Alice Crary
Seeing the world rightly is already a moral achievement, and the lives of animals carry meaning that a detached, number-crunching ethics cannot see.
Placement
Wittgensteinian moral philosopher at the New School: seeing the world rightly is already moral work, animals are “inside ethics” – and effective altruism’s number-crunching misses structural injustice.
Key ideas
- Moral perception and “wider” objectivity
- Animals inside ethics
- Critique of effective altruism
Influence
Influenced by 4
Ludwig Wittgenstein
influenced by
Crary co-edited The New Wittgenstein (2000) and drew on Wittgenstein to argue that moral thought pervades our concepts, not only explicit judgements (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary and R. Read (eds.), The New Wittgenstein (2000); A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007)
Evidence: AI draft
Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951
Theodor W. Adorno
influenced by
Crary joined Wittgenstein’s later thought with Frankfurt School critical theory, defending a ‘wide’ conception of rationality on which social critique can be objective (‘Wittgenstein Goes to Frankfurt’, 2018). A. Crary, “Wittgenstein Goes to Frankfurt (and Finds Something Useful to Say)”, Nordic Wittgenstein Review 7 (2018); Inside Ethics (2016)
Evidence: AI draft
Theodor W. Adorno › 1903–1969
Iris Murdoch
influenced by
Crary followed Murdoch in holding that moral work lies in learning to see situations justly, so that the world, rightly perceived, has moral features (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007); I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (1970)
Evidence: AI draft
Iris Murdoch › 1919–1999
Hilary Putnam
influenced by
Crary, whose Harvard undergraduate thesis Putnam supervised, shared his rejection of the fact–value dichotomy, arguing that moral concepts reveal real features of the world (Beyond Moral Judgment, 2007). A. Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment (2007); H. Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (2002)
Evidence: AI draft
Hilary Putnam › 1926–2016
Criticism
Criticizes 1
Peter Singer
criticised
Crary objected that Singer ranks beings by individual capacities, a ‘moral individualism’ that does justice neither to animals nor to people with severe cognitive disabilities (Inside Ethics, 2016). A. Crary, Inside Ethics: On the Demands of Moral Thought (2016)
Evidence: AI draft
Peter Singer › b. 1946
Works
- 2016Inside Ethics
Animals and human beings are “inside ethics”: their moral standing shows itself in an understanding of their lives that is already moral, not in a neutral list of capacities.
Position
Crary rejects the widespread view that moral thinking consists in applying principles to morally neutral facts. Following Wittgenstein, Iris Murdoch and Cora Diamond, she argues in “Beyond Moral Judgment” and “Inside Ethics” that the world, rightly perceived, already contains morally significant features: learning to see a situation justly, with the right concepts and sensibilities, is itself moral work, and emotions can be ways of knowing. Applied to animals, this means that what animals are and what we owe them cannot be read off neutral lists of capacities. Animals are “inside ethics” – beings whose lives have a meaning that an attentive observer can perceive – and the same holds for human beings with severe cognitive disabilities, whom capacity-based arguments tend to degrade. “Animal Crisis”, written with Lori Gruen, links the treatment of animals with racism, colonialism and environmental destruction. She is also one of the most prominent critics of effective altruism: in essays and in a volume co-edited with Carol J. Adams and Gruen she argues that its quantifying approach overlooks structural injustice and the knowledge of affected communities, and that longtermism diverts attention from present harms.
Life & context
Alice Crary (born 1967) studied philosophy at Harvard, where Hilary Putnam supervised her undergraduate thesis on Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell was among her teachers, and took her doctorate at the University of Pittsburgh in 1999 under John McDowell. She has taught at the New School for Social Research in New York since 2000, chaired its philosophy department and is now Walter A. Eberstadt University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy; in 2018–19 she held a professorship at Regent’s Park College, Oxford. Her work connects Wittgensteinian moral philosophy with feminism, animal ethics, disability studies and critical theory.
Further main works
- The New Wittgenstein (ed. with Rupert Read, 2000)
- Beyond Moral Judgment (2007)
- Animal Crisis (with Lori Gruen, 2022)
- The Good It Promises, the Harm It Does (ed. with Carol J. Adams and Lori Gruen, 2023)
Appears in
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