Thomas S. Kuhn
Science does not grow steadily; it works within a shared framework until crisis forces a revolution that replaces it with a new one.
Placement
Science develops through paradigm shifts, not through the steady accumulation of knowledge.
Key ideas
- Paradigm
- Scientific revolution
- Incommensurability
Influence
Influenced by 4
Ludwig Wittgenstein
influenced by
Kuhn used Wittgenstein’s family resemblance to explain how paradigms can guide research without a shared set of rules (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); L. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen (publ. 1953); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
Evidence: AI draft
Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951
Michael Polanyi
influenced by ✓
Kuhn referred to Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge (1958) for tacit knowledge gained through practice rather than rules, on which paradigms as shared exemplars rely (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1958); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
Michael Polanyi › 1891–1976
Jean Piaget
influenced by ✓
Kuhn named Piaget’s studies of the successive worlds of the growing child among the sources of his idea of scientific revolutions (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, preface). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), preface; SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
Jean Piaget › 1896–1980
W. V. O. Quine
influenced by
Kuhn credited Quine with opening for him the puzzles of the analytic–synthetic distinction, a background to his holistic view of scientific concepts (Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962, preface). T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), preface; W. V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Philosophical Review 60 (1951); SEP “Thomas Kuhn”
Evidence: AI draft
W. V. O. Quine › 1908–2000
Influenced 3
Paul Feyerabend
influenced
At Berkeley Feyerabend commented on Kuhn’s draft of Structure (letters, 1960–61); both introduced ‘incommensurability’ in 1962, and Feyerabend later criticised Kuhn’s normal science (‘Consolations for the Specialist’, 1970). P. Hoyningen-Huene (ed.), “Two Letters of Paul Feyerabend to Thomas S. Kuhn on a Draft of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 26 (1995); P. K. Feyerabend, “Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism” (1962); “Consolations for the Specialist” (1970); SEP “Paul Feyerabend”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Paul Feyerabend › 1924–1994
Sandra Harding
influenced
Harding built on the post-Kuhnian view that scientific knowledge is shaped by its historical and social setting to ask about androcentric bias (The Science Question in Feminism, 1986). S. Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (1986); T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); SEP “Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science”
Evidence: AI draft
Sandra Harding › 1935–2025
Bruno Latour
influenced
Latour followed Kuhn’s turn from the logic of science to the practice of scientific communities, but studied laboratories ethnographically rather than paradigms (Laboratory Life, with S. Woolgar, 1979). B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life (1979); B. Latour, Science in Action (1987); T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)
Evidence: AI draft
Bruno Latour › 1947–2022
Criticism
Criticized by 2
Donald Davidson
criticised by
Davidson rejected the incommensurable conceptual schemes he found in Kuhn: an untranslatable language could not be recognised as language (‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, 1974). D. Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 47 (1974), 5–20
Evidence: AI draft
Donald Davidson › 1917–2003
Imre Lakatos
criticised by
Lakatos objected that Kuhn makes theory change a matter of ‘mob psychology’ and proposed rationally reconstructed research programmes instead (‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, 1970). I. Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970), 91–196
Evidence: AI draft
Imre Lakatos › 1922–1974
Criticizes 1
Karl Popper
criticised
Kuhn objected to Popper that normal science solves puzzles without testing its paradigm, which single anomalies do not overturn (‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, 1970). T. S. Kuhn, “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?”, in I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970); Popper’s reply “Normal Science and Its Dangers”, ibid.
Evidence: AI draft
Karl Popper › 1902–1994
Works
Normal science, anomaly, paradigm shift.
Position
Kuhn challenged the image of science as a steady accumulation of truths. Most of the time, he argued, scientists practise “normal science”: they solve puzzles within a paradigm – a shared framework of theories, methods and exemplary achievements that is not itself questioned. When anomalies pile up, a crisis can arise, and finally a scientific revolution in which a new paradigm replaces the old, as with Copernicus, Newton or Einstein. Since paradigms define different problems and standards, they are partly “incommensurable”: there is no neutral measure to compare them. Kuhn thus put history and sociology at the centre of philosophy of science; “paradigm shift” became a household word.
Life & context
Kuhn was born in Cincinnati in 1922 and took his doctorate in physics at Harvard. Teaching science to humanities students led him to the history of science, where he discovered how differently Aristotle had thought about motion. He taught at Harvard, Berkeley, Princeton and MIT; his book on scientific revolutions became one of the most cited academic works of the century.
Further main works
- The Copernican Revolution (1957)
- The Essential Tension (1977)
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