Phenomenology’, 1932). G. Ryle, “Phenomenology”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 11 (1932); “Autobiographical”, in O. P. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds.), Ryle (1970); SEP “Gilbert Ryle”
Evidence: AI draft
Edmund Husserl › 1859–1938
Ludwig Wittgenstein
influenced by
Ryle, who knew Wittgenstein from 1929, shared his view of philosophy as dissolving conceptual confusions and paid tribute to his method (‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’, 1951). G. Ryle, “Ludwig Wittgenstein”, Analysis 12 (1951); “Autobiographical”, in O. P. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds.), Ryle (1970); SEP “Gilbert Ryle”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951
Influenced 5
A. J. Ayer taught
taught ✓
Ryle was Ayer’s tutor at Christ Church, Oxford (1929–32), and suggested that he spend 1932–33 in Vienna with the Vienna Circle, the background to Language, Truth and Logic (1936). A. J. Ayer, Part of My Life (1977)
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
A. J. Ayer › 1910–1989
J. J. C. Smart
influenced
Smart, who studied with Ryle at Oxford, held a Rylean behaviourism at Adelaide until Place persuaded him that sensations are brain processes (‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, 1959). J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review 68 (1959); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
J. J. C. Smart › 1920–2012
Clifford Geertz
influenced
Geertz took Ryle’s distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ description – twitch, wink, parodied wink – as the model of ethnography as interpretation (‘Thick Description’, 1973). C. Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture”, in The Interpretation of Cultures (1973); G. Ryle, “The Thinking of Thoughts: What is ‘Le Penseur’ Doing?” (1968); SEP “Gilbert Ryle”
Evidence: AI draft
Clifford Geertz › 1926–2006
Kwasi Wiredu taught
taught
Wiredu came to University College, Oxford, in 1958 for the BPhil; his thesis, ‘Knowledge, Truth and Reason’, was supervised by Ryle, with Strawson as his college tutor. University College Oxford, obituary notice for K. Wiredu (2022)
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Kwasi Wiredu › 1931–2022
Daniel Dennett taught
taught
Dennett wrote his Oxford DPhil (1965) under Ryle; the revised thesis became Content and Consciousness (1969). D. C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (1969), preface; I’ve Been Thinking (2023)
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Daniel Dennett › 1942–2024
Criticism
Criticized by 4
Donald Davidson
criticised by
Davidson rejected Ryle’s view that motives explain as dispositions, not as causes: a reason explains only if the agent acted because of it (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, 1963). D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949), ch. 4
Evidence: AI draft
Donald Davidson › 1917–2003
U. T. Place influenced
influenced
Place, who studied at Oxford under Ryle’s influence, started from Ryle’s treatment of attention and noticing in ‘The Concept of Heed’ (1954), the preliminary to his identity thesis. U. T. Place, “The Concept of Heed”, British Journal of Psychology 45 (1954); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949); SEP “The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”
Evidence: AI draft
criticised by
Place accepted Ryle’s dispositional analysis of belief and intelligence but held that consciousness and sensations are inner brain processes (‘Is Consciousness a Brain Process?’, 1956). U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, British Journal of Psychology 47 (1956), 44–50
Evidence: AI draft
U. T. Place › 1924–2000
Jerry Fodor
criticised by
Against Ryle’s logical behaviourism Fodor argued that psychology must posit inner mental states that cause behaviour, not mere dispositions to behave (Psychological Explanation, 1968). J. Fodor, Psychological Explanation (1968); “The Mind–Body Problem”, Scientific American 244 (1981)
Evidence: AI draft
Jerry Fodor › 1935–2017
Jason Stanley
criticised by
With Williamson, Stanley argued against Ryle that knowing how is a species of knowing that, propositional knowledge of a way to act (‘Knowing How’, 2001). J. Stanley & T. Williamson, “Knowing How”, Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001), 411–444; J. Stanley, Know How (2011); G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949), ch. 2
Evidence: AI draft
Jason Stanley › b. 1969
Criticizes 1
René Descartes
criticised
Ryle called the Cartesian ‘official doctrine’ of mind and body the dogma of the ‘Ghost in the Machine’, a category mistake (The Concept of Mind, 1949). G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949), ch. 1
Evidence: AI draft
René Descartes › 1596–1650
Works
The dogma of the ghost in the machine.
Position
Ryle attacked what he mockingly called the official doctrine since Descartes: the idea that a person is a body plus an invisible inner theatre, a “ghost in the machine.” This picture, he argued, rests on a category mistake – like a visitor who has seen the colleges and libraries and then asks where the university is. To say someone is intelligent or vain is not to report hidden inner events but to describe dispositions: how they would act and react under various circumstances. Ryle also distinguished “knowing how” from “knowing that”: skill is not the application of memorised propositions. His work paved the way for behaviourist and later functionalist theories of mind.
Life & context
Ryle was born in Brighton in 1900 and spent virtually his entire academic life in Oxford, from 1945 as Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy. For more than two decades he edited the journal Mind. Together with Austin he made postwar Oxford the centre of ordinary language philosophy, and he trained many philosophers from Britain and abroad.
Further main works
- Dilemmas (1954)
Appears in
- Journey ‘Doubt and the Self’ · Stop 9 of 10
- Journey ‘The Riddle of Consciousness’ · Stop 4 of 10
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