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Jerry Fodor

1935–2017

A first way ina deliberate simplification – the portrait says more

Thinking is computation in an inner language of symbols, and perception and language run on specialised, largely innate modules.

Placement

Analytic Philosophy · North America · Mind & Consciousness, Language, Science

Philosopher of cognitive science at MIT and Rutgers: thinking is computation over mental representations in a “language of thought”; perception runs on specialised modules.

Key ideas

  • Language of thought
  • Computational theory of mind
  • Modularity of mind
  • Concept nativism

Teachers: Hilary Putnam

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Influence

Influenced by 2

  • Alan Turing

    influenced by

    Fodor built his computational theory of mind on Turing’s model of computation: thinking is rule-governed manipulation of symbols in a language of thought (The Language of Thought, 1975). J. A. Fodor, The Language of Thought (1975); The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way (2000); SEP “The Computational Theory of Mind”

    Evidence: AI draft

    Alan Turing › 1912–1954

  • Hilary Putnam studied with

    studied with

    Fodor took his PhD at Princeton in 1960 under Putnam with a dissertation in the philosophy of language, The Uses of ‘Use’. Mathematics Genealogy Project, entry J. A. Fodor (Princeton 1960)

    Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO

    Hilary Putnam › 1926–2016

Criticism

Criticized by 2

  • Daniel Dennett

    criticised by

    Dennett objected to Fodor’s language of thought that ascribing beliefs does not require explicitly stored sentences in the head (‘A Cure for the Common Code?’, 1977). D. C. Dennett, “A Cure for the Common Code?”, Mind 86 (1977), repr. in Brainstorms (1978); The Intentional Stance (1987)

    Evidence: AI draft

    Daniel Dennett › 1942–2024

  • Andy Clark

    criticised by

    Clark defended connectionist models against Fodor and Pylyshyn’s claim that only a classical language of thought can explain the systematicity of cognition (Microcognition, 1989). A. Clark, Microcognition (1989); Associative Engines (1993); J. Fodor & Z. Pylyshyn, “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture”, Cognition 28 (1988)

    Evidence: AI draft

    Andy Clark › b. 1957

Criticizes 3

  • Charles Darwin

    criticised

    With Piattelli-Palmarini, Fodor argued that natural selection cannot distinguish traits selected for from coextensive ‘free riders’ and so does not explain adaptation (What Darwin Got Wrong, 2010). J. Fodor & M. Piattelli-Palmarini, What Darwin Got Wrong (2010), part II

    Evidence: AI draft

    Charles Darwin › 1809–1882

  • Ludwig Wittgenstein

    criticised

    With Chihara, Fodor attacked Wittgensteinian criteria for mental concepts (1965) and later argued that learning a language presupposes an innate language of thought (The Language of Thought, 1975). C. Chihara & J. Fodor, “Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein”, American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965); J. Fodor, The Language of Thought (1975), ch. 2

    Evidence: AI draft

    Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951

  • Gilbert Ryle

    criticised

    Against Ryle’s logical behaviourism Fodor argued that psychology must posit inner mental states that cause behaviour, not mere dispositions to behave (Psychological Explanation, 1968). J. Fodor, Psychological Explanation (1968); “The Mind–Body Problem”, Scientific American 244 (1981)

    Evidence: AI draft

    Gilbert Ryle › 1900–1976

Works

  • 1975The Language of Thought

    Cognitive psychology presupposes an internal system of representation with its own syntax – a “mentalese” in which thinking is computation.

  • 1983The Modularity of Mind

    Perception and language are handled by fast, encapsulated input modules; central thinking, by contrast, is holistic and hard to explain.

Position

Fodor was the leading defender of the computational theory of mind. Against behaviourism, in Psychological Explanation (1968), and against Wittgensteinian views of mental concepts, in a 1965 paper with Charles Chihara, he argued that psychology must postulate inner mental states that cause behaviour. The Language of Thought (1975) claimed that these states are representations in an inner language with its own syntax and semantics – “mentalese” – and that thinking is the computation of such symbols. Only this, he argued, explains why thought is productive and systematic: whoever can think that John loves Mary can also think that Mary loves John. With Zenon Pylyshyn he used this argument in 1988 against connectionist models of the mind. The Modularity of Mind (1983) distinguished fast, encapsulated input systems for perception and language from central processes such as belief fixation, which are holistic and, he thought, beyond the reach of current cognitive science. He also held that most lexical concepts are innate and criticised semantic holism. His late book What Darwin Got Wrong (2010, with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini) argued that natural selection cannot explain why particular traits were selected; most biologists rejected it.

Life & context

Jerry Fodor was born in New York City in 1935. He studied at Columbia University and took his doctorate at Princeton in 1960 under Hilary Putnam. From 1959 to 1986 he taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he worked closely with linguists and psychologists in the circle around Noam Chomsky. After two years at the City University of New York he moved in 1988 to Rutgers University, where he remained until his retirement in 2016. He wrote many essays and reviews for the London Review of Books. He died in New York in 2017.

Further main works

  • Psychological Explanation (1968)
  • Psychosemantics (1987)
  • Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (1998)
  • The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way (2000)
  • What Darwin Got Wrong (with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010)

Sources: Wikipedia · Wikidata

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