تشارلز ساندرز برس
معنى الفكرة يكمن في آثارها العملية، وتنمو المعرفة بجماعة من الباحثين يختبرون أنفسهم ويصححونها.
التموضع
مؤسس البراغماتية والسيميائية: معنى المفهوم يكمن في نتائجه العملية.
الأفكار الرئيسة
- القاعدة البراغماتية
- السيميائية
- الاستدلال الاستكشافي (Abduction)
- قابلية الخطأ
التأثير
تأثّر بـ 4
أرسطو
تأثّر بـ
Peirce took his term ‘abduction’ for inference to an explanatory hypothesis from Aristotle’s apagoge in the Prior Analytics, setting it beside deduction and induction. Aristotle, Prior Analytics; SEP “Abduction”; SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
أرسطو › 384–322 ق.م
دانز سكوطس
تأثّر بـ
Peirce called himself a Scotistic realist, defending against nominalism the reality of generals, and adapted Scotus’s haecceity, ‘thisness’, for his category of Secondness. J. F. Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism (1963); C. S. Peirce, review of Fraser’s Berkeley (1871); SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
دانز سكوطس › نحو 1266–1308
جورج بيركلي
تأثّر بـ ✓
Peirce reviewed Fraser’s edition of Berkeley’s Works (1871) and later, writing to James (1903), gave Berkeley more right than anyone to be called the introducer of pragmatism. C. S. Peirce, review of A. C. Fraser (ed.), The Works of George Berkeley, North American Review (1871); letter to W. James (1903); L. Friedman, “Pragmatism: The Unformulated Method of Bishop Berkeley”, Journal of the History of Philosophy (2003)
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في Wikidata · Wikidata
جورج بيركلي › 1685–1753
إيمانويل كانط
تأثّر بـ
Peirce studied the Critique of Pure Reason for years in his youth and took the name ‘pragmatism’ from Kant’s distinction between pragmatisch and praktisch (‘What Pragmatism Is’, 1905). C. S. Peirce, “What Pragmatism Is”, The Monist (1905); SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
إيمانويل كانط › 1724–1804
أثّر في 5
ويليام جيمس
أثّر في
In ‘Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results’ (1898) James credited Peirce’s ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ (1878) with the principle of pragmatism and made it widely known. W. James, “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results” (1898); C. S. Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878); SEP “Pragmatism”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
ويليام جيمس › 1842–1910
جون ديوي
أثّر في
Dewey heard Peirce at Johns Hopkins and built Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) on Peirce’s account of inquiry as the passage from doubt to settled belief. J. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938); C. S. Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief” (1877); SEP “John Dewey”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
جون ديوي › 1859–1952
ولفريد سيلارز
أثّر في
Sellars took over Peirce’s idea of truth as the ideal end of inquiry, calling the final conceptual framework of science ‘Peirceish’ (Science and Metaphysics, 1968). W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (1968); SEP “Wilfrid Sellars”; SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في InPhO · InPhO
ولفريد سيلارز › 1912–1989
يورغن هابرماس
أثّر في
In Knowledge and Human Interests (1968) Habermas read Peirce’s logic of inquiry as uncovering the technical interest that guides the empirical sciences. J. Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse (1968); SEP “Jürgen Habermas”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
يورغن هابرماس › 1929–2026
أومبرتو إكو
أثّر في ✓
Eco took Peirce’s interpretant and unlimited semiosis, every sign interpreted by further signs, as the basis of his general semiotics (Trattato di semiotica generale, 1975). U. Eco, Trattato di semiotica generale (1975); Lector in fabula (1979); SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
التوثيق: مسجّل أيضًا في Wikidata · Wikidata
أومبرتو إكو › 1932–2016
النقد
ينتقد 1
رينيه ديكارت
انتقد
Peirce rejected Cartesian doubt – ‘let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts’ (‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’, 1868). C. S. Peirce, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”, Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2 (1868); SEP “Charles Sanders Peirce”
التوثيق: مسودة بالذكاء الاصطناعي
رينيه ديكارت › 1596–1650
الأعمال
لا نستطيع أن نبدأ بشك تام – ضد الديكارتية.
القاعدة البراغماتية.
الموقف
Peirce is the founder of pragmatism, though he later renamed his version “pragmaticism” to distinguish it from James’. His pragmatic maxim says that the meaning of a concept lies in the practical effects we conceive its object to have. Inquiry begins not with Cartesian doubt but with real doubt, and aims to fix belief; truth is what a community of inquirers would ultimately agree on. All knowledge is fallible. Beyond induction and deduction he identified abduction, the inventive inference to the best hypothesis. He also founded modern semiotics, with his theory of signs as icon, index and symbol, and in logic devised a notation for quantifiers independently of Frege.
الحياة والسياق
The son of a Harvard mathematician, Peirce worked for three decades as a scientist for the US Coast Survey and taught logic only briefly at Johns Hopkins University. With William James and others he belonged to the “Metaphysical Club” in Cambridge. Difficult and unconventional, he never held a permanent professorship and died in poverty in Milford, Pennsylvania, leaving thousands of manuscript pages.
أعمال رئيسة أخرى
- The Fixation of Belief (1877)
- What Pragmatism Is (1905)
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