G. E. Moore
Good cannot be defined by anything else, and common-sense beliefs like having two hands are more certain than any philosophy denying them.
Placement
A defense of common sense and the naturalistic fallacy: “good” is indefinable.
Key ideas
- Naturalistic fallacy
- Common sense
- Moore's paradox
Influence
Influenced by 1
Henry Sidgwick
influenced by
Moore credited Sidgwick, his Cambridge teacher, with seeing that the basic ethical notion is indefinable, and argued at length with the Methods of Ethics in Principia Ethica (1903). G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903); H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1874); SEP “Henry Sidgwick”; SEP “Moore’s Moral Philosophy”
Evidence: AI draft
Henry Sidgwick › 1838–1900
Influenced 4
Bertrand Russell
influenced ✓
Russell followed Moore’s revolt against idealism, adopting his realism of propositions and concepts (‘The Nature of Judgment’, 1899), as the preface to The Principles of Mathematics (1903) acknowledges. G. E. Moore, “The Nature of Judgment”, Mind 8 (1899); B. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics (1903), preface; My Philosophical Development (1959); SEP “Bertrand Russell”
Bertrand Russell › 1872–1970
Susan Stebbing
influenced
Stebbing developed the Cambridge analysis practised by Moore into ‘directional analysis’ aimed at basic facts (1932); recent research qualifies the older view of her as Moore’s follower. L. S. Stebbing, “The Method of Analysis in Metaphysics”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 33 (1932–33); SEP “Susan Stebbing”
Evidence: AI draft
Susan Stebbing › 1885–1943
Ludwig Wittgenstein
influenced
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (written 1949–51; publ. 1969) starts from Moore’s defence of common sense (1925, 1939) and recasts his truisms as hinges of our practices. L. Wittgenstein, Über Gewißheit / On Certainty (written 1949–51; publ. 1969); G. E. Moore, “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925); “Proof of an External World” (1939); SEP “Ludwig Wittgenstein”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
Ludwig Wittgenstein › 1889–1951
J. L. Austin
influenced
Austin made Moore’s reading of ‘could have done otherwise’ as ‘could, if I had chosen’ (Ethics, 1912) the starting point of ‘Ifs and Cans’ (1956). J. L. Austin, “Ifs and Cans”, Proceedings of the British Academy 42 (1956); G. E. Moore, Ethics (1912); SEP “John Langshaw Austin”
Evidence: also in InPhO · InPhO
J. L. Austin › 1911–1960
Criticism
Criticizes 3
George Berkeley
criticised
In ‘The Refutation of Idealism’ (1903) Moore attacked the principle esse est percipi, distinguishing the act of awareness from its object, which need not exist only when perceived. G. E. Moore, “The Refutation of Idealism”, Mind 12 (1903), 433–453; G. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), § 3
Evidence: AI draft
George Berkeley › 1685–1753
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
criticised
Moore broke with British Hegelianism and rejected the Hegelian doctrine that parts of an organic whole have no meaning apart from it (Principia Ethica, 1903, § 22). G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903), §§ 18–22; “The Refutation of Idealism” (1903)
Evidence: AI draft
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel › 1770–1831
John Stuart Mill
criticised
Moore charged Mill with the naturalistic fallacy for inferring ‘desirable’ from ‘desired’, as if ‘desirable’ meant ‘able to be desired’ like ‘visible’ (Principia Ethica, 1903, §§ 39–40). G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903), ch. III, §§ 39–40; J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (1861), ch. 4
Evidence: AI draft
John Stuart Mill › 1806–1873
Works
- 1903Principia Ethica
The naturalistic fallacy: “good” is indefinable.
Against “esse est percipi”.
A list of truisms – “there exists at present a living human body, which is my body” – that I know with certainty, whatever philosophers say.
Position
With Russell, Moore led the revolt against the British idealism that dominated philosophy around 1900. In “The Refutation of Idealism” he insisted that the object of an experience is distinct from the act of experiencing it. In ethics he argued that “good” is a simple, indefinable property; any attempt to define it in natural terms such as pleasure commits the “naturalistic fallacy”. Against sceptics he defended common sense: we know with certainty that we have hands and that the earth has existed for many years, more certainly than any philosophical premise that would deny it. His method of careful conceptual analysis set the style of analytic philosophy.
Life & context
Moore studied at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he became a friend of Russell and a member of the Apostles society. His ethics strongly influenced the Bloomsbury circle around Keynes and Virginia Woolf. He taught at Cambridge for most of his life, held the professorship of philosophy there from 1925 to 1939 and edited the journal Mind for many years.
Further main works
- Proof of an External World (1939)
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