AgoraAn open square of thought

Thomas Nagel

b. 1937

A first way ina deliberate simplification – the portrait says more

We can never know what it is like to be a bat; subjective experience cannot be captured by any objective description.

Placement

Analytic Philosophy · Southern Europe · Mind & Consciousness, Ethics

What is it like to be a bat? Subjective experience eludes objective description.

Key ideas

  • Subjective character of experience
  • The view from nowhere

Teachers: John Rawls

Open in the star map

Influence

Influenced by 2

  • Ludwig Wittgenstein

    influenced by

    Nagel met Wittgenstein’s later philosophy at Cornell through Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein’s student and friend, whose letter introduced him to Anscombe at Oxford in 1958. T. Nagel, review essay on Anscombe, Foot, Midgley and Murdoch, London Review of Books (2022); N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (1958)

    Evidence: AI draft

    Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951

  • John Rawls studied with

    studied with

    Nagel took his PhD at Harvard in 1963 under Rawls with a dissertation on altruism, the theme of his The Possibility of Altruism (1970). Mathematics Genealogy Project, entry T. Nagel (Harvard 1963)

    Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO

    John Rawls › 1921–2002

Influenced 1

  • David Chalmers

    influenced

    Chalmers defined consciousness with Nagel’s phrase that there is ‘something it is like’ to be a subject and made explaining it the ‘hard problem’ (1995). D. J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1995); The Conscious Mind (1996); T. Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review 83 (1974)

    Evidence: AI draft

    David Chalmers › b. 1966

Criticism

Criticized by 1

  • Daniel Dennett

    criticised by

    Dennett denied Nagel’s claim that subjective experience escapes objective science: much about what it is like to be a bat can be learned (Consciousness Explained, 1991). D. C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991), ch. 14; T. Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review 83 (1974); Nagel’s reply: “Is Consciousness an Illusion?”, New York Review of Books, 9 March 2017

    Evidence: AI draft

    Daniel Dennett › 1942–2024

Works

Position

Nagel’s central theme is the tension between the subjective and the objective standpoint. In “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” he argued that conscious experience has a subjective character – there is something it is like to be a bat orienting itself by echolocation – that no objective physical description can capture. Physicalism may be true, but we do not yet understand how it could be. In The View from Nowhere he extended this tension to ethics, freedom and the meaning of life: we can step back and see ourselves from outside, yet never fully leave our own perspective. In Mind and Cosmos he controversially questioned whether neo-Darwinian materialism can explain mind at all. His essays helped revive consciousness as a central problem.

Life & context

Nagel was born in Belgrade in 1937 and came to the United States as a child. He studied at Cornell, Oxford and Harvard, where he wrote his dissertation under John Rawls. After teaching at Berkeley and Princeton he moved to New York University in 1980. He is known for clear essays that make deep questions accessible to non-specialists.

Further main works

  • The Possibility of Altruism (1970)
  • Mortal Questions (1979)
  • Mind and Cosmos (2012)

Appears in

Sources: Wikipedia · Wikidata

As of November 2026 · Sources · Improve this page · How Agora is made

Open in the star map