伦理学原理

简介

Moore’s first book appeared in 1903 from Cambridge University Press. Its first chapter contains what became known as the “open question argument”: for any natural property proposed as a definition of “good”, such as pleasure, it still makes sense to ask whether that property is good – so the definition fails. The following chapters criticise naturalistic, hedonistic and metaphysical ethics, Mill and Sidgwick among others. The final chapter, “The Ideal”, names personal affection and the enjoyment of beautiful objects as by far the greatest goods we know. This made the book a creed for the Bloomsbury group around Keynes and Virginia Woolf, while in academic ethics it set the terms of twentieth-century metaethics.

联系

承接了

• 伦理学方法1874 · 亨利·西季威克

批评了

• 功利主义1863 · 约翰·斯图尔特·密尔

G. E. 摩尔 的更多作品

• 1903驳唯心论
• 1925为常识辩护